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Abstract 
Corporations are among the most important political and economic actors 
today, but the lack of firm-level data has thus far prevented researchers from 
answering long-standing questions on corporations in politics. I draw on 
new data to examine the micro-foundations of important political economy 
theories, to shed light on individual preference formation and the role of 
institutions and policy uncertainty for firm’s international trade. The three 
papers which make up this dissertation answer the following three research 
questions: 
1.	 Do political preferences of employees align with those of their employ­
ers? 
2.	 Under what conditions do political preferences of employees align 
with those of their employers? 
3. How does policy uncertainty affect firm-level trade? 
In the first paper, I link big data on employee donations to their em­
ployer’s Political Action Committee (PAC) donations using natural language 
processing to automatically identify individual employers and occupations. 
I show that employee and company contributions are highly correlated, 
and that firm- and occupation-level factors are significantly associated with 
firm-employee alignment. Contrary to existing datasets, this data can be 
easily linked to external data on industries, firms, and occupations. In the 
second paper, I investigate whether sectors, firms, or occupational asset 
specificity matter more for employee’s political preferences. I find that firm 
and sectoral specificity are associated with higher firm-employee partisan 
alignment and that individuals donate more to firm-supported candidates, 
but no impact of occupations. The results have implications for research on 
coalition formation and preference formation. Work on uncertainty, insti­
tutions, and international trade overlooks the distributional consequences 
vii 
of uncertainty within sectors. In the last paper, I use Ukrainian firm-level 
data between 2003 and 2014 to show that a reduction in TPU has a positive 
and sizable effect on firms’ imports of intermediate and capital goods. Our 
results have implications for the study of trade and uncertainty. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Firms are among the most important political and economic actors today. 
Large corporations capture more and more economic activity. Since 1997, 
market concentration has increased in 3 out of 4 US industries (Grullon, 
Larkin and Michaely, 2018) and as a consequence, firms exert increasing 
market power. Since the 1980s, average markups increased from 21 to 
over 60 percent, a trend driven by few top firms reaping larger profits 
(De Loecker, Eckhout and Unger, 2018).1 Similarly, the top 1 percent of 
‘superstar’ firms alone account for over 80 percent of all US international 
trade (Bernard et al., 2018, p.34). At the same time, firms are pivotal players 
in politics. In the 2018 US electoral cycle, corporation donated over 194 
million USD to federal candidates, more than double as much as trade 
associations, and more than three times as much as labor unions. And in 
2017, public companies spent 1.48 billion USD on lobbying in Washington 
D.C., easily doubling the amounts spent on lobbying by industry-wide 
associations like the American Chamber of Commerce. 
1The increases in market power mostly driven by the top percentile of firms reaping 
higher profits (as opposed to incorporating higher costs), and stems from within-industry 
rather than from between industry changes (De Loecker, Eckhout and Unger, 2018)[pp.1-5]. 
Those stylized facts are not unique to the US, with changes in similar magnitude apparent 
in Europe, Asia, and Oceania (De Loecker and Eckhout, 2018). 
2 
These empirical trends stand in stark contrast a large share of Inter­
national (IPE) and Comparative Political Economy (CPE) research: while 
even recent work on preference formation relies on sector- and factor-based 
models (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014; Owen and Johnston, 2017; Walter, 2017), 
research on the role of international institutions for trade and uncertainty 
uses crude aggregate trade flows at the country-level or broad sectoral level 
(Hollyer and Rosendorff, 2012; Kucik, 2012; Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2008a). 
Moreover, while existing work routinely highlights the importance of firms 
in theory, authors are quick to ignore them in their empirical analyses. 
The lack of firm-level empirical work is even more surprising given that 
new theories highlight the importance of distributional consequences of 
globalization within industries (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004a; Melitz, 
2003b). Thus, while firms are of increasing importance empirically and 
theoretically, “[...] their economic and political activities have not been fully 
incorporated into the field of international political economy” (Kim and 
Osgood, 2019, p.17). 
In this dissertation, I pay close attention to the role of firms in Interna­
tional and Comparative Political Economy, providing answers to the guiding 
question: how do firms influence politics and how do firms react to political change? 
Overall, the papers of this dissertation provide answers to the following 
three research questions: 
1.	 Do political preferences of employees align with those of their employ­
ers? 
2.	 Under what conditions do political preferences of employees align 
with those of their employers? 
3. How does policy uncertainty affect firm-level trade? 
Understanding how corporations influence politics and respond to polit­
ical change requires “more granular theory, data collection, and empirical 
3 
methods” (Kim and Osgood, 2019, p.17). However, collecting firm-level 
data is inherently difficult. One the one hand, government-provided firm-
level datasets require strict anonymity of individual firms, often making 
matching firms to political variables of interest impossible. Openly available 
data, on the other hand, is often un-structured, very large, and lacks unique 
identifiers for key levels of observation. Therefore, a large share of this 
dissertation is dedicated to the generation of original micro-level data. In 
the first two papers, I draw on big data of individual and corporate politi­
cal donations to investigate how the workplace affects individual political 
preferences. Political Economy research shows that jobs and professions 
are crucial for the formation of political preferences, yet workplace or oc­
cupation are virtually absent from American Politics work on individual 
political donations. Therefore, in the first paper of this dissertation, Political 
Alignment between Firms and Employees: Evidence from a New Dataset, I con­
struct a novel measure of partisan alignment between firms and employees. 
I link big data on employee donations to their employer’s Political Action 
Committee (PAC) donations and construct a measure of partisan alignment 
between firms and employees. I accomplish this by using natural language 
processing to automatically identify individual employers and occupations. 
I show that employee and company contributions are highly correlated 
and that firm- and occupation-level factors are significantly associated with 
firm-employee alignment. Contrary to existing datasets, this data can be 
easily linked to external data on industries, firms, and occupations. Thus, 
the data enables scholars to better study the connections between corporate 
and employee donations and the impact of political change and economic 
shocks on individual contributions. 
4 
In the second paper Political Alignment between Firms and Employees: 
The Role of Asset Specificity, I use this newly created data linking firm and 
employee donations to answer the research question: when do political 
preferences of employees align with those of their employers? Comparative 
and International Political Economy scholars debate whether sectors, firms, 
or occupations matter more for preference formation, highlighting the 
importance of asset specificity. While some empirical work confirms the 
impact of sectoral and firm specificity, other research highlights occupational 
skill specificity. I investigate the impact of specificity on alignment using 
new data linking 1,691,790 campaign contributions by 85,109 employees 
to 874 corporate Political Action Committees between 2003 and 2016. I 
find that firm and sectoral specificity is associated with higher partisan 
alignment between firms and employees, but no evidence for the impact of 
occupational skill specificity. I also find that employees donate more to firm-
supported candidates, which is driven by candidates likely to yield political 
returns like incumbents as well as House and Senate candidates. The results 
have implications for research on coalition formation, individual preference 
formation, and highlight that there might be important differences between 
the underlying motivations of political actions and stated preferences. 
In the last paper, Policy Uncertainty and Trade in Intermediate and Capital 
Goods, co-authored with Oleksandr Shepotylo, I ask the question: how 
does policy uncertainty affect firm’s decision to source intermediate goods? 
Despite the central role of uncertainty in political economy theories of trade 
cooperation, few studies have measured the impact of uncertainty between 
alternative trade policies on firm’s expectations. Similarly, existing work 
focuses on the impact of uncertainty on firm’s arm’s length exports, notwith­
standing the importance of global value chains. In this paper, we employ a 
5 
new measure of trade policy uncertainty (TPU) by applying structural topic 
models to business-related news, and extend a heterogeneous firm model 
with policy uncertainty by introducing the decision to import intermediate 
inputs. Then, we empirically investigate the link between TPU and trade in 
intermediate goods using Ukrainian firm-level data between 2003 and 2014. 
We find that a reduction in TPU has a positive and sizable effect on firms’ 
imports of intermediate and capital goods. Our results have important 
implications for the study of uncertainty in international trade. 
The main contributions of my dissertation to the field of IPE are three­
fold. First, I generate novel micro-level data to shed light on the role of firms 
in politics. In the first paper, I produce a new dataset linking big data on 
firm and employee political donations in the US. This data uniquely allows 
for the comparison of firm and employee political preferences in terms of 
their political actions, rather than stated preferences. Moreover, contrary 
to existing datasets, this data contains widely-used identifiers for the firm, 
sector, and occupation. Thus, it enables researchers to merge the data 
with firm-, sector-, and occupation-level covariates of interest, and better 
investigate the impact of policy reforms and economic shocks on individual 
political behavior. Second, all papers in this dissertation use firm-level data 
to take a closer look at the micro-foundations underpinning established the­
ories in IPE and CPE. In the second paper, I tackle a long-standing question 
about the role of asset specificity for political alignment between firms and 
employees, comparing the impact of specificity at the firm-, sector-, and 
occupational level. I find that where people work seems to matter more for align­
ment than what they do, providing an important contribution to the ongoing 
debate on the economic sources of political preferences. In the last paper, I 
investigate the micro-foundations underlying research on the role of institu­
6 
tions, trade, and uncertainty using detailed firm-product-destination-level 
trade data. Existing work assumes that signing international agreements 
reduces firm’s uncertainty about future economic policies, and thus, boosts 
aggregate trade. I show that firms adjust their expectations dynamically 
during the negotiation phase of an agreement, and that a reduction in 
uncertainty affects firms unequally depending on the goods they trade as 
well as the design of the policy alternatives . Finally, this dissertation makes 
use of innovative quantitative methods to measure key concepts of interest 
for IPE and Political Economy more broadly. The first two papers make use 
of natural language processing tools to match individual donors to their 
firms and generate a measure of firm-employee political alignment. The last 
paper leverages structural topic models to measure the uncertainty between 
alternative trade policy options. The uncertainty measure varies intuitively 
along real-world political developments, and similar measures might be 
applied in other cases where firms face multiple, mutually exclusive policy 
options. Future work can also use the measure of alignment developed here 
to investigate important questions on the impact of alignment on corporate 
political activity and coalition formation. 
In the next chapter, I provide a broader overview of the two main lines 
of research that this dissertation speaks to. I discuss the main assumptions 
of existing work, how these are challenged by the growing importance of 
the firm, and how exactly each of the papers addresses these challenges by 
zooming in on the corporation. The chapters three, four, and five present 
the papers, which constitute the main body of this dissertation. The last 
chapter discusses implications of the main findings, and provides a broad 
outlook for the future study of firms in politics. 
Chapter 2 
The Importance of Firms in 
Political Economy 
Two of the most important lines of research in international political econ­
omy of trade are the work on preference formation and lobbying, and the 
research on the role of international institutions for trade cooperation (Mar­
tin, 2015; Milner, 1999). While both are at their core about the political and 
economic activity of firms, their analyses have traditionally concentrated 
on industries or the aggregate country-level. Notwithstanding their contri­
butions, this abstraction from the firm goes contrary to new theories and 
empirical evidence in both Political Economy and International Economics 
which highlights the vast differences in economic and political activity 
within industries. In the following sections, I will review the sector- and 
country-centered literature on both research strands. Then, I will discuss 
how focusing on more aggregate levels of analyses might mask substantial 
heterogeneity at the firm level, leading researchers to draw partially mis­
leading conclusions. Finally, I explain in detail how this dissertation fills 
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the gaps in the literature by explicitly incorporating the firm in theorizing, 
and leveraging new micro-level data. 
2.1 Preference Formation and Cleavages 
What are the fundamental economic sources of political preferences leading 
to cleavages between societal actors? Based on economic self-interest of indi­
viduals, many political economy scholars argue the workplace exerts strong 
influence on political preferences for individuals, as the prime source of 
individual’s livelihood.1 Based on canonical trade theory, individual’s sector 
of employment has been central to this line of research. Established mod­
els predict that political cleavages fall either along industry lines (Frieden, 
1991) or along factors of production (Rogowski, 1989), leading to narrow 
sector-based or broad class-based cleavages, respectively. Whether sectoral 
or factor-based coalitions form depends on the degree of mobility of factors 
of production or specificity of assets (Alt et al., 1999, 1996; Alt and Gilligan, 
1994; Hiscox, 2002b). 
Since then, scholars of IPE have made vast progress in providing empiri­
cal evidence supporting these early theories. Mayda and Rodrik (2005) and 
Ardanaz, Murillo and Pinto (2013) show that individual trade preferences 
are in line with their sectoral exposure to trade. Similarly, Margalit (2011) 
finds that citizen’s vote choices are responsive to sectoral trade-related lay­
offs. In addition, a plethora of studies also argues and tests that lobbying 
for free trade and protection depends on the degree of import competition 
1There are also many studies which cast doubt on the idea that where people work or 
what they do determines preferences (Guisinger, 2009; Rho and Tomz, 2017) or that cultural 
factors matter more for preference formation (Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit, 2014; 
Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Margalit, 2012). In this dissertation, I assume individuals and 
firms to be rational, self-interest maximizing actors. 
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of an industry, and hence, mostly plays out along sectoral lines (Gawande 
and Bandyopadhyay, 2000; Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Grossman and Help-
man, 1994; Irwin and Kroszner, 1999; Schattschneider, 1935; Trefler, 1993). 
While others, building on factor-based theories and new advances in labor 
economics (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003; Blinder, 2009; Blinder and 
Krueger, 2013) have been drawing attention to individual traits such as their 
skills (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006; Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Scheve 
and Slaughter, 2001) and occupational characteristics (Kitschelt and Rehm, 
2014; Owen and Johnston, 2017; Walter, 2017), most studies still implicitly or 
explicitly equate the sector of employment with the workplace. Thus, apart from 
some occupational characteristics, sectors are still treated as uniform.2 This 
goes contrary to the rhetoric in these studies: scholars routinely highlight 
the importance of firm-level differences within sectors, as in Walter (2017, 
pp. 3-5) or Owen and Johnston (2017, pp.668-670), but then resort to aggre­
gate supposed firm differences at the sectoral level. Similarly, Margalit’s 
landmark study on the impact of trade-related layoffs on US Presidential 
vote share (Margalit, 2011) draws on firm-level data but then aggregates at 
the county-level, and Margalit (2012) ignores firms or sectors altogether. In 
the same vein, the Varieties of Capitalism literature rightly distinguishes 
analytically between differences in sectoral or firm-level skill formation 
depending whether countries are classified as liberal or coordinated market 
economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001a), but then aggregates specificity of skills 
at the broad occupation (Iversen and Soskice, 2001) or country level (Iversen 
and Stephens, 2008).3 
2For a good review of the individual-level literature on preferences for economic openness 
see Kuo and Naoi (2015). 
3More recently, the idea that political preferences can be driven by sectoral exposure to 
globalization has gained renewed interest, as new studies which make use of fine-grained 
geographic data on industrial composition document large changes in party preferences 
and vote shares in Western democracies due to import competition from China or Eastern 
Europe (Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2016a; Calantone and Stanig, 2018; Che et al., 2016; 
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Rodrik (1995, p.1459) summarized well over 20 years ago that a model of 
individual preferences need to contain a description of where individuals 
derive their preferences from, and how these individual preferences are 
aggregated and channeled into politics. The sectoral view of preference 
formation and cleavages has some theoretical and empirical shortcomings 
with respect to both parts. 
First, with respect to preference aggregation, it is at odds with the more 
recent economics literature on heterogeneous firms which finds that firm 
productivity is unequally distributed within narrow economic sectors, with 
only a few firms exporting, importing, or investing abroad (Bernard et al., 
2007, 2012). Driven by the inability of standard trade models to explain the 
large amount of intra-industry trade between developed countries, firm-
level research finds that only a small minority of US firms actually exports 
(Bernard et al., 2007), and only 1 percent of US exporters is responsible for 81 
percent of exports. Similar patterns of concentration of international activity 
among few firms are visible across a whole range of European (Mayer and 
Ottaviano, 2008) and non-Western countries (Freund and Pierola, 2015). 
These differences across firms translate into within-industry distributional 
consequences of trade openness (Melitz, 2003b). Thus, it seems unrealistic 
to assume that all firms in the same sector share the same preferences or 
are all equally easy to mobilize politically.4 
Dippel, Gold and Heblich, 2015). The aggregation at the sector-level is less consequential in 
the work relying on geographic data, as there is only limited variation across firms within 
narrow and clearly-defined geographic units (i.e., there will not be many firms in the same 
industry, and many industries without any firms). 
4This seems particularly obvious in most of the work building on the familiar Grossman-
Helpman model on protection for sale as in Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay (2000), or Gawande, Krishna and Robbins (2006). Often, an entire sectors 
is assumed to be ‘mobilized’ on trade policy if any firm or sectoral association is politically 
active, as measured by the presence of a Political Action Committee (PAC). 
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In addition, recent IPE work shows that intra-industry variation in 
political activity is driving support for free trade in the US (Kim, 2017) and 
that narrow industrial sectors are internally divided over trade (Osgood, 
2017a). These findings are in line with stylized facts about lobbying and 
campaign finance which shows that firms are the most important political 
actors. In Figure 2.1 below, I show the growth of political donations in the US 
over time by types of donating groups between 1980 and 2018. The picture 
is striking: even though corporations always donate more than business 
associations, membership organizations, or labor unions, they have clearly 
outspent all of these other groups since 2003, as shown in Panel 2.1a. In 
2018, firms spent 194.5 million USD in political donations, 3.3 times as much 
as labor unions, 2.6 times as much as membership associations, and 2.1 as 
much as trade associations. In terms of the number of donations, Panel 2.1b 
paints a similar picture: with 113.6K single donations, firm PACs comprise 
more donations than labor unions, membership associations, and trade 
associations together (105.2K). Thus, firms are the most important provider 
of campaign finance to federal political candidates in the US, as organized 
entities. Yet firms have received far less attention than labor unions, for 
instance, proportional to their amount of campaign donations (Ahlquist, 
Clayton and Levi, 2014; Feigenbaum, Hertel-Fernandez and Williamson, 
2018; Kim and Margalit, 2017).5 
Similarly, firms are among the most important actors lobbying politicians. 
In Figure 2.2, I show lobbying activity in the US and the European Union 
by different types of organizations.6 US lobbying is depicted in Panel 2.2a 
5Of course, PACs are not the only source of campaign finance in the US. Individual 
donations are another key source of funding for political candidates (Gimpel, Lee and 
Pearson-merkowitz, 2008; La Raya and Schaffner, 2015). For example, while all PAC types 
in Figure 2.1 donated around 467 million USD to federal candidates in 2016, individual 
donors spend a whopping 1.8 billion USD. 
6While “Other” groups also spend as much as companies, this comprises a variety of 
different organizations, including issue groups, universities, and private companies. Public 
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Figure 2.1 Importance of Firm-level Political Donations in the US. This figure 
shows how US federal political donations by corporate Political Action Committees 
have been increasing from 1980 to 2018, and constitute the largest share of PAC 
donations today. Corporations donate more dollars (Panel 2.1a) and donate more 
frequently (Panel 2.1b) than trade associations, membership associations, and labor 
unions. Data: LobbyView. 
showing that publicly traded firms spent more than double on lobbying 
than sector-based trade associations in 2017, with about 1.5 billion USD 
versus 0.65 billion USD, respectively. Moreover, this difference between firm 
and association lobbying has gotten larger over time. However, this pattern 
could also be particular to the US, given the outsized role of campaign 
finance and lobbying in the US context (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and 
Snyder, 2003; de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014). Therefore, in Panel 2.2b, I 
also display data on direct lobbying by different organization types in the 
European Union (EU), specifically, organized meetings with officials from 
the European Commission. While annual lobbying expenditure data is not 
available in the EU context, corporations clearly meet more frequently with 
the European Commission than trade associations. In 2018, corporations 
met 1669 times with the Commission, compared to 1207 trade association 
Firms are all firms from the Compustat database which lobby between 1999 and 2017. 
Trade associations are identified using all groups with a NAICS code 813910 (business 
associations) and other groups whose legal names include the character matches for 
“associations” or “ASSN.”, as in (Huneeus and Kim, 2018). 
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meetings. This indicates more access for firms than for sectoral groups. 
Firms also meet more often with the Commission than labor unions or non­
governmental organizations combined (1045 meetings in 2018). Thus, firms 
seem to lobby and donate more alone than via their industry associations, 
which casts doubt on the idea that political cleavages form along sectoral 
lines in favor of a view of cleavages between firms within industries.7 These 
patterns are fully in line with new empirical evidence on corporate political 
activity. Kim (2017) shows that trade flows and variation in tariffs are at 
odds with both sectoral and factor-based views, and that highly productive 
firms producing differentiated products lobby more on specific trade bills. 
Similarly, Bombardini (2008) finds that sectors with more firm heterogeneity 
receive higher protection. Moreover, contrary to common perceptions of 
firms facing collective action problems, Huneeus and Kim (2018) provide 
some evidence on the targeted nature of lobbying in the US, showing that 
most bills introduced in a given Congress are only lobbied by one or two 
firms. 
Second, the large differences in productivity and wages within industries 
(Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding, 2010) are likely to translate into differences 
in individual preferences based on their firm of employment, which is not 
reflected by the current literature on preference formation.8 This omission 
is problematic because it assumes that within-sector heterogeneity of firms 
does not matter for political preferences. Indeed somebody’s firm can shape 
preferences in a variety of ways. Workplaces can serve as an important 
social network where employees discuss politics, which can encourage 
7While not part of this dissertation, an important question then is under which conditions 
corporations lobby alone or via umbrella organizations (Bombardini and Trebbi, 2012; 
Osgood, 2017a). 
8The few exceptions are the work by Na-Kyung Lee and Liou (2019) which leverages a 
cross-sectional survey from Japan to test the impact of firm productivity on individual trade 
policy preferences, and the work by Hertel-Fernandez (2018) on employees as lobbyists. 
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Figure 2.2 Importance of Firm-level Lobbying in US and European Union. This 
figure shows that firms are very important entities lobbying the US federal gov­
ernment and the European Commission. Panel 2.2a shows that publicly traded 
firms spend more on lobbying than industry associations. The category “Other” 
comprises other groups, including private companies, issue groups, and universi­
ties. Panel 2.2b shows that corporations meet more frequently with the European 
Commission than other types of organizations, including business associations. 
Data: LobbyView and IntegrityWatch. 
preference formation and political activity (Abrams, Iversen and Soskice, 
2011; Mutz and Mondak, 2007). Labor unions also use the workplace 
to contact and mobilize employees to become union members or inform 
them about union stances on particular issues (Kim and Margalit, 2017). 
Finally, recent work by Hertel-Fernandez highlights that employers are 
increasingly mobilizing their own employees by distributing and monitoring 
dissemination of political information, mobilizing them to attend a political 
rallies, or to encourage turning out to vote. Given that for most individuals 
the workplace is the main source of their livelihood, employees seem to be 
more susceptible to employer mobilization if they feel at risk of losing their 
job (Hertel-Fernandez, 2018). In the United States, parallel trends towards 
union-weakening right-to-work legislation (Feigenbaum, Hertel-Fernandez 
and Williamson, 2018; Marx and Fleming, 2012; Starr, Prescott and Bishara, 
2019), the fall of the labor share and the rise of market concentration(Autor 
et al., 2017), and simultaneous labor market monopsomy (Azar, Marinescu 
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and Steinbaum, 2017) might increase dependence of individuals on their 
employer, even in the absence of the direct employer mobilization. Thus, 
it seems very unlikely that individuals in the same sector (given some 
occupational differences) will share the same preferences.9 However, in 
order to micro-found firm level theories and take into account the stylized 
facts presented above, we need to actually measure the preferences of 
individual employees within firms, not within sectors. 
To sum up, the work on cleavages and preference formation which puts 
the emphasis on industry sectors, overlooks the growing importance of 
corporations in politics. The theoretical and empirical differences between 
firms in the same sectors are likely to translate into firm-based patterns of 
preference formation, which require new micro-level data. 
Therefore, in the first paper of this dissertation, Political Alignment be­
tween Firms and Employees: Evidence from a new Dataset, I construct a novel 
dataset linking big data on firm and employee political donations. I match 
1,691,790 US federal campaign contribution filings of 85,109 individuals 
to the donations of 874 Political Action Committees (PACs) of publicly 
listed companies. The paper contributes to the extant literature on prefer­
ence formation and cleavages in two ways. First, I actually measure the 
political preferences of individuals within firms, providing data to test 
the micro-foundations of the firm-level literature. The US as particularly 
interesting case where the prevalence of campaign donations allows for 
the measurement and comparison of firm and employee preferences. 
show that employee and company contributions are highly correlated, and 
that firm- and occupation-level factors are significantly associated with 
9In fact, there are likely significant differences between employees within the same firm. 
This is were occupational characteristics like task routineness, offshorability, and skills are 
useful complements to a firm-based approach (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006; Kitschelt 
and Rehm, 2014; Owen and Johnston, 2017; Walter, 2017). 
I 
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firm-employee alignment. While this is expected from the perspective of 
firm-level political economy approaches, this is less than clear for American 
Politics work on campaign finance (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Sny­
der, 2003; Tripathi, Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2002). Another big advantage 
of this data compared to existing datasets like the Database on Ideology, 
Money in Politics, and Elections (Bonica, 2016b), is that it contains widely-
used identifiers for the firm, sector, and occupation. Thus, the data enables 
scholars to better study the connections between corporate and employee 
donations. Moreover, it allows future researchers in International Political 
Economy to match firm-, sector-, and occupational covariates of interest to 
the data, and better investigate the impact of policies and economic shocks 
on individual political behavior. 
In the second paper Political Alignment between Firms and Employees: The 
Role of Asset Specificity, I use this newly created data to investigate when 
political preferences of employees align with those of their employers. I 
take up the long-standing literature on asset specificity of the firm, sec­
tor, and occupation, and derive clear predictions about when we should 
expect preferences of employees to align with their company. I find that 
firm and sectoral specificity is associated with higher partisan alignment 
between firms and employees, but no no evidence for the impact of skill 
specificity. In addition, I show that even within narrow sectors, there is 
huge variation in partisan alignment, which lends support to the firm-based 
view of political cleavages, and some to sector-based theories. While broad 
partisan alignment provides some evidence for firm-level theories, I also 
investigate a more direct link between individual and firm donations to 
specific candidates, and find that employees tend to donate more to the 
same candidates that their company PAC supports. The latter finding is 
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not driven by sectoral or occupational differences, and provides suggestive 
evidence for patterns of workplace mobilization document in the American 
Politics context (Hertel-Fernandez, 2018; Li, 2018). 
2.2 Institutions, Trade, and Policy Uncertainty 
Another key research area in IPE concerns the role of international insti­
tutions for cross-national commerce and investment. In particular, this 
literature has highlighted the importance of the design of international 
agreements (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001), such as the GATT/WTO, 
for reducing uncertainty about future economic policies of states. In princi­
ple, compliance with international agreements is costly because states might 
not be able to uphold their commitments in the case of domestic political 
pressure or an unexpected economic shock. These institutions contain flexi­
ble provisions which allow states to temporarily suspend their commitments 
to these agreements, and thus, reduce the uncertainty about future costs 
of compliance and the resulting time-inconsistency problem (Rosendorff 
and Milner, 2001). The conclusion from this line of research is that flexible 
provisions in international trade agreements, such escape clauses, rules on 
anti-dumping and countervailing duties, or limitations to the duration of 
these agreements (Koremenos, 2005), while suspending trade liberalization 
temporarily, promote international trade and cooperation. Empirical evi­
dence shows that countries which already have flexible mechanisms such as 
anti-dumping in place are more likely to join the GATT/WTO and commit 
to lower applied tariffs and tariff bindings, with overall efficiency gains 
for private actors in the economy (Reinhardt and Kucik, 2008). Moreover, 
these institutions have been theorized to lock in current trade policies and 
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therefore, reduce firm’s uncertainty about future economic policy (Baccini 
and Urpelainen, 2015) or the unilateral removal of preferential market ac­
cess (Manger and Shadlen, 2014), leading to lower volatility in exports 
and higher aggregate efficiency of trading firms (Mansfield and Reinhardt, 
2008b). Some authors have also argued that Preferential Trade Agreements 
(PTAs) limit the policy discretion of political leaders and hence, increase in 
aggregate efficiency which helps political leaders to stay in power longer 
(Hollyer and Rosendorff, 2012). 
This line of research implicitly or explicitly makes an argument about 
the uncertainty reducing impact of institutions on private actors, i.e. firms. 
Hence, the lion share of this work makes at least two assumptions about 
firm behavior. First, firms actually do adjust their expectations and react 
to swings in uncertainty before expectations are ‘locked in’ by the signing 
of an agreement. Mansfield and Reinhardt (2008b, p.648) close their study 
on trade volatility and institutions by conceding that this is an assumption 
that is not micro-founded. In fact their last sentence is that it “would be 
useful to analyze this micro-causal mechanism more directly in a study cast 
at the level of individual firms’ responses to trade agreement formation”, 
which Mansfield and Reinhardt leave for future research. Evidence for these 
micro-foundations would have to show that individual firms actually adjust 
their trading behavior in the face of varying trade policies. 
Second, the literature assumes that firms will react positively to a reduc­
tion of uncertainty, on average, assuming away within-country or sector 
heterogeneity in the distributional consequences. In fact, Hollyer and 
Rosendorff (2012, p.750) note that “regardless of the distributional con­
sequences of PTA formation, any given PTA will serve to reduce policy 
uncertainty, and this will have political effects”. They go on and write that 
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a “reduction in trade-policy uncertainty increases the volume of trade and 
generates gains to voters through the expansion of tradable sectors and the 
increase in demand for abundant factors”. This welfare generation for voters 
then creates incentives for democratic leaders to sign trade agreements if 
they face less domestic opposition from veto players (Mansfield and Milner, 
2012). However, if incentives for leaders work through the gains to voters, 
then the distributional consequences of trade cannot be ignored. This is 
because politicians care about the geography of their constituencies (Rod-
den, 2010) and distributional consequences of trade across constituencies 
will vary widely across geographies (Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2016b). The 
distributional consequences, in turn, will depend on the trading partner and 
the design of the agreement, including the distribution of tariff reduction 
and non-tariff barriers (Dür, Baccini and Elsig, 2014; Horn, Mavroidis and 
Sapir, 2010; Kim et al., 2019). Moreover, the distributional consequences will 
differ across firms depending on their productivity levels (Melitz, 2003b) 
and how differentiated the goods they produce are (Kim, 2017; Osgood, 
2016). It will also depend on whether firms trade at arm’s length or with 
affiliates, in the case of multi-national corporations (Helpman, Melitz and 
Yeaple, 2004a; Manger, 2009), or whether they are import-dependent firms, 
relying on intermediate inputs from suppliers abroad (Amiti and Konings, 
2007; Halpern, Koren and Szeidl, 2015; Johnson and Noguera, 2012). 
In sum, the extant literature fails to test the micro-level foundations of 
their theories or to measure uncertainty before agreements are signed. In 
addition, existing work makes assumptions about the impact of uncertainty 
which might well depend on trading parter, degree of liberalization, and 
the firms themselves. However, as pointed out by Kim, Liao and Imai 
(2019, p.1), the studies above and related studies rely on aggregate trade 
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flows or flows of a few specific goods between countries (Carnegie, 2014; 
Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2000; Rose et al., 2007). However, by 
aggregating trade at the country-level they ignore this heterogeneity, across 
firms, trading partners, and product types. 
In the last paper of my dissertation, Policy Uncertainty and Firm-level 
Trade in Intermediate and Capital Goods, I attempt to tackle many of these 
shortcomings in the work on institutions, trade, and uncertainty. In the 
paper, I look at how policy uncertainty affects firm’s decision to source 
intermediate goods when importers face uncertainty between mutually 
exclusive policies. The paper contributes to the existing literature in three 
ways. First, we provide a new measure of trade policy uncertainty between 
different policy alternatives based on quantitative text analyses of business 
news. Thus, we actually measure the uncertainty about future economic 
policy assumed by existing studies. Interacted with the tariff schedules of 
the respective policy alternatives, the measure provides clear implications for 
importers and exporters depending on the products they trade, contrary to 
aggregate trade flows (Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2008b; Reinhardt and Kucik, 
2008) or broad industry sectors (Carnegie, 2014). Second, we highlight 
the importance of taking into account the type of products firms trade, 
particularly intermediate inputs. In our theoretical model, we recognize 
that intermediate goods are often key for technological upgrading of firms, 
and thus, require ex ante sunk investment on behalf of the company, similar 
to the decisions to export (Melitz, 2003b) or to serve foreign markets via 
horizontal foreign direct investment (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004a). 
Moreover, recent political economy work stresses that the growth of trade 
in intermediates has been pivotal in driving firm support for recent trade 
agreements (Manger, 2009, 2012; Osgood, 2018), that firms actively lobby for 
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the suspension of tariffs on specific intermediate goods (Ludema, Mayda and 
Mishra, 2018), and that tariffs on intermediate goods have been liberalized 
much faster via PTAs than final goods (Baccini, Dür and Elsig, 2018). Finally, 
we demonstrate empirically the distributional consequences of uncertainty 
between different policy alternatives for firms-level trade before an agreement 
is signed. In line with our model, the effects of uncertainty differ sharply 
according to the trading partner and degree fo liberalization, and are more 
pronounced for trade in intermediate and capital goods relative to consumer 
goods. 
2.3 Summary of Contributions 
To sum up, a large share of the existing literature on the preference formation 
and societal cleavages, and the impact of institutions on international trade, 
overlooks or assumes away the role of firm heterogeneity. I argue that this 
heterogeneity within sectors highlights two major problems inherent in the 
industry-based approaches. 
First, the focus on the sector in the literature on individual preferences 
and trade policy lobbying is at odds with new theories and new empirical 
evidence on the importance of firms for lobbying and employee preferences. 
Sector-based approaches assume homogeneity of individual political pref­
erences within sectors, but within-industry differences are most likely to 
translate into large variation of preferences, both across and within firms. 
This is likely exacerbated by declining bargaining power of employees 
vis-a-vis increasingly powerful corporate employers, and underlined by 
recent evidence on the workplace as a place of political mobilization. Sec­
ond, the work on policy uncertainty and international institutions does not 
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provide micro-level evidence underpinning the main assumption that insti­
tutions reduce uncertainty of firms about future economic policy. Moreover, 
reductions in uncertainty do not affect all firms equally: corporations will 
adjust their expectations according to the types of goods they trade and the 
trade-offs between policy alternatives they face. 
In this dissertation, I take up these challenges to sector-based approaches 
to international and comparative political economy. The following chapters 
draw on firm-based theories and provide new firm- and individual-level 
evidence stressing the importance of the firm: both as political and as 
economic actors. 
Chapter 3 
Political Alignment between 
Firms and Employees: Evidence 
from a New Dataset 
3.1 Introduction 
In the field of Political Economy, an individual’s workplace is viewed as 
one of the most fundamental determinants of a wide range of individual 
political preferences on diverse topics such as free trade (Margalit, 2011; 
Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001), redistribution, labor 
market risk (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014; Walter, 
2017), or foreign investment and offshoring of production (Margalit, 2012; 
Scheve and Slaughter, 2004). After all, where people work and what they 
do is the main source of their livelihood. However, data on the workplace is 
virtually absent from current research on individual campaign contributions, 
despite long-standing debates on whether donations by Political Action 
Committees (PACs) or individual donors are quid pro quo investments 
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in expectation of political favors or merely consumption (Ansolabehere, 
de Figueiredo and Snyder, 2003; Bonica, 2014; Gordon, Hafer and Landa, 
2007; Snyder, 1990).1 If individuals are donating based on what is good for 
their employer, we would expect their donations to be strongly aligned with 
their company’s political preferences. However, observing both individual 
and employer preferences at the same time is very difficult in practice. 
In this paper, I create a measure of political alignment between firms and 
their employees based on novel data matching 1,691,790 federal campaign 
contribution filings of 85,109 individuals to the donations of 874 PACs 
of publicly listed US companies between 2003 and 2016.2. I use natural 
language processing to link individual donors to their company’s PAC, 
and leverage donation shares to Democratic and Republican candidates 
to measure partisan alignment between firms and their employees. I then 
show that PAC- and employee donations are significantly correlated with 
each other. Moreover, I demonstrate that firm-level and occupational char­
acteristics impact firm-employee alignment in predictable ways which are 
in line with expectations from political economy theories. Contrary to exist­
ing datasets, these novel data can be easily linked to external datasets on 
industry-, firm-, and occupational characteristics, enabling scholars to better 
study the connections between corporate and employee donations, or the 
impact of political change and economic shocks on individual contributions. 
Whether individuals align with their employers has important implica­
tions for the political mobilization of firms, the formation of policy coalitions, 
and representation. Firms that are more aligned internally might be more 
1The few exceptions looking explicitly at the workplace of individual donors are Hertel-
Fernandez (2018), Li (2018), and Barber, Canes-Wrone and Thrower (2017). 
2The overall number is actually 3,579,530 filings of 466,839 individuals working for 13,991 
firms publicly listed firms. Since I look at the alignment between PACs and employees, I 
only use firms with data on both PAC and employee contributions in this paper. 
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likely to mobilize politically due to lower costs of collective action (Barber, 
Pierskalla and Weschle, 2014; Hansen, Mitchell and Drope, 2005; Olson, 
1965). Since the corporate political strategy of firms is often determined by 
the senior management, less diverging views result in less frictions to arrive 
at a common political position (Unsal, Hassan and Zirek, 2016). For the 
same reason, we might expect corporations with similar employee political 
preferences to be more likely to form policy coalitions (Dean, 2016; March, 
1962; Rogowski, 1989; Sabatier, 1988) or show greater unity in industry-wide 
associations like the American Chamber of Commerce or the American 
Legislative and Exchange Council (Hertel-Fernandez, 2016; Walker and 
Rea, 2014). Finally, an unequal distribution of preferences across firms and 
occupations might have severe consequences for unequal representation in 
the US Congress(Bartels, 2008; Gilens and Page, 2014). Scholars of money in 
politics should pay more attention to individual’s workplace, their profes­
sion, and the activities of their employers when investigating motivations 
for political giving. 
3.2	 Linking Firm and Employee Campaign Dona­
tions 
Observing both the political preferences of employees and employers at 
the same time is very difficult in practice. Individual-level surveys do 
only ask individuals but not their companies, and most firm-level data 
does not include individual-level attitudes of employees, leading to very 
little research investigating both firm and employee preferences at the same 
time. This stands in contrast to the abundance of studies investigating 
individual political preferences for free trade (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; 
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Owen and Johnston, 2017; Rho and Tomz, 2017; Scheve and Slaughter, 
2001), redistribution (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014), 
labor market risk (Thewissen and Rueda, 2019; Walter, 2017), or other work 
looking at the preferences of individual firms (Bombardini and Trebbi, 2012; 
Kim, 2017; Osgood, 2017b; Plouffe, 2013). The notable exception is recent 
work on employees as lobbyists (Hertel-Fernandez, 2018), contributions 
to political action committees (PACs) (Li, 2018), and some work on chief 
executive’s donations (Babenko, Fedaseyeu and Zhang, 2019; Bonica, 2016a). 
However, these do only cover few industries and occupations or do not focus 
on the potential impact of firm characteristics on firm-employee alignment 
or dis-alignment. 
I match employee to corporate donations using US campaign finance 
data from the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The FEC data contains 
information on corporate PAC campaign contributions and individual dona­
tions to political candidates. The individual-level data contains information 
on a donor’s name, employer, and occupation. However, linking employees’ 
workplace or occupation to firm-, industry-, and occupation-level data or 
the contributions of their employers is challenging for two reasons. First, 
there are no unique employer names or identifiers. Rather, donors just 
manually enter employer names into a form, resulting in vastly different 
firm names across individuals working for the same firm. This problem is 
shown in Table 3.1 which depicts political contributions of five MICROSOFT 
employees, each of which provides a slightly different (and sometimes, 
orthographically incorrect) employer name. The same problem exists for 
individual occupations. Table 3.2 shows the problematic structure of occu­
pation names in the FEC data for five senior managers of well-known US 
companies. Second, the sheer amount of the data precludes attempts to 
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Name Employer Occupation . . .
 
Steven Ballmer MICROSOFT CEO . . . 
Jeff Teper MICROSOFT CORP Corporate CEO . . . 
Lisa Brummel MICROSOFT CORPORATION Executive Vice President . . . 
Rae Garret MICROSOFT CORPORTATION Consultant . . . 
Dorothy Dwoskin MICROSOFT INC. Trade Director . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
Table 3.1 Lack of Unique Employer Names for Individual Campaign Donations. 
The table shows the lack of unique employer names in the FEC individual donations 
data. In this example, all individuals are employees of Microsoft, but they use 
different versions of the company name when filing their contribution to the FEC. 
Name Employer Occupation . . .
 
John H. Myers GENERAL ELECTRIC CO PRESIDENT/C.E.O. . . . 
John H. Chambers CISCO SYSTEMS INC PRESIDENT/CEO . . . 
Richard Clark MERCK & CO PRESIDENT, CEO . . . 
Christopher M. Crane EXELON CORP PRESIDENT COO . . . 
Robert Marcus TIME WARNER CABLE INC PRESIDENT AND COO . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
Table 3.2 Lack of Unique Occupation Names for Individual Campaign Dona­
tions. This table shows examples of different employees of five companies, all of 
which have a very similar jobs. However, all individuals provide very different 
occupation names when filing their contributions to the FEC. 
manually match individuals to employers or manually categorize individual 
occupations. Between 1980 and 2016, the FEC data contains 52,974,196 
individual contributions, 4,085,773 unique employer names, and 825,697 
unique occupation names. 
Therefore, I need an automated way to match employer names to unique 
company identifiers and occupation names to unique occupations identifiers. 
I developed an automated script, written in the programming language 
Python, leveraging Python’s computationally efficient natural language 
processing capabilities. The process by which the script links un-structured 
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employer and occupation names to unique identifiers is portrayed in Figure 
3.1 below. The script takes as input a list of un-structured employer names 
(from the FEC) and a list of unique firm (or occupation) names with unique 
firm IDs (or occupation codes). For company names, I use the full list of 
35,672 publicly traded firms in the Compustat Capital IQ North America 
database. For occupation names, I use the ‘direct match files’ of occupation 
titles to Standard Occupational Classification Codes (SOC) by the US Census 
Bureau and the Bureau for Labor Statistics, as well as more fine-grained 
O∗NET codes, widely used in Labor Economics (Acemoglu and Autor, 
2011).3 
The script proceeds as follows: first, a number of different employer 
names is given to the script. Then, the names are cleaned up: they get lower­
cased, additional whitespace and punctuation is removed, and company 
legal forms are canonicalized. Next, a term-document matrix is created from 
the names and terms are weighted by term frequency-inverse document 
frequency (tf-idf). Hence, terms that appear in many company names (like 
‘incorporated’, ‘inc‘, etc.) receive less weight in the matching step. Second, 
for each cleaned name, the cosine similarity between a given employer name 
and each name in the list of 35,672 publicly traded firms in the Compustat 
database is calculated. The similarity between company names d1 and 
d1·dT i=1 d1id2id2 is then calculated as sim(d1, d2) = 2 = √ ∑
n √ , which ||d1|| ||d2|| ∑ni=1 d2 ∑ni=1 d2 1i 2i 
is simply the angular distance between the two employer name vectors 
given to the script, normalized by vector length. Finally, the script picks 
the Compustat firm name with the highest cosine similarity, if above a set 
3For the SOC codes, there are 89,000 occupation titles relating to 869 unique occupation 
codes. For O∗NET occupation codes 105,000 occupation titles are related to 1100 unique 
occupation codes. The US Census Bureau and US Bureau for Labor Statistics use the 
Standard Occupational Classification Codes (SOC), while O∗NET uses O∗NET SOC, a 
more fine-grained system based on but fully compatible to SOC codes. 
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threshold, and returns it together with its unique firm ID (GVKEY).4. This 
process is repeated for each of the individual employer names, as well as for 
17,215 corporate PAC names between 2003 and 2016. The result can be seen 
below in Table 3.3 for MICROSOFT. All five employees are now matched to one 
unique firm name. Moreover, each individual and employer gets assigned 
a unique ID. In this paper, I use the GVKEY from Compustat in order 
to add firm financial information. The process for matching occupation 
titles to unique occupation titles and codes is identical to the procedure for 
employers. Only the inputs to the script differ. 
4The similarity measure is between 0 and 1, where 0 means no match at all, and 1 indicates 
a full match. For employer names, I use a threshold of 0.81, and for occupations 0.72, based 
on similar record linkage problems in existing research (Raffo and Lhuillery, 2009). 
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Figure 3.1 Script matching employees to unique employer IDs and occupation codes. The flow chart shows how employer names 
and occupations are matched to unique employer IDs (Compustat GVKEY) and occupation codes (Standard Occupational Classification 
(SOC) Codes) GVKEYs can be linked to firm- and industry level variables from financial databases, and SOC codes can be linked to 
official employment statistics. 
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Name ID Firm Firm ID SOC Occup. Title . . . 
Steven Ballmer I00301999 MICROSOFT CORP 12141 11-1011 Chief Executives . . . 
Jeff Teper I06497673 MICROSOFT CORP 12141 11-1011 Chief Executives . . . 
Lisa Brummel I00807330 MICROSOFT CORP 12141 11-1011 Chief Executives . . . 
Rae Garret I01642142 MICROSOFT CORP 12141 13-1199 Consultant . . . 
Dorothy Dwoskin I01780528 MICROSOFT CORP 12141 19-3011 Economists . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Table 3.3 Result of Matching Employees to unique Employers and Occupation 
Codes: This table shows the result of the linkage process depicted in Figure 3.1 
above. The individuals shown in Table 3.1 now have one unique firm name and firm 
ID (Compustat GVKEY), as well as unique occupation code (SOC) and individual 
IDs. Individual ID’s are assigned by cleaning names, and using exact matching on 
first name, last name, and state of employee. 
Overall, I match 3,537,187 filings of 466,840 individuals to 13,991 firms 
and 850 occupations between 2003 and 2016. I also match 274,106 out of 
825,697 unique occupation names in the FEC data. Those occupations make 
up about 85 percent of the individuals contribution records matched to 
employers, excluding unemployed individuals and students.5 I also match 
the zip codes of donors to Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 
county codes. Individual identifiers were created using exact matching on 
the cleaned up versions of first name, last name, and state of residence of 
donors.6 
5For this paper, I limit the period of investigation to the years between 2003 and 2016, 
because occupation data is only available from 2003 onwards. I also only use companies 
for which I observe both firm and employee donations, which are 1,691,790 campaign 
contribution filings of 85,109 individuals, working in 874 publicly listed firms and 850 
occupations. 
6The credit for the individual IDs goes to Mehmet Efe Akengin. The matching strategy is a 
compromise between having accurate individual IDs and being able to observe individuals 
changing workplaces or occupations. See below. 
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3.3 Advantages over Existing Datasets 
These data provide some significant advantages over existing databases of 
US campaign donations like OpenSecrets.org (2018) or the Database on 
Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) (Bonica, 2016b). First, 
the dataset includes donations for all employees identified for a given 
publicly traded company. Existing research provides ample evidence on 
donations of individuals (Barber, Canes-Wrone and Thrower, 2017; Gimpel, 
Lee and Pearson-merkowitz, 2008; La Raya and Schaffner, 2015) or company 
executives (Babenko, Fedaseyeu and Zhang, 2019; Bonica, 2016a; Fremeth, 
Richter and Schaufele, 2013; Gupta, Nadkarni and Mariam, 2019; Richter 
and Werner, 2017; Unsal, Hassan and Zirek, 2016), but these studies do 
not differentiate between different positions of individuals within the same 
company or concentrate only on chief executives. 
Second, the data uses commonly used identifiers for firms (Compustat 
GVKEY), industries (North American Industry Classification - NAICS) and 
occupations (Standard Occupational Classification - SOC), as depicted in 
Table 3.4. Those allow researchers to easily link companies and individuals 
to firm financial databases (e.g. Compustat or Orbis) and add industry 
and occupation level data from the Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, or other official data sources. In comparison, existing research 
uses the Open Secrets coding scheme for industry/occupation of donors 
which cannot easily be linked to any external data. Thus, the data makes it 
much easier for researchers to study the impact of sector- or occupation level 
reforms and economic shocks on the political behavior of donating firms 
and employees. The data also provides a clearer separation of occupation 
and industry of employment. Existing research often confuses occupation 
with industry, even though in economics (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011), CPE 
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Level Identifer Categories CRP Identifier CRP Categories 
SOC 2010 840 – – 
Occupation 
O⋆NET SOC 2010 1010 – – 
Sector NAICS 2012 1068 own scheme 400 
Firm GVKEY 13,766 (1980 - 2017) – – 
Table 3.4 Unique Identifiers in Linked Employer-Employee Data: This table 
shows the unique identifiers available in the employer-employee data and the 
number of categories covered in comparison with the Center for Responsive Politics 
(CRP) data. Unique occupation and firm codes are missing from the CRP data, and 
sector codes cannot easily be linked to external datasets. 
(Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014), or IPE (Owen and Johnston, 2017), researchers 
have developed different theoretical models with very different empirical 
implications for each of these levels of analysis. For example, Bonica 
(2014) uses ‘Lawyers’ as one and ‘Mining’ as another ‘industry/occupation’ 
category, based on the Open Secrets coding scheme. However, ‘Lawyers’ 
are not an industry but only one occupation which can be performed in 
many different industries, and ‘Mining’ is clearly not an occupation, but an 
industry comprising different occupations like miners, engineers, managers, 
and lawyers, among others. The same problem arises in the paper by 
Barber, Canes-Wrone and Thrower (2017) who also rely on the Center for 
Responsive Politics industry/occupation coding scheme.7 Thus, my data 
makes a clearer distinction between firms, industries, and occupations which 
provides both analytical and empirical advantages over commonly-used 
data. 
7In Bonica (2014) or Barber, Canes-Wrone and Thrower (2017) this is not particularly 
consequential, even though the former provides a misleading description of industry 
and occupation ideology. Bonica (2014) does not directly test theories on the impact of 
industry or occupation on donor behavior, and Barber, Canes-Wrone and Thrower (2017) 
do manually match Open Secrets occupation categories to committees with jurisdiction 
over said occupations. 
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3.4 Alignment across Firms and Occupations 
I test three hypotheses that illustrate the potential usefulness of these data 
for scholars of political economy and political behavior. First, I test the 
hypothesis that all else equal, employees campaign contributions will be 
positively correlated with their employers contributions. This could be the 
case for multiple reasons. For instance, employees could self-select into 
firms because they live in areas dominated by the same party that the firm 
supports (Rodden, 2010). Alternatively, the nature of the workplace could 
tie the economic fortune of individuals to the firm and incentive them to 
donate to the same party (Alt et al., 1999; Alt and Gilligan, 1994). Lastly, 
the employers might mobilize employees to support similar candidates 
(Hertel-Fernandez, 2018).8 
Second, I test the hypothesis that all else equal, firm-employee alignment 
will be lower in larger firms, as compared to smaller firms. Intuitively, 
we would expect alignment to be inversely related to firm size, because 
collective action is more difficult in large groups due to the higher likelihood 
of free riding (Barber, Pierskalla and Weschle, 2014; Hansen, Mitchell and 
Drope, 2005; Olson, 1965), and both the firm and their employees need to 
mobilize in order to support the same party9 Also, while firms with a larger 
market share might be more likely to mobilize because political activity 
might yield more concentrated benefits, they are also more likely to have 
politically heterogeneous employees, which might in turn decrease overall 
alignment (Ostrom, 2010; Walker and Rea, 2014). 
8Note that campaign donations are the least-used workplace mobilization mechanism 
according to Hertel-Fernandez (2018). 
9They might also mobilize to support the same candidate, as shown in Chapter 4 of this 
thesis. 
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Third, I test the hypothesis that all else equal, high-ranking employ­
ees’ contributions will be more aligned with their firm’s contributions, as 
compared to lower-ranking employees.10 Work on the political behavior of 
Chief Executives in Finance, Economics, and Management has documented 
that chief executives donate larger sums and more frequently than regular 
employees (Fremeth, Richter and Schaufele, 2013; Richter and Werner, 2017; 
Unsal, Hassan and Zirek, 2016). Moreover, CEO ideology has been shown to 
impact corporate decisions like downsizing or corporate social responsibility 
(Gupta, Briscoe and Hambrick, 2017; Gupta, Nadkarni and Mariam, 2019). 
CEOs should also have more incentives to donate to the same party as their 
company, since a large fraction of executive pay is based on bonuses or 
company shares which depend on the success of the company.11 
Figure 3.2 plots Republican donations as a share of overall donations 
of publicly traded US corporations against the aggregate Republican dona­
tion share of the same companies’ employees. It shows that employer and 
employee donations are indeed highly correlated: the higher the share of Re­
publican donations by a corporate PAC, the higher the share of Republican 
donations by employees. There are also some companies deviating from the 
trend, especially in corporations that only have few employees or make few 
PAC contributions, but the average relationship is clearly positive. Further, 
this trend is driven by House and Senate candidates, and is strongest for 
10Another possibility is that individuals become socialized into particular political views 
over time, via discussions with their co-workers (Abrams, Iversen and Soskice, 2011; Mutz 
and Mondak, 2007). In this dissertation, I concentrate on the economic reasons for partisan 
alignment between employees and their employers. 
11Some part of corporate profits can be outside of CEO’s control, such as external shocks 
to assets important to the company (Davis and Hausman, 2018). Gupta and Wowak (2017) 
shows that more conservative boards pay more to their CEOs, and that the connection 
between firm performance and CEO pay is stronger with more conservative boards. 
However, there is also evidence that CEOs are much more ideological donors than these 
reasons suggest (Bonica, 2016a), making it less clear whether they are more aligned with 
their company. 
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Figure 3.2 Positive Relationship between Firm and Individual Partisan Dona­
tions. This scatter plot shows that there is a positive association between the 
partisan donation share of firms and their employees. 
incumbent candidates, followed by challengers and open seat candidates, 
as shown in Figures A.1 and A.2 in the appendix. This provides evidence 
that is more consistent with investment motives behind corporate donations 
rather than consumption. 
Next, I aggregate the firm-employee donation data at the the firm-cycle 
level, and regress the Republican donation share of employees on the dona­
tion share of their corporate PAC. The result can be seen in Table 3.5 below. 
As expected, employee donation shares to Republicans are very responsive 
to firm donations. I then sequentially add time-varying firm control vari­
ables, cycle fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. In the most conservative 
specification in column 4 I only look at within-firm changes in employee 
donations as a function of the partisan donation share of their firm PAC. 
Moving from 0 to 1 on the PAC Republican donation share increases the 
employee share to Republicans by 18 percent, even after controlling for firm­
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and cycle unobservables. This association is large and surprising, given 
that a large portion of the campaign finance literature argues that individ­
ual donations are merely consumption (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and 
Snyder, 2003; Milyo, Primo and Groseclose, 2000). However, this finding is 
more in line with newer accounts of workplace coercion (Hertel-Fernandez, 
2018) and individual donations to politicians which are members of Con­
gressional committees regulating those employees’ sector of employment 
(Barber, Canes-Wrone and Thrower, 2017). 
Table 3.5 Regression Results: Employee and Firm Donations 
Dependent variable:
 
Employee REP Donation Share 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm REP Donation Share 0.508∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 
(0.028) (0.031) (0.034) (0.049) 
Firm Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Cycle FEs ✓ ✓ 
Firm FEs ✓ 
Observations 3,871 3,009 3,009 3,009 
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.162 0.177 0.465 
Note: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by firm. 
For testing the second and third hypothesis, I need a measure of align­
ment between firms and employees that incorporates the changes across 
electoral cycles. It also needs to represent the fact that most individuals only 
donate to one party, but that corporate PACs vary more in the partisanship 
of their donations, depending on who is in power, seniority of members, 
and whether they become members or chairs of powerful committees (Berry 
and Fowler, 2016; Fouirnaies and Hall, 2018). Hence, the main dependent 
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variable for this paper, partisan alignment between employees and their 
employers, is calculated as: 
Alignmentict = 1 −
    
  Rjt Rijt    
(Rjt + Djt) 
−
 
(Rijt + Dijt)
In Figure 3.3, I plot the distribution of partisan alignment between firms 
and employees which ranges from 0 (complete partisan dis-alignment) to 1 
(complete partisan alignment). One can see that it is approximately normally 
distributed, with some peaks at both extremes of the distribution. This 
reflects that some corporations only donate to one party in some electoral 
cycles, and therefore, all individuals working for this company who donate 
to the opposite party score 0, and all employees donating to the same party 
score 1 on the alignment measure. For example, Blackstone Group LP 
donated only to Republican candidates from 2011 to 2015. Therefore, 408 
employees of Blackstone donating to the Republican party will score 1 (full 
alignment), and 209 employees will score 0 (no alignment). This distribution 
translates into peculiar patterns across firms and industries which I show in 
Figure 3.4 below. Panel 3.4a depicts the 10 sectors with the most and the 10 
sectors with least alignment, and panel 3.4b shows the same for the 10 most 
and 10 least aligned firms. 
Figure 3.5 below provides some descriptive evidence in favor of both of 
the collective action and the chief executive hypothesis. Panel 3.5a depicts 
the bivariate relationship between aggregate alignment of all companies 
in my data and the logged number of employees. The relationship is 
moderately negative, with average alignment across all employees being 
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Figure 3.3 Distribution of Partisan Alignment. This histogram depicts the distri­
bution of alignment from complete disalignment (0) to complete alignment (1) in 
the US campaign finance data. Complete (dis-) alignment happens when companies 
donate exclusvilely to one party and employees donate to the (other) same party. 
about 0.63 for firms with the lowest number of employees, and about 0.45 
for firms with the highest number of employees, supporting the expectation 
that larger firms are less aligned, on average. Panel 3.5b shows boxplots 
comparing average alignment of CEOs and regular employees. Executives 
have a median alignment score of 0.59 and rank- and file employees have 
an median alignment of 0.51. Hence, while CEOs tend to be more aligned 
with the partisan donations of the company PAC, rank-and-file employees 
seem to donate equally to both parties, on average. There is, however, a 
large variation in alignment, especially for non-executive employees. Over 
75 percent of CEOs tend to align with the partisan donations of their PAC. 
Next, in Table 3.6, I regress employee-firm-alignment in a given electoral 
cycle on the logged number of employees of a firm. The regression coeffi­
cient is negative, significant, and similar in size to the bivariate relationship 
in Figure 3.5. I then add a number of firm-election cycle control variables 
(natural log of capital expenditure, plant and property expenses, cost of 
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Figure 3.4 Most and Least Aligned Firms and Sectors. This figure shows the 
ten sectors and firms with most and least alignment. Panel a) shows that ex­
tractive industries like oil, gas, and rubber are most aligned, while electronics 
and transportation manufacturers are least aligned. Panel b) shows that Timken 
and Marathon Petroleum are most aligned, while Vmware and Time show little 
alignment. 
goods sold, sales), and the coefficient stays almost unchanged. Then, step by 
step, I add different fixed effects for electoral cycle, individual occupations 
at the 6-digit SOC level, and county fixed effects to control for geographic 
unobservables. At last, I also add broad industry fixed effects to control 
for the fact that some industries might be larger than others due to other 
factors, such as the necessity of a larger workforce or economies of scale 
(Chase, 2005). The strength of the coefficient on the number of employees 
decreases, especially when adding county fixed effects, but remains negative 
and significant. Holding constant occupation, electoral cycle, county, and 
industry, going from the minimum logged number of employees in the 
data (close to 0) to the 90th percentile is associated with a 0.059 increase 
in alignment which is substantive, given that most observations cluster 
closely around 0.5 (as shown in Figure 3.3 above). Even though these effects 
cannot be interpreted as causal, they support the notion of larger collective 
action problems in larger companies. There are several possible mechanisms 
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(a) Alignment and Firm Size (b) Alignment and Occupations 
Figure 3.5 Alignment and Firm- and Occupational Characteristics. Panel a) 
shows that there is a negative relationship between firm size and average alignment 
between firms and employees at the firm-level. Panel b) shows that chief executives 
are significantly more aligned with their firm, compared to all other firm employees. 
behind this relationship that might be interesting to investigate further in 
the future: first, to the extent that it is important whom your colleagues 
donate to, it might be easier for employees in smaller companies to coor­
dinate donations, or to converge on similar candidates via firm-internal 
discussions. Second, firms might find it easier to mobilize their employees 
to donate in smaller firms, especially if their workforce is more concentrated 
geographically (Hertel-Fernandez, 2018). 
Finally, in Table 3.7, I regress firm-employee alignment on a binary 
indicator which is 1 if an employee is a top executive in a company (SOC 
11-1011), and 0 otherwise. As expected, the coefficient is strongly significant 
and positive, indicating that CEOs are more aligned than other employees, 
on average. Thus, this provides some evidence that chief executives might 
have more incentives to support candidates which their firm supports. 
Like before, I then add firm controls and a host of fixed effects to the 
model. Holding constant electoral cycle, firm, county, and broad 2-digit 
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SOC occupations, CEOs are more aligned than other employees. In the 
most conservative specification, chief executives score 0.044 higher on my 
measure of alignment. This is less than a big increase in the number of 
employees but still substantively large, given that alignment centers around 
0.5 for most employees.
 
Table 3.6 Regression Results: Firm Size and Alignment
 
Dependent variable: 
Align 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
log(Employees) −0.021∗∗∗ 
(0.002) 
−0.023∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.022∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.019∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.014∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
−0.011∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
Firm Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Cycle FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Occupation FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ 
County FEs ✓ ✓ 
NAICS 2-digit FEs ✓ 
Observations 113,110 112,405 112,405 112,405 100,910 100,910 
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.034 0.042 0.066 0.123 0.127 
Note: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by firm. 
Table 3.7 Regression Results: Chief Executives and Alignment 
Dependent variable: 
Align 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CEO 0.073∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
0.058∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
0.055∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
0.045∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
0.045∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
0.044∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
Firm Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Cycle FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Firm FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ 
County FEs ✓ ✓ 
SOC 2-digit FEs ✓ 
Observations 126,686 112,405 112,405 112,405 100,910 100,910 
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.048 0.054 0.164 0.184 0.187 
Note: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by firm. 
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In this paper, I match big data on corporate and employee campaign contri­
butions to each other, and create a measure of partisan alignment between 
firms and their employees. In line with Political Economy theories, firm and 
employee donations are highly correlated, and firm-employee alignment is 
significantly associated with firm size and one’s position in the company. 
These data open up multiple avenues for further research to gain insights 
into coalition formation, individual motivations for political giving, and 
representation in US politics. 
For example, how do economic shocks or policy reforms with distri­
butional consequences on occupations and sectors affect individual contri­
butions? There is good evidence that import competition influences vote 
shares of incumbent parties (Che et al., 2016), polarization (Autor, Dorn and 
Hanson, 2016a), and support for extreme right wing parties (Calantone and 
Stanig, 2018; Dippel, Gold and Heblich, 2015), or that the shale gas boom 
has benefited Republicans in terms of received donations (Sances and You, 
2019). However, the presence of firm, sector, and occupational identifiers 
makes it possible to investigate the impact of policy reforms affecting only 
particular sectors or occupations, such as changes in occupational licensing 
requirements across US states, or firm-specific changes such as mergers and 
acquisitions on donor behavior. 
Another important question is, what are the implications of alignment 
within sectors on the likelihood of firms to lobby alone or in business asso­
ciations (Bombardini and Trebbi, 2012; Osgood, 2017a), and does alignment 
affect lobbying success? While both my data and Bonica (2016a) show that 
there is a large variation in partisanship of US top executives, I find that 
CEOs are still more aligned than rank- and file employees, on average. Apart 
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from group size, heterogeneity of political preferences has been theorized 
to be an important factor inhibiting collective action (Ostrom, 2010). Thus, 
more internally aligned firms might be more likely to lobby in the first place, 
and firms more politically homogeneous sectors might be more likely to 
engage with politicians via umbrella associations. 
Finally, how has the distribution of donations across and within sectors 
and occupations changed over time, and how has that affected represen­
tation (Gilens and Page, 2014; Schlozman, Verba and Brady, 2012) and 
polarization in US politics (Bafumi and Herron, 2010)? While it is well-
known that donors are more likely to be white and male, older, more 
educated, and of higher income (Francia, 2003; La Raya and Schaffner, 2015), 
much less is known about how skewed are donations towards particular 
firms and occupations within firms. 
These are only some of the questions which will be easier to answer 
with the linked employer-employee donations data presented in this paper. 
While here I show only one application from my ongoing work, this dataset 
will be a very useful resource for many different purposes in American 
Politics and Political Economy research. 
Appendix A 
Data Appendices on matched 
Firm-Employee Data 
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A.1 Accuracy of Information in FEC Data
 
How accurate are the FEC data files in terms of individual employers or 
occupations? Based on the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), dis­
closure of donations is mandatory for all individual contributions exceeding 
USD 200, a threshold which has not been changed since 1980 (McGeveran, 
2003). While employers can and do report all contributions, even those 
smaller than USD 200 most candidates report only donations over USD 200.1 
Contribution limits differ by entity donated to, and change each electoral 
cycle.2 Individuals who give to federal candidate must disclose their occu­
pation and employer. Committees receiving donations must make their best 
effort to determine employer and occupation of donors before filing contri­
butions to the FEC. Nevertheless, there is some mis-reporting, especially 
among occupation names. Some obviously incorrect or non-informative 
examples include: 
• ANTI-ISLAMOFASCISM E�PERT 
• ANTI-ISLAM OF ASCIST CONSULTANT 
• "MOBBED" OCCUPATIONAL THERAPIST 
• Mother : ) 
• DINOSAUR E�PERT 
• UNEMPLOYED LIKE 22% OF AMERICANS 
• UNEMPLOYED & LOVING IT 
• VP DICK CHENEY 
1Non-federal candidate disclosure rules are even stricter at times, but are not relevant for 
this paper which only uses federal contributions data. 
2The 2017/2018 electoral cycle contribution limits within a given per election are: (1) USD 
2,700 to individual candidates (2) USD 5,000 to PACs (3) USD 10,000 to non-national party 
committees (state, local, district), and (4) up to USD 33,900 to national party committees. 
Those limits are subject to adjustment for inflation every electoral cycle. 
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That being said, there are few ways to check the accuracy of each individual 
filing. Hence, I need to assume that committees are checking the accuracy 
of individual donations thoroughly, on average. 
One downside of the data is that I have to compromise on the accuracy 
of individual identifiers. Bonica (2014, p.370) maximizes the precision of 
his identity-resolution algorithm by utilizing individual names, addresses, 
occupations, and employer names. Consequently, he loses the ability to 
follow individuals when they change occupation, address, or workplace. 
I only use first name, last name and state of residence for determining 
individual identifiers, to be able to observe changes in occupations and 
sectors. 
48 A.2 Companies in Firm-Employee Data 
A.2 Companies in Firm-Employee Data
 
Company Name NAICS Code NAICS Title Frequency 
MICROSOFT CORP 511210 Software Publishers 6294 
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC 523110 Investment Banking and Securities Dealing 5139 
MORGAN STANLEY 523110 Investment Banking and Securities Dealing 5115 
BOEING CO 336411 Aircraft Manufacturing 4360 
BANK OF AMERICA CORP 522110 Commercial Banking 3293 
MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC 523110 Investment Banking and Securities Dealing 2723 
COMCAST CORP 515210 Cable and Other Subscription Programming 2665 
RAYTHEON CO 334511 Aeronautical, and Nautical Manufacturing 2134 
ORACLE CORP 511210 Software Publishers 2115 
NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL LIFE INS 524113 Direct Life Insurance Carriers 1974 
AMERICAN AIRLINES INC 481111 Scheduled Passenger Air Transportation 1973 
PFIZER INC 325412 Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing 1881 
CISCO SYSTEMS INC 334210 Telephone Apparatus Manufacturing 1834 
JOHNSON & JOHNSON 325412 Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing 1618 
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 999977 Unknown/Other 1550 
ACCENTURE PLC 541611 Management Consulting Services 1508 
NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE 524113 Direct Life Insurance Carriers 1243 
INTEL CORP 334413 Semiconductor Manufacturing 1199 
AMGEN INC 325414 Biological Product Manufacturing 1146 
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP 336411 Aircraft Manufacturing 1138 
FORD MOTOR CO 33611 Automobile Manufacturing 1121 
GENERAL MOTORS CO 33611 Automobile Manufacturing 1098 
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO 522210 Credit Card Issuing 1082 
UNITED AIRLINES INC 48111 Scheduled Air Transportation 997 
MERCK & CO 325412 Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing 995 
MCDONALD’S CORP 722513 Limited-Service Restaurants 973 
AMAZON.COM INC 454111 Electronic Shopping 951 
LILLY (ELI) & CO 325412 Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing 945 
TARGET CORP 452990 All Other General Merchandise Stores 939 
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES 481111 Scheduled Passenger Air Transportation 856 
COCA-COLA CO 312111 Soft Drink Manufacturing 819 
EXXON MOBIL CORP 324110 Petroleum Refineries 814 
BLACKSTONE GROUP LP 523920 Portfolio Management 802 
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 325611 Soap and Other Detergent Manufacturing 783 
DISNEY (WALT) CO 515120 Television Broadcasting 772 
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO 2211 Electric Power Generation and Distribution 743 
HOME DEPOT INC 444110 Home Centers 743 
3M CO 322220 Paper Manufacturing 733 
HARRIS CORP 334511 Aeronautical, and Nautical Manufacturing 733 
EXPRESS SCRIPTS HOLDING CO 446110 Pharmacies and Drug Stores 724 
Table A.1 Most Frequent Firms in Linked Firm-Employee Campaign Contribu­
tions Data. The table shows the distribution of 40 most common firms in the linked 
employer-employee data, their matched North American Industrial Classification 
System (NAICS) code, as well as their industry title. 
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NAICS Code NAICS Title Frequency 
523 Securities, Commodity Contracts, and Other Financial Investments 15660 
325 Chemical Manufacturing 11931 
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 10615 
511 Publishing Industries (except Internet) 9826 
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 9514 
522 Credit Intermediation 8538 
524 Insurance Carriers 6229 
221 Utilities 5723 
515 Broadcasting (except Internet) 4869 
541 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 4331 
481 Air Transportation 4207 
333 Machinery Manufacturing 2970 
999 Unknown/Other 2167 
211 Oil and Gas Extraction 1950 
311 Food Manufacturing 1590 
517 Telecommunications 1547 
452 General Merchandise Stores 1359 
722 Food Services and Drinking Places 1235 
324 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 1186 
621 Ambulatory Health Care Services 1153 
446 Health and Personal Care Stores 1098 
482 Rail Transportation 1038 
561 Administrative and Support Services 1012 
424 Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods 994 
312 Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing 986 
454 Nonstore Retailers 951 
339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 935 
444 Building Material and Garden Equipment and Supplies Dealers 849 
322 Paper Manufacturing 778 
721 Accommodation 764 
445 Food and Beverage Stores 718 
519 Other Information Services 712 
236 Construction of Buildings 672 
111 Crop Production 583 
332 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 571 
512 Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries 532 
212 Mining (except Oil and Gas) 496 
316 Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing 476 
492 Couriers and Messengers 438 
532 Rental and Leasing Services 437 
Table A.2 Most Frequent Industries in Linked Firm-Employee Campaign Con­
tributions Data. The table shows the distribution of 40 most frequent North 
American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) 3-digit industries in the linked 
employer-employee data. 
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A.4 Industries in Firm-Employee Data vs. US 
Economy 
% 2016 US % FEC 
NAICS Code Industry Name Employment Filings Difference 
31–33 Manufacturing 8.8 32.3 23.5 
52 Finance and Insurance 4.1 14.0 9.9 
22 Utilities 0.4 5.3 4.9 
51 Information 2.0 6.7 4.7 
48–49 Transportation/Warehousing 4.0 7.0 3.0 
21 Mining, Oil & Gas 0.5 2.0 1.5 
11 Agriculture, Forestry & Hunting 0.3 0.5 0.2 
53 Real Estate, Rental & Leasing 1.5 1.2 -0.3 
71 Arts & Entertainment 1.7 0.1 -1.6 
42 Wholesale Trade 4.2 1.6 -2.6 
81 Other Services 2.9 0.0 -2.9 
54 Professional Services 6.2 2.5 -3.7 
23 Construction 4.8 0.6 -4.2 
56 Administrative & Support 6.5 0.9 -5.6 
99 Unknown 6.8 0.3 -6.5 
44–45 Retail Trade 11.4 4.0 -7.4 
72 Accommodation & Food Services 9.5 0.9 -8.6 
61 Educational Services 9.2 0.2 -9.0 
62 Health Care & Social Assistance 13.7 1.9 -11.8 
Table A.3 Differences between US Industry Employment and FEC Industry 
Filings. The table shows that there are large differences between 2016 US private 
Employment across 2-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
industries and Filings per Industry in the FEC data. Source: Bureau for Labor 
Statistics and own calculations. 
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A.5 Occupations in Firm-Employee Data
 
SOC 2010 SOC 2010 Title Frequency 
11-1011 Chief Executives 24291 
23-1011 Lawyers 9057 
11-3031 Financial Managers 7726 
11-9199 Managers, All Other 7375 
17-2021 Agricultural Engineers 6079 
15-1111 Computer and Information Research Scientists 3727 
13-2052 Personal Financial Advisors 3719 
11-2021 Marketing Managers 2880 
41-3031 Financial Services Sales Agents 2748 
41-4011 Sales Representatives, Wholesale and Manufacturing 2726 
11-1021 General and Operations Managers 2357 
11-9081 Lodging Managers 1636 
11-9041 Architectural and Engineering Managers 1571 
13-1199 Business Operations Specialists, All Other 1558 
45-3011 Fishers and Related Fishing Workers 1486 
13-2011 Accountants and Auditors 1335 
11-3121 Human Resources Managers 1308 
19-3094 Political Scientists 1259 
11-2031 Public Relations and Fundraising Managers 1171 
11-2022 Sales Managers 1168 
29-1069 Physicians and Surgeons, All Other 968 
11-9021 Construction Managers 947 
15-1132 Software Developers, Applications 914 
17-3029 Engineering Technicians, Except Drafters, All Other 890 
11-3021 Computer and Information Systems Managers 888 
41-3021 Insurance Sales Agents 826 
13-1111 Management Analysts 742 
15-1199 Computer Occupations, All Other 700 
53-2031 Flight Attendants 630 
41-1012 First-Line Supervisors of Non-Retail Sales Workers 624 
11-9033 Education Administrators, Postsecondary 617 
27-3031 Public Relations Specialists 578 
15-1121 Computer Systems Analysts 569 
13-2031 Budget Analysts 557 
11-9111 Medical and Health Services Managers 546 
29-1051 Pharmacists 507 
15-1152 Computer Network Support Specialists 481 
13-1161 Market Research Analysts and Marketing Specialists 419 
13-1011 Agents and Managers of Artists, Performers, and Athletes 411 
11-3061 Purchasing Managers 394 
Table A.4 Unequal Frequency of Occupations in Linked Firm-Employee Cam­
paign Contributions Data. The table shows the distribution of 40 most common 
Standardized Occupation Classification (SCO) codes in the linked firm-employee 
contributions data. The table shows that Management, Business and Financial, 
and Legal occupations comprise more than half of the individual contributions 
matched. 
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A.6 Occupations in Firm-Employee Data vs. US 
Economy 
% 2016 US % FEC 
SOC Code Occupation Name Employment Filings Difference 
11-0000 Management 5.1 34.0 28.9 
23-0000 Legal 0.8 3.9 3.1 
17-0000 Architecture & Engineering 1.8 4.1 2.3 
13-0000 Business & Financial Operations 5.2 7.3 2.1 
15-0000 Computer & Mathematical 3.0 5.1 2.1 
19-0000 Life, Physical, & Social Science 0.8 2.0 1.2 
45-0000 Farming, Fishing, & Forestry 0.3 0.6 0.3 
27-0000 Arts, Design & Entertainment 1.4 1.1 -0.3 
21-0000 Community and Social Service 1.4 0.1 -1.3 
33-0000 Protective Service 2.4 0.2 -2.2 
39-0000 Personal Care & Service 3.2 0.8 -2.4 
31-0000 Healthcare Support 2.9 0.0 -2.9 
37-0000 Building Cleaning & Maintenance 3.2 0.2 -3.0 
49-0000 Installation, Maintenance, & Repair 3.9 0.3 -3.6 
47-0000 Construction and Extraction 4.0 0.3 -3.7 
29-0000 Healthcare Practitioners and Technical 5.9 1.1 -4.8 
53-0000 Transportation and Material Moving 6.9 1.5 -5.4 
25-0000 Education, Training, and Library 6.2 0.3 -5.9 
51-0000 Production 6.5 0.6 -5.9 
41-0000 Sales and Related 10.4 3.3 -7.1 
35-0000 Food Preparation and Serving Related 9.2 0.6 -8.6 
43-0000 Office and Administrative Support 15.7 1.4 -14.3 
Table A.5 Differences between US Occupational Employment and FEC Occu­
pation Filings. The table shows that there are large differences between 2016 
US private Employment across 2-digit Standard Occupation Classification (SOC) 
categories and Filings per occupation in the FEC data. Source: Bureau for Labor 
Statistics and own calculations. 
53 A.7 Examples of Firms Donating One-Sided 
A.7 Examples of Firms Donating One-Sided 
Only 1282 firm-year observations (out of 7844, or 16%) donate one-sided. 
83% donate to both parties. There are some firms with consistent Republican-
only donations, but not as many donating to the Democratic party only. 
Below, see examples of Republican companies (gvkey in parenthesis): 
• XTO ENERGY INC (28256), 
• WORTHINGTON INDUSTRIES (11600) 
• WERNER ENTERPRISES INC (12266) 
• SUN BANCORP INC (19420) 
• REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY INC (9043) 
• COOPER INDUSTRIES PLC (3497) 
• CRYOLIFE INC (27823) 
• LEGGETT & PLATT INC (6649) 
• COLONIAL BANCGROUP (14201) 
Below, see examples of Democratic companies (gvkey in parenthesis): 
• JERRYS INC (6252) 
• HOMESTREET INC (187164) 
• MAUI LAND & PINEAPPLE CO (7117) 
• PHOENIX COMPANIES INC (142462) 
• REEBOK INTERNATIONAL LTD (9004) 
• BANK OF HAWAII CORP (16200) 
• BROWN & BROWN INC (117500) 
• FUELCELL ENERGY INC (25430) 
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A.8 Alignment across Candidate Types and In­
cumbency Status 
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Figure A.1 Correlation between Firm- and Employee Donations across Candi­
date Offices: The plots show the correallation between employee and firm Repub­
lican donation share, aggregated at the firm-level between 2003 and 2016, across 
different offices donated to. It shows that donations of corporations and employ­
ees are more correlated for House and Senate candidates than for Presidential 
candidates. 
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Figure A.2 Correlation between Firm- and Employee Donations and Candidate 
Incumbency Status: The plots show the correallation between employee and firm 
Republican donation share, aggregated at the firm-level between 2003 and 2016, for 
different candidate types. It shows that donations of corporations and employees 
are more correlated for Incumbent and Open Seat candidates than for Challengers. 
Chapter 4 
Political Alignment between 
Firms and Employees: The Role of 
Asset Specificity 
4.1 Introduction 
When do political preferences of employees align with those of their employers? 
Research in Comparative (CPE) and International Political Economy (IPE) 
states that sectors (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Scheve and Slaughter, 2004), 
firms (Ardanaz, Murillo and Pinto, 2013; Naoi and Urata, 2013), or occupa­
tions (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014; Owen and Johnston, 2017) are an important 
source of political preferences. In particular, the existing literature identifies 
asset specificity as a key factor determining which level of analysis should 
dominate individual preference formation (Alt and Gilligan, 1994; Iversen 
and Soskice, 2001): high specificity should tie the fate of individual jobs 
more closely to their firm, and hence make employees more likely to share 
the economic preferences of their company. Therefore, they should also be 
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more likely to align politically with their employer. However, while some 
empirical work confirms the impact of specificity at the level of the firm or 
sector (Alt et al., 1999; Dean, 2016; Hiscox, 2002a) other scholars highlight 
the role of occupational skill specificity on preferences (Iversen and Soskice, 
2001; Rehm, 2009). Thus, the jury is still out with regards to whether firm, 
sectoral or occupational specificity matters more for preference formation. 
Moreover, observing both individual and employer political preferences at 
the same time is very difficult in practice, so that most work relies on either 
firm or individual preferences. In addition, measurement mostly focuses on 
stated preferences of individuals instead of political actions.1 
This paper provides three main contributions. First, I uniquely test the 
relationship between specificity and alignment at the firm-, sector-, and 
occupational level, comparing the impact of all three levels of analysis 
against each other. Thus, I provide an important contribution to the debate 
on the economic sources of political preferences. I find that employees in 
companies and sectors with high asset specificity are more aligned with 
their employer, holding constant individual occupation and location, and 
controlling for firm and sectoral characteristics. However, I find no evidence 
for the impact of skill specificity on alignment. Hence, where people work 
seems to be more important for their preferences than what they do. Second, I am 
able to measure alignment in terms of firm’s and employee’s political actions 
instead of relying on stated preferences. I accomplish this by exploiting a 
novel dataset matching the donations of corporate Political Action Commit­
tees (PACs) to employee donations, using 1,691,790 campaign contribution 
filings of 85,109 individuals working in 874 publicly listed firms and 850 oc­
1For some examples of work in IPE focusing either on firm preferences (Kim et al., 2019; 
Osgood, 2017b; Plouffe, 2013) or individual preferences (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Rho and 
Tomz, 2017; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001), without comparing employers’ and employees’ 
preferences. 
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cupations between 2003 and 2016.2. Third, I explore further the mechanism 
linking firm-level factors to employee donations. If employees pay attention 
to their company’s political activities, they should change their donation 
patterns in conjunction with their firm. I focus on within-individual vari­
ation in donations and find that employees increase donations to specific 
candidates by 4.4 to 4.5 percent once their company political action com­
mittee (PAC) contributes to the same candidate. Moreover, they are more 
reactive to PAC donations to candidates where donations are more likely 
to yield political benefits, such as congressional candidates, incumbents, 
and candidates running for open seats. Thus, I provide evidence on PAC 
donations as a possible informational mechanism linking firm and sectoral 
characteristics to employee political contributions, and suggestive evidence 
on an investment motive behind this connection (Li, 2018). 
The results of this paper have important implications for the study of 
collective political action, coalition formation, and individual preference 
formation. If structural firm characteristics are associated with more ho­
mogeneous political preferences of employees, then overcoming collective 
action problems might be much easier for these firms. In particular, corpora­
tions might be more likely to lobby together in associations as coordination 
on common political goals becomes easier. Alternatively, firms with politi­
cally coherent workforce might just engage in political action if gains from 
taking action are private (Bombardini and Trebbi, 2012; Hansen, Mitchell 
and Drope, 2005). Moreover, this paper adds to our understanding of indi­
2The overall number is actually 3,579,530 filings of 466,839 individuals working for 13,991 
firms publicly listed firms. Since I look at the alignment between PACs and employees, I 
only use firms with data on both PAC and employee contributions in this paper. There is 
very little research combining campaign contributions data by firms and individuals. Bonica 
(2016a) only compare donations of CEOs to company PACs, and Babenko, Fedaseyeu and 
Zhang (2019) investigate whether CEO contributions influence donations of individuals 
working in the same firm. 
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vidual preference formation. Contrary to existing studies relying on stated 
preferences of employees, occupational characteristics such task routineness 
or offshorability are not associated with firm-employee alignment while 
sectoral and firm characteristics are (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Owen and 
Johnston, 2017; Rehm, 2009; Rho and Tomz, 2017; Scheve and Slaughter, 
2001). This does not invalidate the results of existing studies, but points 
towards qualitative differences between the factors influencing stated pref­
erences often used in political economy research, and the rationales for 
political actions of already politically active individuals. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: the first part describes the 
literature relating firm, sectoral, and occupational characteristics to firm-
employee alignment, and derives testable hypotheses. The second part de­
scribes the process of matching individual campaign contributions to firms 
and occupations. The third part shows descriptively the main dimensions 
of variation in the data and demonstrates that most of the meaningful varia­
tion is along industry lines and not across occupations. Then, I empirically 
analyze the relationship between asset specificity and employer-employee 
partisan alignment, and zoom in on donations to specific candidates. The fi­
nal part concludes, discusses implications, and describes avenues for future 
research. 
4.2 Theory 
4.2.1 Asset Specificity and Firm-Employee Alignment 
In Comparative and International Political Economy, a long line of research 
has tried to determine whether firms, sectors, or occupational characteristics 
are most decisive for the formation of individual political preferences on 
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redistribution (Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit, 2014; Walter, 2017), risk 
assurance (Thewissen and Rueda, 2019), trade openness (Mayda and Rodrik, 
2005; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001) or foreign direct investment (Margalit, 
2012; Scheve and Slaughter, 2004). One of the most-debated factors in the 
literature has been asset specificity at the sectoral level, the occupational level, 
or the firm level (Alt et al., 1999; Alt and Gilligan, 1994; Iversen and Soskice, 
2001). 
First, In International Political Economy (IPE), canonical trade models 
predict that individual preferences will be determined by one’s sector of 
employment (Frieden, 1991; Grossman and Helpman, 1994) or according 
to individual factor endowment (Rogowski, 1989). A combination of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson theorem assumes that factors of 
production (labor and capital) are mobile across sectors and hence, all own­
ers of the same factor are equally affected by changes in goods prices. The 
Ricardo-Viner model assumes that factors are highly specific to a particular 
industry and therefore, the fate of factor owners is closely tied to economic 
sectors. The extent to which we see coalitions in favor of or in opposition 
to free trade depends on the degree of asset specificity (Alt and Gilligan, 
1994).3 Asset specificity refers to the degree to which an asset can be re­
deployed to alternative uses without sacrificing its production value (Alt 
et al., 1999). For instance, if workers (labor) would have to sacrifice a sector-
specific wage premium due to skills that are only useful in a particular 
sector, sectoral specificity is high and workers will find it costly to move to 
a job in a different industry. Workers are more ‘stuck’ in their workplace, 
more vulnerable to economic and political changes affecting their sector, and 
3While the IPE literature refers to factor mobility (Hiscox, 2002b; Rogowski, 1989), the 
CPE literature uses the term asset specificity (Iversen and Soskice, 2001). Since one is the 
inverse of the other, I use both interchangeably from here on. 
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their economic interest will be more aligned with their employer. Therefore, 
under low mobility of labor, employee economic interests are more tied 
to their industry, and employees will be more likely to share the political 
preferences of their employer. Hence, the first hypothesis for this paper is 
the following: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher specificity in a sector, the more politically aligned 
individuals are with their firm in terms of their campaign donations, all else 
equal. 
Most evidence on the impact of inter-sectoral specificity (low mobility) 
comes from the realm of trade policy. Hiscox (2002a) finds that congres­
sional voting patterns on trade policy better reflect class-based cleavages 
during times of low specificity, and that sector-based considerations domi­
nate in times of higher specificity. Mukherjee, Smith and Li (2009) extend 
this work and provide cross-national evidence that trade protection in ma­
joritarian democracies is higher under low labor mobility because interests 
of voters are more aligned with the sector they work in. Similarly, Rickard 
(2009) shows that lower labor mobility (high labor specificity) is associated 
with more narrow distributive transfers and Zahariadis (2001) finds that 
more specificity is associated with more sector-specific subsidies.4 There is 
also anecdotal evidence linking worker mobility to firm-employee political 
alignment. Hertel-Fernandez (2018, p.66) notes that companies who attempt 
to mobilize their workforce need to be careful when employees are highly 
skilled and mobile, as they might resist mobilization efforts and leave the 
4Imai and Tingley (2012, pp. 230) use more sophisticated mixture models but find little 
evidence that factor mobility distinguishes well between class- and sector-based voting in 
Hiscox’s original study, but concede that this could easily be due to the low number of 
bills under investigation. A more recent study by Zhou (2017) argues that labor mobility is 
(plausibly) not exogenous to political outcomes, but the result of left-wing parties seeking 
higher mobility when unions are decentralized. 
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company: “Managers are simply not in the position to send potentially 
controversial messages to [these] highly mobile workers”. 
Second, the CPE and IPE literature equally identifies firm-level asset speci­
ficity as an important factor that might facilitate or hinder firm-employee 
political alignment. Based on research in transaction cost economics, the 
literature further distinguishes between physical specificity (the physical 
asset has specific design characteristics), site specificity (the value of assets 
is tied to the location), human asset specificity (relationship-specific human 
capital acquired via learning-by-doing), and dedicated assets (of a seller to a 
particular customer) (Joskow, 1988, pp.106-107). As before, more firm-level 
asset specificity means that firms are more vulnerable to changes in the 
regulatory environment and economic shocks since redeploying immobile 
assets is more costly. If firms are more vulnerable to regulatory changes 
due to high asset specificity, they are more likely to engage in corporate 
political activity such as lobbying, donations, or workplace mobilization, to 
minimize the risk that policies will hurt their economic interests (Sawant, 
2012).5 Moreover, if both labor and capital are firm-specific, both workers 
and managers potentially benefit more from the rents obtained through 
corporate political activity, and both realize higher losses in the case of 
adverse shocks. If employees are aware of the vulnerability of their firm 
to regulatory change (or economic shocks), they might support similar 
political candidates as their company to guarantee a friendly regulatory 
environment. Therefore, I expect that employees of firms with more specific 
assets are more likely to share the political preferences of their employer, 
leading to the following second hypothesis: 
5Even though mobilizing employees to donate is not the most prevalent strategy of US 
firms documented by Hertel-Fernandez (2018), his survey results could under-estimate 
the mobilization of senior managers and executives, who are the most represented donor 
group in federal elections (Francia, 2003). 
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Hypothesis 2: The higher the share of specific assets of a firm, the more 
politically aligned employees are with their firm in terms of their campaign 
donations, all else equal. 
Alt et al. (1999) investigate the impact of asset specificity on firm-level 
lobbying and find that firms with more specific assets are more likely to 
engage in lobbying for subsidies. Given the immobility of their assets, 
firms are more likely to invest in corporate political activity to insure 
against un-wanted policies. Sawant (2012) argues that firms with high asset 
specificity have larger incentives to engage in corporate political activity 
when uncertainty or transaction costs in the political market are low.6 
Qualitative evidence also shows that firms with large investment in non-
mobile physical assets are more likely to mobilize their employees. For 
example, an Ohio coal mining company required their employees take an 
unpaid day off to attend a rally of 2012 Republican Presidential candidate 
Mitt Romney. Participation was not formally enforced, but the company 
noted on lists who attended and who did not (Hertel-Fernandez, 2018, p.2). 
Third, there is now a rich literature differentiating occupational charac­
teristics from sectoral and firm characteristics as explanations for political 
preferences. More recent research has taken up the findings from labor 
economics on skill-biased technological change which disproportionally 
affects routine tasks occupations (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003), or used 
offshorability of occupations (Blinder, 2009; Blinder and Krueger, 2013) 
to predict individual preferences about redistribution, labor market risks, 
6For example, Gehl and Porter (2017) analyze the US political system from a market 
competition perspective and argue that it is a duopoly that serves only the two major US 
parties. With most House and Senate elections being uncontested, one could argue that 
the current US political system is provides such a low-uncertainty environment. Kim and 
Kung (2017) also demonstrate that after shocks or uncertainty-inducing events, firms with 
less specific assets find it much easier to redeploy capital to more productive uses and 
recover faster. 
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and trade policies (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014; Owen and Johnston, 2017; 
Thewissen and Rueda, 2019; Walter, 2017).7 The varieties of capitalism 
(VoC) literature also puts skill specificity at the core of its theoretical edifice 
(Iversen and Soskice, 2001). Under certain institutional conditions (Hall and 
Gingerich, 2009), workers and firms tend to invest in so-called co-specific 
skills that can only be used in a particular industry or firm. Having invested 
in these co-specific skills, workers cannot easily move to other sectors with­
out a pay-cut.8 While skills that can be employed in any firm are considered 
general, those that cannot be carried from one firm to another are specific 
(Becker, 1993, pp.33-40). The investment in specific skills makes it rational 
for employees to demand more redistribution as an insurance against longer 
unemployment spells, demand more job security, and for employers to 
offer longer job tenure to benefit from the investment in skill formation. 
This leads to more strategic coordination between firms and employees in 
coordinated market economies, and more market-based coordination in 
liberal market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001a).9 While the original VoC 
argument is about cross-national variation in specificity, the same argument 
can easily be applied to variation within countries (Hall and Gingerich, 
2009, p.452). Individuals with specific skills are more closely tied to the fate 
of their sector or firm and are thus more likely to support similar political 
candidates as their employer.10 Hence, my third hypothesis is the following: 
7Note that at its core, offshorability can also be seen as a case of low asset specificity 
since it implies mobility of capital across borders. In separate empirical tests I also include 
widely-used measures of offshorability (Blinder, 2009) and task routineness (Acemoglu 
and Autor, 2011), and do not find any impact on partisan alignment. 
8According to the VoC literature, the early investment in specific skills of employees was 
decisive for consensus between workers and employers in the introduction of proportional 
representation in coordinated market economies (Cusack, Iversen and Soskice, 2007). See 
Korpi (2006) for dissenting views highlighting conflictual nature of the cleavage between 
capital and labor (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). 
9See Streeck (2011) for a critique of the distinction between general and specific skills, and 
the political economic implications thereof outlined by the VoC literatire. 
10This is an extension of the sector-based argument made above. In sectors with high 
specificity (e.g. low labor mobility), occupational skills will tend to be more specific. 
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Hypothesis 3: The higher the skill specificity of individual’s occupation, 
the more politically aligned individuals are with their firm in terms of their 
campaign donations, all else equal. 
There is ample evidence on the impact of occupational characteristics on 
political preferences. Individuals with more specific skills demand more 
employment protection (Iversen and Soskice, 2001) and more redistributive 
social policies (Rehm, 2009). With regards to the impact of occupations in 
general, Owen and Johnston (2017) find that occupations focusing on routine 
tasks are more inclined to oppose free trade if they are more easy to offshore, 
and Walter (2017) shows that education and occupational offshorability 
shape labor market risk perceptions. Hertel-Fernandez (2018, pp.65-66) 
notes that within companies, occupations and positions in the firm hierarchy 
are associated with how susceptible employees are for mobilization efforts of 
employers. For example, high-demand occupations like research scientists 
are described as being less responsive to company political messages than 
more easily replaceable administrative and support staff. 
Finally, even though I propose a positive relationship between asset 
specificity and partisan alignment, the relationship might not be the same 
for Democratic and Republican partisan alignment. In the US, the Demo­
cratic party has historically been the party that was more supportive of the 
interests of labor, whereas the Republican party has been more representing 
capital interests. For example, Democrats have a long-standing positive rela­
tionship with labor unions (Dark, 2001) while Republicans have historically 
opposed unions (Ahlquist, 2017). Most recently, Republican states have 
been quite active in passing right-to-work laws which have effectively weak­
ened unions across the US (Feigenbaum, Hertel-Fernandez and Williamson, 
2018). Moreover, even though most US companies split their donations be­
65 4.2 Theory 
tween both parties, they also tend to have a slight Republican bias (Tripathi, 
Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2002), on average.11 Therefore, I expect there 
to be a stronger positive relationship between firm-level asset specificity 
and Republican alignment, and a stronger, negative relationship between 
sectoral labor mobility and Republican alignment than with Democratic 
alignment.12 
4.2.2	 Employee and Firm Motivations for Political Dona­
tions 
Individuals might have different motivations to donate than their company 
PACs. While the donations of PACs are typically conceived to be more 
strategic, with companies often splitting donations more or less equally 
between parties, individuals are often seen as merely expressing their 
personal ideology. However, for individuals to base contributions on their 
firm, sector, or occupation, I need to assume that employees are at least 
somewhat rational and self-serving in their donations. 
On the one hand, a prominent line of research on campaign contribution 
argues that donations are too small (Milyo, Primo and Groseclose, 2000) and 
that there is too little evidence of political returns on donations for them to 
be strategic investments (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder, 2003). 
Similarly, Bartels (2008) contends that individuals routinely vote against 
their objective economic preferences. In addition, Rho and Tomz (2017) 
show that individual preferences on free trade and protectionism are less in 
line with their economic interest if they are not educated about the potential 
11In the data used for this paper, firms spend on average 60% of donations on Republican
 
candidates, and 40% on Democrats.
 
12This is not the main focus of this paper, but I provide additional evidence on the specific
 
partisan direction in the appendix.
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negative or positive effects of trade. On the other hand, there are reasons to 
believe that (donating) employees are at least somewhat rational. I focus 
on individual donations, and donors are not a random sample of the US 
population. On average, they have higher income and are more educated 
(Francia, 2003). Moreover, there is ample evidence that politically organized 
employers communicate their political preferences to their employees, or 
mobilize them to contact legislators or accompany company lobbyists on 
visits to Washington DC (Hertel-Fernandez, 2018). Further, recent research 
on campaign donations shows that donations strategically flow across state 
borders to competitive districts (Gimpel, Lee and Pearson-merkowitz, 2008), 
and that donors tend to give to politicians with similar political views or 
with jurisdiction over their sector of employment (Barber, Canes-Wrone 
and Thrower, 2017). Considering these findings, it increasingly difficult to 
support the notion that donations of individuals are merely consumption. 
Employees also need to be aware of the donations of their company PACs 
to donate to the same party or the same candidates. While public opinion 
scholars often highlight the ignorance of voters (Zaller, 1992), work on chief 
executives has shown that employees start donating to candidates after 
their company CEO donated to the same candidate, pointing to signaling 
by well-known company representatives (Babenko, Fedaseyeu and Zhang, 
2019).Li (2018) also provides evidence that employees react to the donations 
of their company PAC. She finds that donors reduce the contributions to 
their firms’ PAC if their firm donates too much to candidates that are at 
odds with those employees’ ideology. This work highlights the different 
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strategic and ideological incentives faced by firms and employees, but also 
shows that employees pay attention to PAC donations.13 
4.3	 Empirics 
4.3.1	 Data Linking Firm and Employee Campaign Dona­
tions 
For this paper, I use new data matching employee to corporate political dona­
tions using US campaign finance data from the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC). The FEC data contains information on corporate PAC contributions 
to federal candidates and individual donations to candidates. Moreover, 
the individual data contains the donor name, employer, occupation, and 
address. I describe in detail how I match individuals to their companies 
in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. The matched firm-employee donations 
data contains 3,537,187 filings of 466,840 individuals, working for 13,991 
firms in 850 occupations between 2003 and 2016. For this paper, I limit 
the investigation to the time period from 2003 to 2016, because occupation 
data is only available from 2003 onwards. I only use companies for which I 
observe both firm and employee donations, which leaves me with 1,691,790 
campaign contribution filings of 85,109 individuals, working in 874 publicly 
listed firms and 850 occupations. 
The data has two unique features that make them well-suited for an­
alyzing the impact of specificity on firm-employee alignment. First, they 
contain unique identifiers at the level of the firm (Compustat GVKEY), 
13One important limitation of Li’s study is that the study does not specify which kind of 
employees react to changes in PAC donations. For example, senior managers might be 
more aware of changes in PAC donations than rank-and-file employees. 
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the sector (NAICS), and the occupation (SOC). Thus, the data allow for 
clear differentiation of levels of analysis which are treated as analytically 
and empirically different in the Political Economy (Owen and Johnston, 
2017; Walter, 2017) and Labor Economics (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011), but 
not in American Politics (Barber, Canes-Wrone and Thrower, 2017; Bonica, 
2014). The availability of both firm and occupation-level identifiers allows 
me to test the impact of occupational-, firm- as well as sector-level asset 
specificity on political alignment between firms and employees. Second, the 
data enable me to identify of individual preferences via employee actions 
(donations). Thus, I do not rely on stated preferences as does virtually all 
the IPE and CPE research on individual preferences on trade, investment, 
or redistribution.14 
4.3.2 Alignment across Firms, Sectors, and Occupations 
I use the matched firm-employee campaign finance data to measure the 
partisan preferences of employees and their employers. I approximate these 
preferences with the party of the candidates that they donate to. Then, I 
calculate from these donations a time-varying measure of alignment. I use 
partisanship for two reasons: first, especially in the US context, partisanship 
is highly correlated with many specific policy preferences of interest in IPE 
and CPE, such as preferences for redistribution, regulation, health care, or 
trade policy (Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009; Cusack, Iversen and Rehm, 2006; 
Mansfield and Mutz, 2009). Thus, the partisanship of donations can be 
viewed as indicative of the broad policy preferences of individuals. More­
14For a selection of this literature see, among others, Ardanaz, Murillo and Pinto (2013); 
Baker (2005); Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit (2014); Iversen and Soskice (2001); Margalit 
(2011, 2012); Mayda and Rodrik (2005); Naoi and Kume (2015); Rehm (2009); Scheve and 
Slaughter (2001, 2004), and Thewissen and Rueda (2019). Kuo and Naoi (2015) provides an 
excellent overview on the literature on individual-level trade preferences. 
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over, donors are usually one-sided partisan supporters (Bonica, 2014; La 
Raya and Schaffner, 2015). Only two percent of the individuals in my sample 
donate to both sides of the isle, which makes partisanship a good indicator 
for broad policy positions. Second, there are severe limitations with regards 
to the availability of data on specific policy positions of candidates. While 
there is some data on policy reforms or individual issues such as support 
for North American Free Trade Agreement15, issue position data are only 
available for a limited number of candidates. Moreover, even simple mea­
sures like left-right ideology are problematic. DW-Nominate scores are only 
available for current Senate and House members, but not for challengers 
and new candidates. The ideology scores by Adam Bonica (Bonica, 2016b) 
cover both elected and non-elected candidates, but are themselves a function 
of individual and PAC donations, and thus, are of limited use to explain 
donations themselves. 
Therefore I focus on partisanship in this part of the paper and analyze 
donations to specific candidates in a later section. The main dependent 
variable, partisan alignment between firms and their employees, is calculated 
as: 
Rjt Rijt Alignmentict = 1 − − (Rjt + Djt) (Rijt + Dijt) 
15Some of those are available at On the Issues (http://www.ontheissues.org/) or Project 
Vote Smart (https://votesmart.org/), but issue position data is not available for most 
candidates, or in the case of voting records for key bills, only available for candidates who 
make it into office. Barber, Canes-Wrone and Thrower (2017, p.275) used various sources to 
determine the positions of candidates in 22 races. Unfortunately, this would be impossible 
to do manually for the 4667 candidates in my sample. 
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where Rjt and Djt are Republican and Democratic donations of firm j 
in year t, while Rijt and Dijt are Republican and Democratic donations of 
individual i working for firm j in year t, respectively. This variable ranges 
from zero to one, where larger values indicate more partisan alignment 
between employee and a firm in a given year. Intuitively, some company 
PACs donate more to one of the two parties while some PACs donate equally 
to both parties. The measure will be larger if an employee donates to one 
party and the employer gives a higher proportion of donations to the same 
party, and less so if they donate to the opposite sides of the isle. Figure 3.3 
in Chapter 3 showed the distribution of alignment in my data. Alignment 
is approximately normally distributed, with most observations around the 
mean of 0.53 (median 0.52). Around 2000 observations show complete 
non-alignment (corresponding to 1531 individuals) and 4000 observations 
(corresponding to 2906 individuals) show complete alignment.16 
This means there can be very high alignment when PACs donate very 
one-sided, but also very low alignment if most employees of the same 
company donate to the opposite party. What are the patterns of partisan 
alignment across sectors, firms and occupations in the matched employer-
employee data? First, as Figure 3.4 in Chapter 3 shows, average alignment is 
highest in extractive and primary resources industries like metal and rubber, 
while the lowest alignment can be seen in publishing, food, and information 
services. This translates into specific companies in panel b). Timken, 
Marathon Petroleoum, and Devon Energy are most alignment between 
employees and company PAC, and J.P. Morgan, Time Warner, and Vmware 
are least aligned. It seems quite striking that the companies and sectors 
with large sunk investment in site-specific structures and physical assets 
16In Tables B.3 and B.4 I show that all the main results of this paper hold excluding the 
extreme cases in the data where alignment is 0 or 1. 
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(machinery) are the ones that are most aligned, while services industries 
seem to be less aligned, on average.17 
Second, how does alignment between individual and firm contributions 
vary across all industries? In Figure 4.1, I plot the distribution of average 
individual alignment for each 3-digit NAICS industry in the data. The plot 
reveals that there is substantive variation in alignment across and within 
sectors. Heavy industries and extractive industries are much more aligned, 
with alignment larger than 0.6, on average. Many services industries like 
information services, merchandise stores, broadcasting, but also some man­
ufacturing industries like food or chemical manufacturing seem to be much 
more split between the two parties, with alignment scores closer to 0.5. 
Third, how does the large variation across industries compare to the 
variation across occupations? Below in Figure 4.2, I plot the distribution 
of alignment across 23 two-digit SOC occupations. There is actually little 
variation in alignment across occupations as different as management, legal 
services, construction, extraction workers, or personal care. 
In Figure B.2 in the appendix, I show the same pattern of non-variation 
across 96 more fine-grained three-digit SOC occupations. While there is 
more variation in Figure , there is still much less divergence in alignment 
between different occupations than between industries. Some might argue 
that the differences across industries might simply be driven by geography: 
certain sectors might be located in red (or blue) states, and these states 
might happen to have a more politically aligned population of donors.18 
17The exception is Expedia wich is also very aligned. Both Expedia’s PAC and employees 
donate mostly to Democratic candidates. 
18In Figure B.3 in the appendix, I show that even though there might be a role for geography 
in determining alignment, it might not be as large one might think. There is less variation 
in alignment across the 50 US states than across industries. Despite some states like 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Wyoming showing more alignment between employees 
and firms than other states, most states are closer to alignment scores of 0.5. 
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Lessors of Nonfinancial Intangible Assets (except Copyrighted Works) (533)Food Manufacturing (311)
Electronics and Appliance Stores  (443)Nonstore Retailers  (454)
Paper Manufacturing (322)Wood Product Manufacturing (321)
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing (336)Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services (541)
Chemical Manufacturing (325)Publishing Industries (except Internet) (511)
Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing (312)Broadcasting (except Internet) (515)
Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing (316)General Merchandise Stores  (452)
Ambulatory Health Care Services (621)NA (999)
Rental and Leasing Services (532)Credit Intermediation (522)
Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing (334)Couriers and Messengers (492)
Other Information Services (519)Air Transportation (481)
Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores  (448)Securities, Commodity Contracts, and Other Financial Investments (523)
Food and Beverage Stores  (445)Insurance Carriers (524)
Waste Management and Remediation Services (562)Telecommunications (517)
Administrative and Support Services (561)Construction of Buildings (236)
Apparel Manufacturing (315)Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods  (424)
Accommodation (721)Miscellaneous Manufacturing (339)
Food Services and Drinking Places (722)Educational Services (611)
Machinery Manufacturing (333)Water Transportation (483)
Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services (518)Health and Personal Care Stores  (446)
Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing (335)Rail Transportation (482)
Building Material and Garden Equipment and Supplies Dealers  (444)Truck Transportation (484)
Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries (713)Support Activities for Transportation (488)
Nursing and Residential Care Facilities (623)Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries (512)
Utilities  (221)Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing (326)
Textile Mills (313)Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers  (441)
Hospitals (622)Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing (327)
Printing and Related Support Activities (323)Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing (332)
Crop Production (111)Real Estate (531)
Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods  (423)Funds, Trusts, and Other Financial Vehicles  (525)
Primary Metal Manufacturing (331)Mining (except Oil and Gas) (212)
Transit and Ground Passenger Transportation (485)Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction (237)
Oil and Gas Extraction (211)Support Activities for Mining (213)
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing (324)Pipeline Transportation (486)
Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing (337)Wholesale Electronic Markets and Agents and Brokers  (425)
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Figure 4.1 Strong Variation in Alignment across 3-Digit NAICS Industries. The 
boxplot shows that there is strong variation in alignment across 3-digit NAICS 
industries (3-digit industry codes in parentheses) Heavy and extractive industries 
are most aligned while most services industries are less aligned. Data: own 
calculations. 
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Food Preparation and Serving Related (35)
Community and Social Service (21)
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair (49)
Transportation and Material Moving (53)
Office and Administrative Support (43)
Healthcare Support (31)
Computer and Mathematical (15)
Education, Training, and Library (25)
Healthcare Practitioners and Technical (29)
Legal (23)
Personal Care and Service (39)
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media (27)
Production (51)
Life, Physical, and Social Science (19)
Construction and Extraction (47)
Business and Financial Operations (13)
Architecture and Engineering (17)
Sales and Related (41)
Management (11)
Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance (37)
Protective Service (33)
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry (45)
Military Specific (55)
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Figure 4.2 Weak Variation in in Alignment across Occupations. The plot shows 
that there is very little variation in alignment across 2-digit SOC occupations of 
donors. Data: own calculations. 
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Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing (312)Electronics and Appliance Stores  (443)
Securities, Commodity Contracts, and Other Financial Investments (523)Transportation Equipment Manufacturing (336)
Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries (512)Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services (518)
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Educational Services (611)Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services (541)
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Miscellaneous Manufacturing (339)Machinery Manufacturing (333)
Accommodation (721)Wood Product Manufacturing (321)
Waste Management and Remediation Services (562)Administrative and Support Services (561)
Rail Transportation (482)Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods  (424)
Health and Personal Care Stores  (446)Utilities  (221)
Support Activities for Transportation (488)Rental and Leasing Services (532)
Hospitals (622)Food and Beverage Stores  (445)
Building Material and Garden Equipment and Supplies Dealers  (444)Mining (except Oil and Gas) (212)
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing (327)Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing (335)
Funds, Trusts, and Other Financial Vehicles  (525)Paper Manufacturing (322)
Real Estate (531)Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods  (423)
Crop Production (111)Transit and Ground Passenger Transportation (485)
Food Services and Drinking Places (722)Nursing and Residential Care Facilities (623)
Oil and Gas Extraction (211)Printing and Related Support Activities (323)
Primary Metal Manufacturing (331)Truck Transportation (484)
Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction (237)Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing (326)
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing (332)Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing (324)
Support Activities for Mining (213)Pipeline Transportation (486)
Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers  (441)Wholesale Electronic Markets and Agents and Brokers  (425)
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Figure 4.3 Strong Within-Occupation Variation in Alignment across Industries. 
The boxplot depicts the strong within-occupation variation in alignment for one 
specific occupation (chief executives, SOC Code 11-1011) across 3-digit NAICS 
industries (3-digit industry codes in parentheses). Data: own calculations. 
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Finally, there is significant variation within individual occupations across 
industries. Figure 4.3 depicts the same three-digit NAICS distribution of 
alignment as before, but this time for only one occupation, in this case 
chief executives and presidents (SOC 11-1011). In fact, the differences in 
alignment are even starker than pooled across occupations, ranging from 
approximately equal donations of companies and employees to both sides 
of the isle in broadcasting and couriers services (median alignment of 0.5) 
to more than a 0.8 alignment in petroleum, coal, and pipeline transportation. 
This goes partly against the argument put forward by Bonica (2016a) that 
CEOs are mostly ideological and not strategic in their contributions. In fact, 
heir contributions seem to vary systematically with the industry in which 
they are employed.19 
This pattern becomes even clearer if we only concentrate on manufac­
turing industries (NAICS 31 - 33). Figure 4.4 below shows that even within 
manufacturing industries and within the same occupation, there is a trend 
towards more alignment in industries related to resource extraction and 
raw materials, i.e. in industries with highly specific physical assets. Further, 
in Figure B.1 in the appendix, I show that this pattern is not specific to 
chief executives. Very similar alignment distributions can also be observed 
in other occupations like lawyers, agricultural engineers, and (with some 
limitations) IT specialists. 
This initial inspection of the data reveals that there is significantly more 
variation in alignment across industries (and only a bit more across states) 
than there is across individual occupations. Hence, where people work seems to 
matter more than what people do, in terms of whether they share the same parti­
19This is more coherent with strategic CEO donations as observed by Babenko, Fedaseyeu 
and Zhang (2019), even though they do not hypothesize about differences in strategies 
across different industries. 
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Figure 4.4 Strong within-Occupation Variation in Alignment across Manufac­
turing Industries. The graph shows that within one narrow occupational group 
(chief executives, SOC Code 11-1011) there is substantive variation in alignment 
across 3-digit manufacturing industries. CEOs in extractive industries and energy 
industries tend to be most aligned, and computer and chemical industries less. 
Data: own calculations. 
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sanship with their employer. This is in itself a surprising finding considering 
the long line of research which argues that occupational characteristics are 
important sources of political preferences. However, individual occupational 
characteristics within firms seem not to be as important for donation-based 
partisan alignment. In sum, the main message from the data is that sectoral 
models of individual preference formation might still be valuable, despite a 
recent push towards occupation-based models.20 
4.3.3 Measuring Specificity: Firms, Sectors & Occupations 
For measuring sector-level asset specificity, I use a measure of labor mobility 
JGkt+JLkt (Alt et al., 1999) which is calculated as LMkt = , where JGkt are Lkt 
job gained in industry k in year t, JLkt, are job lost, and Lkt are overall 
jobs in a sector, taken from the Statistics of US Businesses (SUSB) tables, 
published by the US Census Bureau. Hence, LMkt measures the overall 
relative job turnover in a given sector-year, one important indicator of 
specificity (Cusack, Iversen and Soskice, 2007; Hall and Soskice, 2001a). The 
measure ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates the absence of mobility and 
1 indicates full mobility. Hence, more mobility implies less human capital 
specificity. I show the distribution of this variable in Panel a) in Figure 
4.5 below. One can see that it is approximately normally distributed, if 
somewhat right-skewed.21 The average labor mobility is 0.28 in the sample, 
which is slightly higher than the country-wide average of 0.26 between 
2003 and 2015. The most mobile 3-digit NAICS sectors across 2003 and 
20In separate tests, I did not find a significant relationship between partisan alignment in 
donations and different measures of offshorability and job routineness from Acemoglu 
et al. (2015) or Blinder and Krueger (2013), both used in the study by Owen and Johnston 
(2017). If there is any relationship in the aggregate, it is driven by CEOs (low offshorability 
in the data) and disappears once I control for this single occupation. 
21One caveat of this measure is that the SUSB tables only become available after some delay, 
so the measure ends in 2015 at the moment. 
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2015 in the data are Information Services and Data Processing Services 
(514), Broadcasting and Telecommunications (513), Data processing, hosting, 
and related services (518), and Construction of Buildings (236). The least 
mobile are Central Banks and Monetary Authorities (521), Hospitals (622), 
Paper Manufacturing (322), and the Petroleum Sector (324). One can easily 
identify some of the most (e.g. Petroleum) and least (e.g. Data Processing) 
aligned sectors from the descriptive analysis above.22 
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Figure 4.5 Distribution of Sector- and Firm Specificity. Panel a) shows the 
distribution of Labor Mobility across 4-digit NAICS sectors. Panel b) depicts the 
distribution of specific assets as a share of overall assets at the firm level. Source: 
Compustat Capital IQ North America, Statistics of US Businesses (SUSB). 
For firm-level specificity, I use a combination of site specificity and phys­
ical specificity (Joskow, 1988, pp.106-107). I measure asset specificity as 
firm-level plant, property and equipment expenses as a share of overall 
firm assets, (PPENTjt/ATjt), both taken from Compustat.23 Below in Panel 
22Note that I also found highly aligned information technologies firms above (Expedia), 
while most of the information technology firms have rather low alignment. Therefore, this 
measure might underestimate specificity in sectors with stringent occupational licensing 
(hence, high specificity) but not necessarily long-term contracts (such as hospitals), or in 
sectors with high use of non-compete contracts (such as technology firms). 
23I do not use R&D expenditures as a measure of asset specificity, as does former work 
Alt et al. (1999). R&D expenditure data are missing for over 60% firm-year observations 
in Compustat. Moreover, at the industry level R&D expenditure is often only available at 
the very rough 2-digit NAICS level or it is missing altogether. Ideally, I would also use 
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b) of Figure 4.5, I show the distribution of asset specificity in my data. 
Which companies have high and low specificity, respectively? Companies 
with a very high share of specific assets in the data include oil and gas 
extraction companies like Whiting Petroleum (alignment: 0.79, asset speci­
ficity: 91.3) and Chesapeake Energy (alignment: 0.69, asset specificity: 87.7), 
or the pipeline transportation firm Energy Transfer Partners (alignment: 
0.84, asset specificity: 68.1). Firms with very low asset specificity include 
Fannie Mae (alignment: 0.53, asset specificity: 0), the insurance carrier 
MetLife (alignment: 0.52, asset specificity: 1.2), chemical manufacturer 
Celegne (alignment: 0.5, asset specificity: 3.7), or the professional services 
consultancy SRA International (alignment: 0.53, asset specificity: 4.1). 
Level Explanatory Variable Measurement Source Expected Sign 
Sector Labor Mobility LMkt = 
JGkt+JLkt 
Lkt 
SUSB − 
Firm Asset Specificity (PPENTjt/ATjt) Compustat + 
Occupation Skill Specificity Skill Specificity Iversen and Soskice (2001) 
Cusack, Iversen and Rehm (2006) 
+ 
Table 4.1 Main Explanatory Variables and Expected Signs: This table depicts 
the measures for asset specificity at the sector-level, firm-level, and occupation-
level, their sources, and the expected signs. LMkt is labor mobility, where JGkt 
are job gains in industry k in year t, JLkt are job losses, and Lkt are overall jobs. 
(PPENT/AT) are plant, property and equipment expenses as a share of overall 
firm assets. 
Finally, I measure specificity at the occupational-level using the measure 
of skill specificity by Iversen and Soskice (2001) and Cusack, Iversen and 
Rehm (2006), calculated from individual-level response data from the Inter­
national Social Survey Project and OECD labor force statistics. It measures 
the specialization of individual skills in an occupation relative to total skills 
or general skills. The original measure is at the ISCO-88 classification of 
occupations and matched to US SOC codes for this paper. I use the stan­
firm-specific investment in training and skills of employees but such data is not available 
either. 
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dardized version of the measure which ranges from zero to 4.5, and recode 
it into a binary measure which scores 1 if specificity is above the mean value 
of the continuous skill specificity measure, and 0 if it is below the mean. 
All the results shown below are identical using the continuous measure 
instead. Overall, 30 percent of my sample exhibit a high skill specificity, and 
70 percent have a low occupational skill specificity. The main independent 
variables at the sectoral-, firm-, and occupational level used in the analysis 
part are summarized in Table 4.1. 
4.3.4 Analysis: Specificity and Individual Alignment 
In this section, I empirically analyze the impact of asset specificity on 
partisan alignment between employees and their company in terms of 
their campaign contributions. First, I show that employees in sectors with 
high asset specificity are more inclined to share the partisan preferences 
of their employer. I do not find the same result for skill specificity at the 
occupational level, indicating that where individuals work seems to matter 
more for the partisan alignment with their employer than the jobs they have 
in a company. Second, I explore in more detail the mechanism behind the 
observed firm-employee alignment, and test the impact of firm donations 
on employee donations to specific candidates. 
Figure 4.6 shows the relationship between specificity at the sectoral-, 
firm-, and occupational level and alignment between firms and employees. 
Panel a) depicts a negative association between labor mobility and alignment 
as hypothesized above. However, the correlation between the two variables 
is also rather weak (-0.137). Panel b) plots firm-level asset specificity as 
defined above against average firm alignment showing a stronger, positive 
relationship. In Figure B.5 and B.6 in the appendix, I partition alignment by 
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Figure 4.6 Relationship between Specificity and Partisan Alignment across Sec­
tors, Firms, and Occupations. These plots shows the relationship between the three 
main explanatory variables and partisan alignment between firms and employees. 
While labor mobility as an inverse measure of specificty shows a weak negative 
relationship, both firm-level asset specificity and skill specificity are positively 
related to firm-employee alignment. Source: Iversen and Soskice (2001) and own 
calculations. 
partisanship and show that the negative relationship between mobility and 
alignment and the positive correlation between asset specificity and align­
ment are driven by Republican alignment. Labor mobility (asset specificity) 
and aligning on a Republican candidate are strongly negatively (positively) 
related. Conversely, Democratic alignment correlates positively (negatively) 
with labor mobility (firm asset specificity). While I do not explore the parti­
san mechanism here, a plausible explanation could be that the Democratic 
Party has historically been more aligned to labor-intensive industries and 
labor unions. Moreover, since corporate PACs have a conservative bias, on 
average, it seems intuitive that a larger portion of firm-employee alignment 
is Republican and hence driving results. Panel c) shows that skill specificity 
is associated with a a 6% increase in alignment. Across all individuals, the 
mean level of alignment is 0.51 when skill specificity equals 0 and 0.57 when 
skill specificity equals 1. 
Table 4.2 includes descriptives of the main variables used in the following 
analysis. Motivated by the initial descriptive results shown above, I am 
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Table 4.2 Summary Statistics
 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Year 138,549 2010.39 4.04 2003 2016 
Partisan Alignment 138,539 0.53 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Democratic Alignment 138,549 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Republican Alignment 138,549 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Share Specific Asset 122,657 0.21 0.23 0.00 0.94 
Labor Mobility 101,133 0.26 0.11 0.00 0.94 
Skill Specificity 117,885 0.31 0.46 0 1 
log(Median Annual Income) 111,634 11.39 0.45 9.58 12.24 
log(Employees) 121,601 3.77 1.31 0.00 7.74 
log(Sales) 126,109 9.90 1.41 −0.28 13.09 
log(Capital Expenditure) 124,645 6.41 2.00 −0.06 10.44 
log(Cost of Goods Sold) 126,110 9.15 1.52 0.00 12.78 
log(Expenses for Plant/Property) 122,267 8.26 1.87 0.00 12.44 
Productivity 120,601 −0.10 0.69 −4.89 6.19 
Union Membership (in %) 124,419 8.30 11.19 0.00 72.90 
log(# Regulatory Restrictions) 84,068 7.93 1.56 5.27 10.49 
Herfindahl-Hirschman (geographic) 120,057 0.16 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Red State (Presidential Vote) 123,272 5.82 2.05 1.50 28.80 
interested in the relationship between partisan alignment between firms 
and employees and specificity at the sectoral-, firm-, and occupational level. 
I expect that more specificity at a given level of analysis will be related to 
more alignment between employees and companies, holding constant the 
other levels of analysis. Therefore, for the first empirical specification, I 
estimate the following linear model, regressing individual alignment on 
firm- and sectoral asset specificity, using occupation and year fixed effects: 
Alignmentiojst = αo + θt + γSpeci f icityjt + βZjt + δIiot + τRst + ϵiojst 
where alignment is measured for employee i in occupation o working in 
firm j living in county c in state s, with t denoting year. The αo refers 
to occupation fixed effects, and θt to year fixed effects. My coefficient of 
interest is γ, the degree of asset specificity. In the initial specification, I 
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control for a host of firm-level factors like log sales, employment, cost of 
goods sold, capital expenditure, and firm productivity24, contained in the 
matrix Zjt. Moreover, I control for the log of the occupation-specific median 
income from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Iiot, and for Rist, whether the 
state an employee lives in is Republican or Democratic, according to the 
presidential vote share from the respective election. 
The main specification in column 1 in Table 4.3 shows that there is 
a strong positive relationship between the share of firm-specific assets 
and individual partisan alignment. Holding constant SOC occupation 
and several controls, a one-standard-deviation increase in asset specificity 
(a 0.23 increase) means a 0.015 (or 1.5%) increase in alignment. This is 
a significant increase given that most firms are located around the 0.5 
alignment score mark. A larger two-standard deviation increase in asset 
specificity would be associated with a 3% increase in alignment. Conversely, 
the relationship between labor mobility (as an inverse measure of specificity) 
is shown in Column 4 in Table 4.3 and is negative and significant, as 
expected. The substantive effect is smaller than the firm-level asset specificity. 
A one-standard deviation increase in labor mobility is associated with a 
0.007 decrease in alignment. I sequentially introduce 2-digit industry and 
county-level fixed effects, to account for unobserved and time-invariant 
geographic factors and larger industry-level differences, respectively. The 
results are remarkably stable, even though controlling for geography slightly 
reduces the impact of firm-level asset specificity and sectoral labor mobility. 
The coefficient for Republican states is positive and significant, indicating 
that living in a Republican-voting state increases alignment by 0.031, on 
24Productivity is measured by estimating the Solow-residual, i.e. by regressing (logged) 
sales on employment and expenditures for plant, property and equipment, as well as 
industry and year fixed effects (Bilir, 2014). The resulting residual is my measure of 
productivity. 
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average. As expected from the theoretical discussion and descriptives in 
Figures B.6 B.5, this result seems to be driven by firms and employees 
being aligned on Republican candidates. In sum, being in a firm with high 
asset specificity is almost as predictive of alignment as the state individuals 
live in. Furthermore, I test for the impact of skill specificity on alignment 
between firms and employees in Table 4.4 below. Controlling for firm-
and county-level fixed effects, the results suggest a positive effect of skill 
specificity on alignment. Within the same firm and county, employees 
employed in a skill-specific occupation are approximately 2% more aligned 
than employees in a non-specific occupation. However, because there is a 
strong correlation between skill specificity and the occupational category of 
chief executives (SOC 11-1011), I include a binary measure for whether an 
employee is a chief executive in columns 3 and 4. This eliminates virtually 
all the relationship between skill specificity and alignment. While I find a 
strong association between sectoral and firm-level specificity and alignment, 
I do not find support for occupational skill specificity.25 
I also find that firms with more employees are less aligned, on average. 
This is an interesting result in itself that is in line with the expectation 
that collective political actions is more difficult in larger groups because of 
higher likelihood of free riding (Hansen, Mitchell and Drope, 2005; Olson, 
1965). While larger firms might be potentially more powerful, they are also 
more likely to have more politically heterogeneous employees which would 
reduce alignment, confirming work on how group size and heterogeneity 
(or cohesiveness) of preferences inhibit or foster collective action (Ostrom, 
25Because their compensation most often depends on company profits, it is not surprising 
that CEOs and Presidents of companies are significantly more aligned with their company, 
as also shown in the descriptives above. 
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Table 4.3 Regression Results: The Effect of Specificity on Partisan Alignment, 
Firms and Sectors 
(1) (2) 
Dependent variable: 
Align 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
Share Specific Assets (firm) 0.068∗∗∗ 
(0.017) 
0.070∗∗∗ 
(0.026) 
0.036∗∗ 
(0.015) 
Labor Mobility (sector) −0.063∗∗ 
(0.029) 
−0.098∗∗∗ 
(0.035) 
−0.043∗ 
(0.024) 
log(Capital Expenditure) 0.003 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.008∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.004∗ 
(0.002) 
log(Sales) −0.005 
(0.005) 
−0.005 
(0.006) 
−0.002 
(0.005) 
−0.012∗∗ 
(0.006) 
−0.007 
(0.006) 
−0.003 
(0.005) 
log(Employees) −0.016∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
−0.015∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
−0.014∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
−0.023∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
−0.023∗∗∗ 
(0.006) 
−0.019∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
log(Cost Goods Sold) 0.003 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
−0.001 
(0.004) 
0.010∗∗ 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Productivity −0.0001 
(0.004) 
−0.004 
(0.005) 
−0.001 
(0.004) 
−0.007 
(0.005) 
−0.017∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.007∗∗ 
(0.004) 
log(Med. Income) −0.045 
(0.031) 
−0.047 
(0.031) 
−0.032 
(0.030) 
0.029 
(0.033) 
0.029 
(0.034) 
0.042 
(0.035) 
Red State (1/0) 0.031∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
0.030∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
0.037∗∗∗ 
(0.006) 
0.032∗∗∗ 
(0.006) 
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Occupation FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
NAICS 2-digit FEs ✓ ✓ 
County FEs ✓ ✓ 
Observations 95,220 95,220 85,524 74,576 74,576 67,117 
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.089 0.133 0.065 0.073 0.120 
Note: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.4 Regression Results: The Effect of Skill Specificity on Partisan Alignment, 
Occupations 
(1) 
Dependent variable: 
Align 
(2) (3) (4) 
Skill Specificity (1/0) 0.019∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
0.019∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Chief Executive (1/0) 0.042∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
0.042∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
log(Capital Expenditure) 0.009∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
0.009∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
0.009∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
0.009∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
log(Sales) 0.021 
(0.018) 
0.026 
(0.019) 
0.021 
(0.019) 
0.025 
(0.019) 
log(Employees) −0.010 
(0.032) 
−0.009 
(0.033) 
−0.011 
(0.032) 
−0.010 
(0.033) 
log(Cost Goods Sold) −0.023 
(0.016) 
−0.027 
(0.017) 
−0.022 
(0.017) 
−0.026 
(0.017) 
Productivity −0.014 
(0.023) 
−0.014 
(0.023) 
−0.014 
(0.023) 
−0.014 
(0.023) 
log(Med. Income) 0.020∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
0.022∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.007∗ 
(0.004) 
Red State (1/0) 0.023∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
0.023∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Firm FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
County FEs ✓ ✓ 
Observations 94,951 85,284 94,951 85,284 
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.187 0.167 0.189 
Note: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
 
Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses.
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2010). For future research, it would be interesting to investigate the potential 
interaction between political preference heterogeneity in firms and firm size. 
Of course, there are alternative explanations for why individuals might 
donate to the same party as their employer, which I explore in Table B.1 
and B.2 in the appendix, using the main specification from Column 1 and 4 
above. Hertel-Fernandez (2018) notes that when individuals live in a region 
with higher unemployment, they are more likely to become politically active 
for the company because they are more fearful of retaliation if they do not 
follow company demands. Therefore, I control for the annual county-level 
unemployment rate taken from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics 
(LAUS), published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.26 The coefficient on 
the unemployment rate is negative and significant, which suggests that 
the mechanism proposed by Hertel-Fernandez does not hold for donations. 
The results in this paper indicate that those employees who are living in 
more affluent counties are more aligned with their company, on average. 
Moreover, geographic concentration of an industry has been shown to be 
positively related to political mobilization (Busch and Reinhardt, 2000). In 
column 3 of Table B.1 and B.2, I control for industry concentration using 
a local Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI). I do not find that including 
this control variable changes the result for my main independent variable of 
interest. While the coefficient on the HHI is negatively signed, opposite to 
what I would expect from existing research, it is not significantly different 
from zero.27 Related to the argument of this paper, employees in sectors 
26The mean unemployment rate in the linked firm-employee data is 5.82 percent, which is 
slightly lower than the US-wide mean unemployment rate of 6.53 between 2003 and 2016. 
27The HHI is measured as ∑Kk=1 s
2 2 
ik where sik are the squared employment shares of each 
industry k in county i, which are subsequently summed over all counties. Intuitively, if 
all employees in an industry are located in one county, this measure is one, indicating full 
geographic concentration, and approaches zero as the number of employees is distributed 
across more and more counties. The geographic HHI has a mean of 0.16 in the sample 
analyzed which is higher than the US-wide 0.12, on average. This makes sense as I am only 
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with stronger profit-sharing institutions like unions could be more likely 
to align politically with their employer, because their own wages are more 
closely linked to company profits (Dean, 2016). Controlling for union 
membership as in column 4 does not change the strong positive relationship 
between asset specificity and alignment. Furthermore, the coefficient on 
union membership is not significantly different from zero, suggesting no 
impact of profit sharing institutions on partisan alignment. Finally, Hertel-
Fernandez (2018) also finds that companies are more likely to mobilize their 
employees in highly regulated industries, i.e. in sectors where there is a 
tighter connection between regulation and company profits. In column 5 
of Table B.1 and B.2, I control for regulatory exposure using the number of 
regulatory restrictions from the RegData database as a measure of regulatory 
exposure, measured at the 6-digit NAICS level (McLaughlin et al., 2017). 
I do not find any relationship between the extent to which an industry is 
exposed to regulation and the degree of partisan alignment between firms 
and employees.28 Finally, Table B.5 and B.6 replicate the main results from 
above, splitting alignment by partisanship. While the effect of labor mobility 
(firm asset specificity) Republican alignment is always negative (positive) 
and highly significant, the signs are reversed for Democratic alignment. 
In sum, these results point to a positive relationship between sectoral and 
firm-level specificity and partisan alignment, but not for occupational skill 
specificity. However, both from the descriptive graphs in Figures B.5 and 
looking at companies which are politically organized (i.e. which have a PAC). Industry 
concentration has been shown to be positively related to the existence of corporate political 
activity at the firm and industry level, although with mixed results (Hansen, Mitchell and 
Drope, 2005). 
28Note that labor mobility becomes insignificant when introducing the measure of regula­
tory restrictions. However, this measure is also missing for many observations and shrinks 
the sample used for estimation by 1/3. Thus, those last results are not as conclusive as 
other robustness tests. 
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B.6 and the below analysis, this relationship seems to be driven by firms 
and employees aligning on a Republican candidate. 
4.3.5 Employee Responsiveness to PAC Donations 
Above, I find a strong positive relationship between different measures of 
specificity at the sector-level and firm-level and firm-employee alignment. 
This suggests that individuals support the party or the candidates that 
their company supports. But do employees pay attention to their com­
pany donations, and then change their contribution patterns when their 
company PAC does? An alternative mechanism could be that individuals 
self-select into particular employers due to individual characteristics like 
unobserved skills, education, or their own political preferences, despite 
controlling for occupation, broad industry, or geography. Unfortunately, 
I do not observe many donors changing employers in my dataset, but I 
do observe the candidates that company PACs donate to, as well as those 
that individuals support. Therefore, I can test whether employees change 
candidate-specific donations when their company PAC changes contribu­
tion patterns. This would provide stronger evidence for the claim that 
employees follow their company political activities. Hence, I aggregate the 
linked employer-employee donations data at the employee-candidate-cycle 
level and add information on whether the PAC of on individuals’ employer 
donated to the respective candidate in a given election cycle. I estimate the 
following linear regression model: 
log(Donationsijt) = αi + θj + γt + δFirm Donationijt + ϵijt 
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where the dependent variable is the log of individual i’s donations to 
candidate j in electoral cycle t, and the independent variable of interest 
Firm Donationijt equals one if an employees i’s company PAC donates to 
candidate j in cycle t. Firms donating to the same candidate as an em­
ployee happens 47,316 times in my sample of 432,474 individual-candidate­
cycle donations, for about 10.9 percent of donations. I include individual-, 
candidate-, and cycle-specific fixed-effects. Therefore, I estimate only the 
effect of firm donations on within-individual and within-candidate dona­
tions amounts. Thus, I control for all unobserved time-invariant individual 
and candidate characteristics, and cycle-specific shocks that affect all donors 
equally. 
Table 4.5 Regression Results: Effect of Firm Donations on Employee Donations 
Dependent variable:
 
log(Donations) 
(1) (2) 
Firm Donation 0.044∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 
(0.015) (0.016) 
Cycle FEs ✓ 
individual FEs ✓ ✓ 
Candidate FEs ✓ 
Candidate-Cycle FEs ✓ 
Observations 432,474 432,474 
Adjusted R2 0.566 0.572 
Note: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
 
Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
 
Column 1 in Table 4.5 shows the results. There is indeed a positive and 
very significant relationship between PAC donations to specific candidates 
and employee donations to the same candidates. In Column 2, I substitute 
the candidate-specific fixed effects for candidate-cycle fixed effects, since 
some candidates run for multiple offices over time. For example, some 
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candidates run for the House in one cycle and for Senate in the next cycle, 
which could affect both company and employee donations, because these 
candidates might be more well-known to the public and more valuable for 
corporations. The effects are almost identical and still highly significant. 
Substantively, the coefficients indicate a 4.4 and 4.5 percent increase in 
employee donations to specific candidates in a given cycle, if the employees’ 
company PAC donates to the same candidate. This is equivalent to an 
additional 59 USD to 60 USD donated per employee.29 Since I include indi­
vidual fixed effects, this effect is not driven by individual occupations (like 
CEOs or other top executives).30 This provides quite strong evidence that 
employees pay attention to the donations of their employer PAC, providing 
a mechanism for the aggregate correlations found in the previous section. 
I proceed by investigating which types of candidates are driving the 
increases in individual donations following PAC donations. If the motiva­
tion behind the changes is to support one’s company, then the relationship 
should be stronger for candidates that are more likely to be politically valu­
able. These include House and Senate representatives (versus Presidential 
candidates), well-entrenched incumbents, and candidates running for open 
seats. In Table 4.6, I drop the candidate-specific fixed effects to investigate 
which kind of candidates or elections contribute more to the average positive 
effect of PAC donations on individual donations. I interact Firm Donationijt 
with dummy variables for whether the respective candidate is running 
for the House, Senate, or trying to become President. Given that PACs 
donate strategically, one would expect them to be more likely to contribute 
to House and Senate candidates, because they can affect actual legislation 
29The average individual donation in my sample is $1335, and the median donation $500. 
30Of course, occupations can change over time. In separate regressions I interact the 
donation dummy with a dummy for chief executives and find no effect. 
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Table 4.6 Regression Results: Effect of Firm Donations on Employee Donations by 
Election Types 
(1) 
Dependent variable: 
log(Donations) 
(2) (3) 
Firm Donation −0.070∗∗∗ 
(0.020) 
−0.103∗∗∗ 
(0.022) 
0.065∗∗∗ 
(0.016) 
House −0.281∗∗∗ 
(0.010) 
Senate −0.021∗ 
(0.011) 
President 0.495∗∗∗ 
(0.013) 
Firm Donation × House 0.099∗∗∗ 
(0.025) 
Firm Donation × Senate 0.144∗∗∗ 
(0.026) 
Firm Donation × President −0.031 
(0.048) 
Cycle FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ 
individual FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 432,474 432,474 432,474 
Adjusted R2 0.534 0.524 0.543 
Note: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
 
Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
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once elected. Hence, one would expect stronger effects for Senatorial and 
House races. This indeed what I find: when a firm donates to a House 
or a Senate candidate, employees of the firm donate more to the same 
candidate, on average, indicated by the positive and significant interaction 
terms on Firm Donation × House as well as Firm Donation × Senate. The 
same does not hold for Presidential candidates, for which the interaction 
term is negative and insignificant. Moreover, the effect is stronger for Senate 
candidates than for House candidates. This makes intuitive sense because 
individual Senators are more powerful legislators than individual House 
Representatives which receive larger donations, on average, and are more 
targeted by PACs. Substantively, the effects are slightly lower, but similar 
to the baseline results shown above. Employees increase donations by 2.9 
percent to House candidates and by 4.2 percent to Senate candidates if their 
employer’s PAC donates to the same candidate.31 
Finally, I repeat the same for the incumbency status of the candidate, 
shown in Table 4.7. Again, the results point towards an investment mo­
tive for individual donations. Employees donate more to challengers and 
less to open seats and incumbents, showing that their are probably more 
ideological, on average, than institutional donors like PACs (La Raya and 
Schaffner, 2015). However, the negative effect of incumbency status on indi­
vidual donations narrows down significantly when the employer donates 
to the same candidate, as indicated by the significant interaction term Firm 
31Note that above, I only estimate the intensive margin, or how much individuals donate 
more to candidates supported by their company. I do not estimate, however, the extensive 
margin, or whether they donate to a candidate or not. At the moment, creating this 
dataset takes up too much computing resources because it would require a prohibitively 
large dataset. For instance, only creating a company-candidate-cycle dataset with all 
possible combinations of firms, candidates, and cycles, would result in 12799 firms × 4667 
candidates × 7 cycles, or a dataset with 418,130,531 rows. The data used above contains 
information on approximately 240,000 individuals, which would result in a dataset of 
78,642,776,942 rows. 
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Table 4.7 Regression Results: Effect of Firm Donations on Employee Donations 
across Seat Types 
(1) 
Dependent variable: 
log(Donations) 
(2) (3) 
Firm donated −0.018 
(0.017) 
−0.045∗∗ 
(0.019) 
−0.067∗∗∗ 
(0.021) 
Challenger 0.057∗∗∗ 
(0.010) 
Open Seat −0.019∗ 
(0.011) 
Incumbent −0.042∗∗∗ 
(0.011) 
Firm donated x Challenger −0.077∗∗∗ 
(0.030) 
Firm donated x Open Seat 0.007 
(0.026) 
Firm donated x Incumbent 0.062∗∗∗ 
(0.024) 
Cycle FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ 
individual FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 432,474 432,474 432,474 
Adjusted R2 0.524 0.523 0.523 
Note: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
 
Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses.
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Donation × Incumbent. Vice versa, the positive effect of firm donations on 
employee donations is not driven by open seats and incumbents, as visible 
in the negative and significant interaction Firm Donation × Challenger, and 
the insignificant interaction term Firm Donation × Open Seat. 
Overall, this section shows that employees follow their company political 
activities, and donate more to candidates that their corporate PAC supports. 
Moreover, this positive relationship between employee donations and com­
pany contributions is driven by incumbents as well as House and Senate 
candidates. This provides evidence that individuals seem to pay attention 
to the information provided by company PAC donations, and more so if 
these donations are more likely to be politically valuable.32 
4.4 Discussion of Limitations 
There remain important limitations and qualifications with regards to the 
findings of this paper. In terms of case selection and external validity of 
findings, it is not clear that the US allows very broad conclusions about 
firm-employee alignment in other countries. The out-sized role money 
in politics in the US is quite exceptional, compared to other developed 
countries which typically have stricter limits on campaign finance. I am also 
limited to a sample of firms which choose to have a PAC and employees 
who decide to donate to political candidates in the first place. Hence, there 
can be doubt with regards to how far the findings concerning the firm-
employee link travel outside of the US and how much we can learn about 
32Note that the firm and individuals donating to the same candidate is not determined by 
individual occupation. In the appendix in Table B.7 I show that the chief executives, even 
though more likely to support the same party, are not more likely to donate to the same 
candidate. Senate and House Candidates are more likely to be supported by employees 
and PACs, as are incumbents and open seat candidates (in that order, decreasing), relative 
to Presidential candidates and challengers. 
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non-donation-based forms of alignment. First, I want to stress that open 
data on employee donations is not readily available in many other countries, 
and usually not easily linked to their employer.33 Second, similar questions 
can indeed be investigated elsewhere using firm- and employee surveys as 
in Hertel-Fernandez (2018), but but would likely require more resources 
than are available for a PhD dissertation. Third, while I show that the 
sample of employees in publicly-traded companies is not representative of 
the US as a whole in terms of sectoral and occupational composition, the 
data might still allow conclusions about the overall US donor population, 
or donors in public firms. Publicly traded firms are important because 
they make up a large share of US economic activity, and the abundance of 
financial data on them will facilitate future work.34 
With regards to measurement of alignment, I assume in the first two 
papers of this dissertation that individual donations are expressions of 
employee ideology, and that firm donations are expressions of the corporate 
political leanings. While individual donations are often regarded as purely 
ideological (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder, 2003; La Raya and 
Schaffner, 2015)35, this is assumption can be challenged for corporate PACs, 
which have been shown to donate strategically (Fouirnaies and Hall, 2018). 
However, since PACs depend on donations from their employees for funding, 
we know that PACs face a trade-off between donating to the candidates that 
promise the most return on investment and potentially scaring off donations 
33In cases like Brazil in which this data is indeed available, similar analyses might be
 
possible though, in principle (Colonnelli, Prem and Teso, 2018).
 
34In addition, we know that donors are different from the rest of the population (Francia,
 
2003; La Raya and Schaffner, 2015), and the skewness to certain sectors and occupations is
 
likely a feature of the data.
 
35Of course, this is also a simplifying assumption, given that individual donors donate to
 
many candidates across the US (Gimpel, Lee and Pearson-merkowitz, 2008), and seem to
 
target committees based on the sector they work in (Barber, Canes-Wrone and Thrower,
 
2017).
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from ideological employees if the PAC donates too strategically on both 
sides of the aisle (Li, 2018). Thus, PACs cannot solely donate based on 
investment motives, and must (at least partially) represent the make-up 
of their employees. This is also partly visible in the distribution of my 
alignment measure, which, despite being fairly normally distributed around 
0.5, seems quite left-skewed, towards more rather than less alignment. 
Hence, simple partisan alignment might not be the perfect measure of 
political alignment, but it seems to provide an approximation of individual 
and corporate preferences. 
Lastly, I cannot claim causality of the findings in this paper. This is 
mostly due to the observational nature of the data. I try to address some 
of the endogeneity problems by ruling out a host of plausible alternative 
explanations and by leveraging within-individual variation in donations. 
Further, while causal inference and big data do not need to be mutually 
exclusive (Grimmer, 2015; Monroe et al., 2015; Varian, 2014), the strength of 
both this paper and the first paper in this dissertation lies in the development 
of new micro-level data, and the measurement of the theoretically and 
empirically important variable firm-employee political alignment. Good 
identification is impossible, though. I see better causal identification as a 
key challenge which I want to address more explicitly in future work. I will 
take up and discuss these issues in more detail in the concluding chapter of 
this dissertation. 
4.5 Conclusion 
There is an ongoing debate on the impact of individuals’ sector, firm, 
or occupation on preferences, but no clear consensus has emerged yet. 
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Leveraging big data on firm and employee donations, I find that employees 
in firms and sectors with more specific assets show more partisan alignment 
with their employer, but I find no impact of occupations-specific effects. 
Hence, where individuals work seems to matter more for partisan alignment than 
what they do. Moreover, I find that employee donations are reactive to the 
donations of their company’s PAC. This suggests that PAC contributions 
inform employees about company-preferred politicians, and provides a 
potential mechanism linking employee and firm political activities. 
These results have important implications for the study of collective 
political action, coalition formation and future work on preference forma­
tion. First, meaningful corporate political action might be much easier in 
firms that are internally aligned, particularly if top executives share the 
same political views (Bonica, 2016a). Aligned firms might be more likely to 
engage in other corporate political activity like lobbying if benefits from this 
activity are private (Bombardini and Trebbi, 2012; Kim, 2017; Osgood, 2016). 
Alternatively they might be more likely to engage in collective political ac­
tivity in ad-hoc policy coalitions or established business associations like the 
American Chamber of Commerce or the American Legislative and Exchange 
Council (Hansen, Mitchell and Drope, 2005; Hertel-Fernandez, 2016; Olson, 
1965) because coordination on common political goals is easier. Future work 
should explore whether ideological coherence is a factor affecting individual 
or collective political action of corporations. 
Second, I find that sectoral and firm characteristics are more important 
than occupations as predictors of alignment between firms and employees 
in terms of their donations. These results go against the literature on 
individual preferences on trade, foreign direct investment, redistribution, 
and economic risk. This line of work most often finds no coherent impact 
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of sectoral factors (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Rho and Tomz, 2017), and 
instead highlights occupational characteristics (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; 
Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014; Owen and Johnston, 2017; Rehm, 2009; Thewissen 
and Rueda, 2019). Why do occupational factors provide little explanatory 
power for firm-employee alignment? Theoretically, the VoC literature notes 
that the US is characterized by general skills, as opposed to specific skill 
(Hall et al., 2001; Iversen and Stephens, 2008). Hence, skills might be 
less specific to the occupation in the US, and therefore be less predictive 
of partisan alignment with employers. On the other hand, occupational 
licensing and training varies markedly across US states and could be a much 
better indicator of occupational immobility than general or specific skills. 
Moreover, the results do not mean that occupations do not matter at all for 
alignment. CEOs are one of the few occupations that stands out in terms of 
partisan alignment, and I do find some (if less) variation in alignment across 
occupations (Bonica, 2016a). More importantly, this paper departs from 
existing studies in leveraging actual political action of employers and their 
employees as opposed to stated preferences of individuals in surveys, which 
could explain partly why the findings differ from the existing literature. In 
fact, there might be a qualitative difference between the factors explaining 
stated policy preferences in the general population, as measured in surveys 
and survey experiments, and the drivers behind political actions of those 
individuals which have already overcome barriers to political engagement. 
Thus, future work should try to tease out which factors lead to meaningful 
variation in political activity among those citizens who are already active to 
begin with. 
Finally, the observed relationship between firm and individual donations 
to specific candidates suggests that donating employees are aware of their 
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employer’s contributions, and might be able to use them as informational 
cues partly guiding their own decisions to donate. Thus, the results are in 
line with work highlighting that employees pay attention to the donations 
of their company PAC when their firm solicits money from them (Li, 2018), 
and other research highlighting the informational role CEO donations for 
employee donations (Babenko, Fedaseyeu and Zhang, 2019). Given the strict 
regulations on campaign finance, firms might not be able to force their 
employees to donate to specific candidates, but they could highlight which 
particular candidates their firm support, which might in turn influence 
politically active employees (Hertel-Fernandez, 2018). When employees are 
more susceptible to these signals by their employers is also an open question 
which future work should try to answer. 
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Figure B.1 Strong Within-Occupation Variation in Alignment in Manufactur­
ing Industries. These boxplots show that there is strong within-occupation varia­
tion in alignment for six very different different six-digit SOC occupations across 
industries. Data: own calculations. 
103 B.2 Alignment across 3-Digit SOC Occupations 
B.2 Alignment across 3-Digit SOC Occupations
 
lll
l l
ll
l
lll ll
l
l ll
ll
l l ll ll l
ll
ll ll ll
l lllllll l ll
l lll llllllll l l
l l
l l
l
ll lll
ll
l ll ll ll ll ll ll
l l
l l l ll ll l ll ll l ll ll ll l l ll ll lll ll ll lll ll l ll ll l l l lll ll llll lll l llll ll l
l lll
ll llll
ll lll l l lll l
ll l
ll ll ll l llllllll llll lll lll ll lll ll l ll
l ll llll llll lll ll lll lll ll l l lll l ll ll
ll
l lll ll l ll l l ll ll l ll
l ll l
ll ll ll
ll lll ll l ll ll l l ll ll lll ll
l ll l ll llll l ll l ll l lll ll ll l ll lll ll l lll llll l llll l ll
l ll lll ll lll l ll l lll lll ll llll lll l ll ll l lll ll lll
ll ll ll lll llll lllll l ll ll l ll lll l ll ll l ll lll lll ll l ll ll ll l llll lll ll l l ll
lllll
ll
lll l
ll
l l l ll ll ll l ll l ll ll ll
ll ll lll lll l ll ll l lll lll ll ll llll l ll
l ll
l
ll ll ll ll l l ll llll ll lll l lll ll l
l
l ll lll
l ll ll ll ll lll llll lll l ll l l l lll l llll ll l ll lll l ll ll l
l ll ll ll ll llll lll lll lll l l ll ll l l lll l ll l
ll
l ll lll l l lll ll l ll l ll
ll
l
l l l
l ll lll ll l ll ll lll ll
l
Helpers, Construction Trades (47−3000)
Baggage Porters, Bellhops, and Concierges (39−6000)
Other Teachers and Instructors (25−3000)
Communications Equipment Operators (43−2000)
Nursing, Psychiatric, and Home Health Aides (31−1000)
Rail Transportation Workers (53−4000)
Printing Workers (51−5100)
Material Moving Workers (53−7000)
Other Construction and Related Workers (47−4000)
Cooks and Food Preparation Workers (35−2000)
Animal Care and Service Workers (39−2000)
Food and Beverage Serving Workers (35−3000)
Food Processing Workers (51−3000)
Grounds Maintenance Workers (37−3000)
Tour and Travel Guides (39−7000)
Other Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Occupations (49−9000)
Assemblers and Fabricators (51−2000)
Counselors, Social Workers, and Other Community and Social Service Specialists (21−1000)
Other Production Occupations (51−9000)
Other Sales and Related Workers (41−9000)
Supervisors of Production Workers (51−1000)
Information and Record Clerks (43−4000)
Legal Support Workers (23−2000)
Material Recording, Scheduling, Dispatching, and Distributing Workers (43−5000)
Supervisors of Construction and Extraction Workers (47−1000)
Life Scientists (19−1000)
Librarians, Curators, and Archivists (25−4000)
Air Transportation Workers (53−2000)
Religious Workers (21−2000)
Mathematical Science Occupations (15−2000)
Supervisors of Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance Workers (37−1000)
Vehicle and Mobile Equipment Mechanics, Installers, and Repairers (49−3000)
Preschool, Primary, Secondary, and Special Education School Teachers (25−2000)
Health Technologists and Technicians (29−2000)
Retail Sales Workers (41−2000)
Funeral Service Workers (39−4000)
Other Office and Administrative Support Workers (43−9000)
Art and Design Workers (27−1000)
Other Personal Care and Service Workers (39−9000)
Computer Occupations (15−1100)
Health Diagnosing and Treating Practitioners (29−1000)
Other Education, Training, and Library Occupations (25−9000)
Physical Scientists (19−2000)
Postsecondary Teachers (25−1000)
Supervisors of Food Preparation and Serving Workers (35−1000)
Business Operations Specialists (13−1000)
Lawyers, Judges, and Related Workers (23−1000)
Life, Physical, and Social Science Technicians (19−4000)
Electrical and Electronic Equipment Mechanics, Installers, and Repairers (49−2000)
Entertainers and Performers, Sports and Related Workers (27−2000)
Other Food Preparation and Serving Related Workers (35−9000)
Construction Trades Workers (47−2000)
Media and Communication Workers (27−3000)
Other Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations (29−9000)
Advertising, Marketing, Promotions, Public Relations, and Sales Managers (11−2000)
Other Management Occupations (11−9000)
Engineers (17−2000)
Architects, Surveyors, and Cartographers (17−1000)
Motor Vehicle Operators (53−3000)
Plant and System Operators (51−8000)
Media and Communication Equipment Workers (27−4000)
Supervisors of Sales Workers (41−1000)
Law Enforcement Workers (33−3000)
Sales Representatives, Wholesale and Manufacturing (41−4000)
Metal Workers and Plastic Workers (51−4000)
Secretaries and Administrative Assistants (43−6000)
Social Scientists and Related Workers (19−3000)
Agricultural Workers (45−2000)
Personal Appearance Workers (39−5000)
Entertainment Attendants and Related Workers (39−3000)
Supervisors of Office and Administrative Support Workers (43−1000)
Drafters, Engineering Technicians, and Mapping Technicians (17−3000)
Financial Specialists (13−2000)
Operations Specialties Managers (11−3000)
Other Protective Service Workers (33−9000)
Sales Representatives, Services (41−3000)
Fire Fighting and Prevention Workers (33−2000)
Supervisors of Personal Care and Service Workers (39−1000)
Financial Clerks (43−3000)
Fishing and Hunting Workers (45−3000)
Building Cleaning and Pest Control Workers (37−2000)
Top Executives (11−1000)
Supervisors of Protective Service Workers (33−1000)
Water Transportation Workers (53−5000)
Textile, Apparel, and Furnishings Workers (51−6000)
Supervisors of Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Workers (49−1000)
Military Officer Special and Tactical Operations Leaders (55−1000)
Military Enlisted Tactical Operations and Air/Weapons Specialists and Crew Members (55−3000)
Extraction Workers (47−5000)
Other Healthcare Support Occupations (31−9000)
Supervisors of Transportation and Material Moving Workers (53−1000)
Woodworkers (51−7000)
Forest, Conservation, and Logging Workers (45−4000)
Other Transportation Workers (53−6000)
Occupational Therapy and Physical Therapist Assistants and Aides (31−2000)
Alignment (individual mean)
SO
C 
3−
di
gi
t
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Figure B.2 Weak Variation in Alignment across 3-Digit Occupations. The graph 
shows that there are much less differences in alignment across very fine-grained 
occupations, compared to variation across industries. Data: own calculations. 
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Figure B.3 Variation in Alignment across US States. The boxplot shows that 
there is some variation in alignment across US states, albeit not as much as across 
industry sectors. Data: own calculations. 
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B.4 Asset Specificity and Partisan Alignment over 
Time 
In Figure B.4 below, I show the aggregate (mean) alignment between em­
ployees and their firms in my data between 2003 and 2016, the time period 
under investigation. One can see that for most of the time, it is close to 0.5 
(firms and employees donate to both parties equally), with occasional up 
and down swings. The plot also depicts the share of alignment in donations 
by party, with more Republican alignment except for the time between 
2007 and 2009. This seems to be driven by strategic changes in partisan 
donations by corporations (Fouirnaies and Hall, 2018) during the Obama 
campaign, as traditionally more conservative companies donated more to 
Democracts than usual. The graph also includes the mean asset specificity 
across all firms in my sample. Even though the changes in asset specificity 
are not large, they seem to tick up in tandem in 2005, 2009, and 2013 with 
alignment, and decrease in years of lower alignment (correlation of 0.44). 
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Figure B.4 Alignment and Asset Specificity over Time. The graph depicts av­
erage alignment across all firms in the sample between 2003 and 2016. It shows 
that average asset specificity moves in tandem with overall alignment, and that the 
share of Republican and Democratic Alignment changes with election years. Data: 
own calculations and Compustat Capital IQ North America. 
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B.5	 Sectoral Labor Mobility and Partisan Align­
ment 
Figure B.5 plots the average alignment in each 4-digit NAICS sector in my 
data against this labor mobility measure. There is only a weakly negative 
relationship in terms of overall alignment at the industry level. However, 
the middle and the rightmost scatter plot show that there seems to be a 
negative relationship between Republican alignment and labor mobility, 
while there is a positive relationship between labor mobility and Democratic 
alignment. 
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Figure B.5 Party-Specific Relationship between Alignment and Labor Mobility. 
For robustness, these plots show the relationship between labor mobility at the 
4-digit NAICS level and mean sectoral alignment. Labor mobility shows a strong 
negative relationship with Republican alignment, and a strong negative relationship 
with Democratic alignment. Data: own calculations and Census Bureau Statistics 
of U.S. Businesses (SUSB). 
Controlling for year- and occupation fixed effects, Table B.6 replicates the 
main results from this paper using labor mobility as an inverse measure of 
firm-level asset specificity. The results show that there is a slight negative 
relationship between mobility and higher partisan alignment. Moreover, 
the regressions reflect the asymmetric impact of mobility on Republican 
and Democratic alignment shown in the scatter plots in Figure B.5, using 
different combinations of fixed effects. 
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How does the relationship between specificity and alignment look like at 
the firm level? Figure B.6 (left panel) shows that there is indeed a posi­
tive association between asset specificity and alignment. However, there 
is still a large variation in the alignment within firms with high and low 
asset specificity, respectively. The center and right panel of the same figure 
depict another interesting pattern in the data. The relationship shown in 
the left panel seems to be driven by the share of Republican alignment at 
the firm-level which is more positively related to asset specificity. Demo­
cratic alignment, on the other hand, is indeed weakly negatively related 
to asset specificity. This partly supports my expectation that specificity 
is more strongly associated with Republican alignment, based on historic 
relationships between labor- and capital intensive industries and US parties. 
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Figure B.6 Positive Relationship between Alignment and Specific Assets. These 
scatter plots show that there is a positive relationship between specific assets and 
average firm-employee partisan alignment. Moreover, the relationship is negative 
for Democratic aignment, but strongly positive for Republican alignment. Data: 
own calculations and Compustat Capital IQ Annual Updates North America. 
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B.7 Robustness Checks and Additional Models 
Table B.1 Regression Results: The Effect of Firm Asset Specificity on Partisan 
Alignment, Extended Controls 
(1) (2) 
Dependent variable: 
Partisan Alignment 
(3) (4) (5) 
Share Specific Assets 0.068∗∗∗ 
(0.017) 
0.065∗∗∗ 
(0.018) 
0.072∗∗∗ 
(0.020) 
0.079∗∗∗ 
(0.020) 
0.078∗∗∗ 
(0.020) 
log(Capital Expenditure) 0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
log(Sales) −0.005 
(0.005) 
−0.004 
(0.005) 
−0.005 
(0.005) 
−0.007 
(0.005) 
−0.002 
(0.006) 
log(Employees) −0.016∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
−0.017∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.016∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.016∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.017∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
log(Cost of Goods Sold) 0.003 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
Productivity −0.0001 
(0.004) 
−0.0003 
(0.004) 
0.00005 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
log(Median Income) −0.045 
(0.031) 
−0.044 
(0.031) 
−0.045 
(0.031) 
−0.046 
(0.031) 
−0.064∗∗ 
(0.030) 
Red State (1/0) 0.031∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
0.032∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
0.030∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
0.031∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
0.027∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
Unemployment Rate −0.003∗∗ 
(0.001) 
HHI −0.005 
(0.015) 
Union Membership −0.0004 
(0.0004) 
# Regulatory Restrictions 0.001 
(0.002) 
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Occupation FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 95,220 85,110 90,293 93,543 62,881 
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.085 0.084 0.084 0.083 
Note: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
 
Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses.
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Table B.2 Regression Results: The Effect of Labor Mobility on Partisan Alignment, 
Extended Controls 
(1) (2) 
Dependent variable: 
Partisan Alignment 
(3) (4) (5) 
Labor Mobility −0.043∗ 
(0.024) 
−0.043∗ 
(0.024) 
−0.042∗ 
(0.024) 
−0.051∗ 
(0.026) 
−0.044 
(0.033) 
log(Capital Expenditure) 0.004∗ 
(0.002) 
0.004∗ 
(0.002) 
0.004∗ 
(0.002) 
0.004∗ 
(0.002) 
0.005∗∗ 
(0.002) 
log(Sales) −0.003 
(0.005) 
−0.003 
(0.005) 
−0.003 
(0.005) 
−0.004 
(0.005) 
−0.0004 
(0.006) 
log(Employees) −0.019∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.019∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.020∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.020∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.023∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
log(Cost of Goods Sold) 0.003 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Productivity −0.007∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.007∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.008∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.007∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.007 
(0.004) 
log(Median Income) 0.042 
(0.035) 
0.038 
(0.036) 
0.039 
(0.035) 
0.042 
(0.035) 
0.021 
(0.039) 
Red State (1/0) 0.017∗∗ 
(0.008) 
0.016∗∗ 
(0.008) 
0.016∗∗ 
(0.008) 
0.017∗∗ 
(0.008) 
0.031∗∗∗ 
(0.010) 
Unemployment Rate −0.006∗∗∗ 
(0.002) 
HHI −0.020∗∗ 
(0.010) 
Union Membership −0.0003 
(0.0003) 
# Regulatory Restrictions 0.002 
(0.002) 
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Occupation FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 67,117 66,781 65,753 67,117 46,227 
Adjusted R2 0.120 0.121 0.122 0.120 0.106 
Note: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
 
Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses.
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Table B.3 Regression Results: The Effect of Specificity on Partisan Alignment, 
Outliers Dropped 
(1) (2) 
Dependent variable: 
Align 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
Share Specific Assets (firm) 0.073∗∗∗ 
(0.017) 
0.065∗∗ 
(0.026) 
0.045∗∗∗ 
(0.015) 
Labor Mobility (sector) −0.066∗∗ 
(0.028) 
−0.088∗∗∗ 
(0.033) 
−0.048∗∗ 
(0.023) 
log(Capital Expenditure) 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.007∗∗∗ 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.003∗ 
(0.002) 
log(Sales) 0.003 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
−0.003 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
log(Employees) −0.017∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
−0.014∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.014∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
−0.023∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
−0.021∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
−0.018∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
log(Cost Goods Sold) −0.0001 
(0.004) 
−0.002 
(0.005) 
−0.005 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
−0.001 
(0.004) 
Productivity −0.001 
(0.004) 
−0.004 
(0.004) 
−0.004 
(0.004) 
−0.007∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.016∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.009∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
log(Med. Income) −0.046 
(0.030) 
−0.047 
(0.031) 
−0.040 
(0.029) 
0.020 
(0.032) 
0.019 
(0.032) 
0.031 
(0.033) 
Red State (1/0) 0.028∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
0.027∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
0.014∗∗ 
(0.006) 
0.033∗∗∗ 
(0.006) 
0.028∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
0.017∗∗ 
(0.008) 
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Occupation FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
NAICS 2-digit FEs ✓ ✓ 
County FEs ✓ ✓ 
Observations 91,615 91,615 82,255 71,430 71,430 64,271 
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.091 0.137 0.065 0.074 0.123 
Note: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. 
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Table B.4 Regression Results: The Effect of Skill Specificity on Partisan Alignment, 
Outliers Dropped 
(1) 
Dependent variable: 
Align 
(2) (3) (4) 
Skill Specificity (1/0) 0.019∗∗∗ 
(0.002) 
0.018∗∗∗ 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Chief Executive (1/0) 0.038∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
0.038∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
log(Capital Expenditure) 0.010∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
0.010∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
0.009∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
0.009∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
log(Sales) 0.024 
(0.018) 
0.027 
(0.019) 
0.024 
(0.018) 
0.026 
(0.019) 
log(Employees) −0.007 
(0.033) 
−0.006 
(0.034) 
−0.007 
(0.034) 
−0.006 
(0.034) 
log(Cost Goods Sold) −0.028 
(0.018) 
−0.031∗ 
(0.018) 
−0.027 
(0.018) 
−0.030∗ 
(0.018) 
Productivity −0.013 
(0.024) 
−0.012 
(0.024) 
−0.014 
(0.024) 
−0.013 
(0.024) 
log(Med. Income) 0.018∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
0.019∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.006∗ 
(0.004) 
Red State (1/0) 0.022∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
0.014∗∗ 
(0.006) 
0.022∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
0.014∗∗ 
(0.006) 
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Firm FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
County FEs ✓ ✓ 
Observations 91,361 82,029 91,361 82,029 
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.182 0.157 0.184 
Note: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
 
Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses.
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Table B.5 Regression Results: The Effect of Asset Specificity on Partisan Alignment, 
by Party 
Align 
(1) 
REP 
(2) 
Dependent variable: 
DEM Align 
(3) (4) 
REP 
(5) 
DEM 
(6) 
Share Specific Assets 0.070∗∗∗ 
(0.026) 
0.181∗∗ 
(0.073) 
−0.089 
(0.100) 
0.036∗∗ 
(0.015) 
0.156∗∗∗ 
(0.051) 
−0.146∗∗ 
(0.057) 
log(Capital Expenditure) 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.00004 
(0.010) 
log(Sales) −0.005 
(0.006) 
−0.078∗∗∗ 
(0.024) 
0.087∗∗ 
(0.035) 
−0.002 
(0.005) 
−0.034∗ 
(0.019) 
0.038 
(0.031) 
log(Employees) −0.015∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.014) 
−0.032 
(0.020) 
−0.014∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
−0.018 
(0.012) 
−0.005 
(0.015) 
log(Cost Goods Sold) 0.002 
(0.005) 
0.064∗∗∗ 
(0.017) 
−0.079∗∗∗ 
(0.025) 
−0.001 
(0.004) 
0.038∗∗ 
(0.015) 
−0.048∗ 
(0.026) 
Productivity −0.004 
(0.005) 
−0.014 
(0.019) 
−0.003 
(0.019) 
−0.001 
(0.004) 
−0.003 
(0.020) 
−0.013 
(0.018) 
log(Med. Income) −0.047 
(0.031) 
−0.142∗ 
(0.086) 
0.047 
(0.049) 
−0.032 
(0.030) 
−0.124 
(0.085) 
0.043 
(0.051) 
Red State (1/0) 0.030∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
0.139∗∗∗ 
(0.011) 
−0.071∗∗∗ 
(0.011) 
0.014∗∗ 
(0.006) 
0.032∗∗ 
(0.016) 
−0.006 
(0.019) 
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Occupation FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
NAICS 2-digit FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ 
County FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 95,220 95,230 95,230 85,524 85,533 85,533 
Adjusted R2 0.089 0.200 0.208 0.133 0.243 0.230 
Note: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. 
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Table B.6 Regression Results: Labor Mobility and Partisan Alignment, by Party
 
Align 
(1) 
REP 
(2) 
DEM 
(3) 
Dependent variable: 
Align REP 
(4) (5) 
DEM 
(6) 
Align 
(7) 
REP 
(8) 
DEM 
(9) 
Labor Mobility −0.063∗∗ 
(0.029) 
−0.352∗∗∗ 
(0.089) 
0.301∗∗∗ 
(0.091) 
−0.043∗ 
(0.024) 
−0.203∗∗ 
(0.079) 
0.200∗∗ 
(0.089) 
−0.098∗∗∗ 
(0.035) 
−0.277∗∗ 
(0.121) 
0.147 
(0.131) 
log(Capital Expenditure) 0.008∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
0.025∗∗∗ 
(0.007) 
−0.015∗∗ 
(0.006) 
0.004∗ 
(0.002) 
0.021∗∗∗ 
(0.006) 
−0.016∗∗ 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.014∗∗ 
(0.006) 
−0.006 
(0.008) 
log(Sales) −0.012∗∗ 
(0.006) 
−0.087∗∗∗ 
(0.017) 
0.061∗∗∗ 
(0.022) 
−0.003 
(0.005) 
−0.051∗∗∗ 
(0.015) 
0.041∗ 
(0.024) 
−0.007 
(0.006) 
−0.088∗∗∗ 
(0.022) 
0.075∗∗∗ 
(0.029) 
log(Employees) −0.023∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
−0.032∗∗∗ 
(0.012) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
−0.019∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.032∗∗∗ 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.013) 
−0.023∗∗∗ 
(0.006) 
−0.013 
(0.014) 
−0.016 
(0.017) 
log(Cost of Goods Sold) 0.010∗∗ 
(0.005) 
0.080∗∗∗ 
(0.015) 
−0.058∗∗∗ 
(0.021) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.051∗∗∗ 
(0.014) 
−0.040∗ 
(0.023) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.075∗∗∗ 
(0.018) 
−0.062∗∗∗ 
(0.022) 
Productivity −0.007 
(0.005) 
−0.021 
(0.017) 
−0.010 
(0.016) 
−0.007∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.018 
(0.018) 
−0.011 
(0.018) 
−0.017∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
−0.036∗∗ 
(0.017) 
−0.002 
(0.017) 
log(Median Income) 0.029 
(0.033) 
0.049 
(0.117) 
0.028 
(0.064) 
0.042 
(0.035) 
0.056 
(0.116) 
0.037 
(0.063) 
0.029 
(0.034) 
0.037 
(0.116) 
0.046 
(0.064) 
Red State (1/0) 0.037∗∗∗ 
(0.006) 
0.166∗∗∗ 
(0.014) 
−0.092∗∗∗ 
(0.011) 
0.017∗∗ 
(0.008) 
0.026 
(0.019) 
0.018 
(0.018) 
0.032∗∗∗ 
(0.006) 
0.145∗∗∗ 
(0.013) 
−0.076∗∗∗ 
(0.011) 
Year FEs 
Occupation FEs 
County FEs 
NAICS 2-digit FEs 
Observations 
Adjusted R2 
✓ 
✓ 
74,576 
0.065 
✓ 
✓ 
74,576 
0.185 
✓ 
✓ 
74,576 
0.203 
✓ 
✓ 
✓ 
67,117 
0.120 
✓ 
✓ 
✓ 
67,117 
0.246 
✓ 
✓ 
✓ 
67,117 
0.239 
✓ 
✓ 
✓ 
74,576 
0.073 
✓ 
✓ 
✓ 
74,576 
0.203 
✓ 
✓ 
✓ 
74,576 
0.219 
Note: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. 
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Table B.7 Regression Results: Candidate Characteristics and Same-Candidate 
Donations 
Dependent variable: 
Donation to Same Candidate 
(1) (2) (3) 
Chief Executive 0.004 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
House 0.127∗∗∗ 
(0.020) 
0.108∗∗∗ 
(0.017) 
Senate 0.144∗∗∗ 
(0.025) 
0.122∗∗∗ 
(0.021) 
Republican 0.009 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
Incumbent 0.095∗∗∗ 
(0.019) 
0.067∗∗∗ 
(0.015) 
Open Seat 0.043∗∗∗ 
(0.010) 
0.032∗∗∗ 
(0.009) 
Cycle FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ 
individual FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 432,474 432,474 432,474 
Adjusted R2 0.372 0.364 0.377 
Note: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
 
Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses.
 
Chapter 5 
Policy Uncertainty and Trade in
 
Intermediate and Capital Goods
 
5.1 Introduction 
How does policy uncertainty affect manufacturing firm’s decision to source interme­
diate inputs from abroad? Uncertainty is of central importance to both Political 
Economy Research on international cooperation and Economics work on 
trade and investment. In International Political Economy (IPE), research has 
focused on the uncertainty-reducing role of international institutions for 
private actors and political leaders. Flexibility in international agreements 
promotes cooperation by reducing uncertainty about future costs of compli­
ance and decreases the resulting time-inconsistency problem (Rosendorff 
and Milner, 2001). Empirically, countries with anti-dumping mechanisms 
which allow temporary escape from free trade commitments are more likely 
to join the GATT/WTO, and have lower tariff bindings and applied tariffs 
(Reinhardt and Kucik, 2008). Some authors also argue that the reduced 
policy uncertainty leads to higher economic efficiency which helps demo­
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cratically elected leaders to stay in office longer (Hollyer and Rosendorff, 
2012). Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and the GATT/WTO also lower 
export volatility by locking in existing trade policies, and thus reduce uncer­
tainty of economic actors about future policy (Baccini and Urpelainen, 2015; 
Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2008a). 
Demand uncertainty stemming from trade policies has also long been 
recognized as an important question in Economics (Fishelson and Flatters, 
1975; Helpman and Razin, 1978; Hillman and Katz, 1986; Rodrik, 1995). 
Recent work on trade policy uncertainty (TPU) departs from country-level 
analyses and shows that even within narrowly-defined sectors, only few 
firms are able to pay the sunk necessary to start exporting (Bernard et al., 
2007, 2012). Building on the insights of ‘new-new’ trade theory, this work 
integrates policy uncertainty into models of heterogeneous firms (Helpman, 
Melitz and Yeaple, 2004b; Melitz, 2003a) and provides evidence of the effect 
of uncertainty on firm-level export decisions (Feng, Li and Swenson, 2017; 
Handley, 2014; Handley and Limao, 2015; Limao and Maggi, 2015).1 This 
work highlights that country-level or sectoral analyses might overlook large 
variation in the distributional consequences of TPU on firms within sectors. 
Notwithstanding their important contributions, both lines of research 
suffer from particular empirical and theoretical shortcomings. On the one 
hand, even though theories of trade cooperation assume that there is sub­
stantive uncertainty about future trade policy before uncertainty-reducing 
1Handley and Limao (2015) show that Portugal’s accession to the EEC increased firm 
export entry and sales even before it came into effect. Feng, Li and Swenson (2017) show 
that China’s WTO accession increased Chinese firm export entries, while Liu and Ma (2017) 
demonstrate that TPU reduction encourages firm patent applications. Manger and Shadlen 
(2014) find that FTAs ‘lock in’ preferential market access for developing countries since 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) tariffs can be unilaterally suspended. For work 
looking at the effect of WTO tariff bindings on exports see also Handley (2014), Osnago, 
Piermartini and Rocha (2015), Francois and Martin (2004), and Groppo and Piermartini 
(2014). Uncertainty has also been a major theme in macroeconomics (Bernanke, 1983; Dixit, 
1989) and industrial organization (Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen, 2007). 
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agreements are enacted, almost no effort has been put into actually measuring 
trade policy uncertainty between alternative policies during the negotiation 
phase. Moreover, the few existing measures of economic uncertainty are 
based on word dictionary approaches (Baker, Bloom and Davis, 2016) which 
can be prone to researcher bias (King, Lam and Roberts, 2017). In addition, 
existing work assumes that on average, private actors will prefer trade open­
ness (Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2008a) and that political leaders negotiate 
and sign trade agreements because they are welfare-enhancing. However, 
there are well-known distributional consequences of liberalization which 
will differ according to the design of the agreements that states can choose 
from, like their depth and scope (Dür, Baccini and Elsig, 2014). The distribu­
tional effects can also differ sharply within industries (Baccini, Pinto and 
Weymouth, 2017; Kim, 2017), depending on what types of products firms 
trade, and can be realized before the respective policies are in place, as firms 
adjust their expectations. In contrast, the existing IPE literature on trade 
and uncertainty treats all agreements as equal using binary measures for 
signing of PTAs, and results mask the distributional consequences because 
of the use of aggregate trade flows. In short, we lack a good measure of un­
certainty between different trade-liberalizing policy alternatives during the 
negotiation phase that also takes into account the diverging distributional 
consequences across firms. 
On the other hand, while economics studies focus on the role of policy 
uncertainty for firm exports, there is a remarkable absence of research 
on the impact of trade policy uncertainty for firm’s decisions to source 
important intermediate inputs from abroad. This absence is surprising 
given the importance of high-quality inputs for productivity-increasing 
technological upgrading of firms, especially in developing economies (Amiti 
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and Konings, 2007; Halpern, Koren and Szeidl, 2015). Moreover, political 
economy research has shown that firms integrated in global production 
networks are particularly engaged in shaping trade policies. For example, 
firms relying on import of intermediate inputs have been most actively 
lobbying in favor of PTAs in order to opening up and retaining access to 
global supply chains (Manger, 2009; Osgood, 2018), which is also reflected 
in the faster liberalization of intermediate goods relative to final goods 
in PTAs (Baccini, Dür and Elsig, 2018). Thus, despite the prominence of 
policy uncertainty and intermediate inputs in work on international trade, 
it remains unclear how uncertainty between different trade policies affect 
firm-specific decisions to source intermediate inputs. 
In this paper, we attempt to fill both gaps in the literature and provide 
three main contributions. First, we employ a new measure of TPU by 
applying machine learning tools to textual data. We use structural topic 
models (Roberts et al., 2014) to analyze over 2000 news releases on Ukrainian 
economic policy to approximate the uncertainty between two particular 
trade policies: a free trade agreement with the European Union (EU FTA) 
and a customs union with Russia (RU CU).2 Interacted with differing 
tariff schedules for the EU FTA and the RU CU, our measure picks up 
the distributional consequences of both policies across Ukrainian firms. 
This approach is almost fully automated and can be easily applied to a 
broad range of other cases involving multiple, mutual exclusive policies. 
We demonstrate that our TPU measure picks up real-world policy swings 
between Ukraine, the EU, and the Russian Federation. We also show that our 
TPU measure is related to (but different from) general economic uncertainty 
2In that respect, our approach is similar to that by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016). However, 
we do not purposely select keywords such as ‘uncertainty’ but use a method which requires 
less decisions by the researcher. 
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(Baker, Bloom and Davis, 2016), and not driven by changes in tone or 
sentiment, or how articles talk about the EU FTA or the RU CU. 
Second, we extend a heterogeneous firm model with monopolistic com­
petition and trade policy uncertainty (Handley and Limao, 2015) by intro­
ducing an additional decision on the choice of intermediate inputs. These 
intermediate goods can be sourced from domestic and foreign suppliers, 
with wider choice increasing productivity (Ethier, 1982). In the spirit of 
heterogeneous firm models, importing is costly and requires irreversible 
sunk investments.3 The connection between TPU and imported intermediate 
inputs is especially important for developing countries, since these inputs 
have been shown to improve firm productivity via technological upgrading 
(Amiti and Konings, 2007; Halpern, Koren and Szeidl, 2015; Ramanarayanan, 
2017), which in turn impacts the intensive margin of exports. 
Finally, we empirically investigate the link between changes in TPU and 
imports of intermediate inputs. We test our model predictions by combining 
Ukrainian manufacturing census and firm-product-destination-level trade 
data between 2003 and 2014. Ukraine faced an unusually volatile trade 
policy with regards to both Russia and the EU over the last two decades, 
being torn between two mutually exclusive policy options: an FTA with the 
EU (EU FTA) or a Customs Union with Russia (RU CU) (Hoekman, 2014). 
We conceptualize TPU as the probability of Ukraine signing either the EU 
FTA or joining the CU with Russia. In this binary decision, each of those 
two options implies increased uncertainty with regards to the alternative 
policy, because both policies could not have been implemented at the same 
3This is similar to the TPU model with intermediate inputs by Novy and Taylor (2014), but 
contrary to their paper, we emphasize the heterogeneity across firms, and the technology 
upgrading channel for intermediate goods. 
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time.4 The shifts in TPU between the RU CU and the EU FTA were difficult 
to predict for Ukrainian firms and driven by the foreign policies of the EU 
and Russia.5 We find that a reduction in TPU with EU FTA has a positive 
and sizable effect on export to and imports from EU countries. Moreover, 
a reduction in the probability of joining the RU CU is associated with 
more imports from the EU. This is because the CU would have increased 
Ukrainian MFN tariffs compared to the status quo, whereas the EU FTA left 
MFN tariffs untouched.6 
In line with our theoretical model, we also show that different types of 
goods respond differentially to reductions in uncertainty. While exports 
and imports of intermediate and capital goods which require higher sunk 
investments respond strongly to TPU, we do not find any effect of TPU 
on trade in consumer goods. Further, imports of products that are more 
protected in the CU relative to Ukrainian MFN tariffs expand more once 
TPU with respect to the EU FTA is reduced. According to our results, full 
elimination of TPU (signing an EU FTA), would increase Ukrainian exports 
to EU countries by 8.3 percent and imports to Ukraine from the EU by 
10.1 percent, while tariff reduction would increase exports by 1.3 percent 
and imports by 6 percent, respectively. Additionally, we leverage the 2014 
transition following the Euro-Maidan demonstrations as a shock to TPU 
4Being part of the RU CU would have made it impossible for Ukraine to negotiate an 
FTA with the EU on its own due to the common external tariff, and joining the RU CU 
after concluding the EU FTA was impossible due to incompatibility of the RU CU tariff 
structure with the EU FTA trade regime and with the WTO commitments of Ukraine. 
5Moreover, the decision between closer economic ties with the West (EU) or the East 
(Russia) resulted in multiple political turnovers in Ukraine in 2004 and early 2014 (Earle 
and Gehlbach, 2015), leading up to the Russian annexation of Crimea in early 2014. 
6Russia threatened to withdraw from the free trade agreement with Ukraine, apply MFN 
tariffs, and impose some arbitrary bans on sensitive items of Ukrainian imports to Russia 
(milk, cheese, chocolate, railway carriages), but as previous cases related to the Eastern 
European countries joining EU (i.e Estonia, Poland) demonstrated, those sanctions were 
short-lived. While trade policy retaliation from Moscow might have been credible, firms 
could not reasonably believe that a decision to join EU FTA could lead to a full-scale conflict 
between Ukraine and Russia, annexation of Crimea, and war in the Eastern Ukraine. 
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which made the EU FTA more likely and rendered the CU with Russia 
politically infeasible. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we show 
that imports of intermediate products, which are more protected under the 
status quo or under the alternative RU CU, expanded more in the aftermath 
of the transition. Our results are not driven by other uncertainty-inducing 
events, such as the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the Global Financial 
Crisis, or Ukrainian accession to the WTO.7 Our results also stay robust 
when we control for a host of alternative measures of uncertainty, overall 
trade policy salience, and general economic uncertainty. 
Our results have important implications for the study of uncertainty in 
international trade. We show how quantitative text analysis can be fruitfully 
applied to the study of trade and uncertainty between clearly-defined poli­
cies without resorting to more ambiguous dictionary approaches. Further, 
contrary to studies assuming that on average, policies locking in trade liber­
alization are welcomed by private interests, we show that even during the 
negotiation phase, there are clear distributional consequences within sectors 
depending on the trading partner and the degree of liberalization. Moreover, 
while lots of existing work relies on aggregate trade flows between countries, 
we show that at the level of the firm, not all types of goods react uniformly 
to swings in uncertainty, emphasizing the added value of micro-level data. 
We also add to an emerging literature on how trade policies affect firm’s 
expectations and decisions to export and import even before they are signed 
or implemented (Handley, 2014; Handley and Limao, 2015). Finally, the pa­
per shows a mechanism by which uncertainty between policies can dampen 
productivity growth in emerging economies, by reducing imports of key 
inputs necessary for technological upgrading. 
7Limiting our analysis to 2013-2014 or excluding the Luhansk, Donetsk, and Crimea 
regions does not affect our findings 
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The next section outlines our theoretical model of heterogeneous firms 
under monopolistic competition and trade policy uncertainty. The third 
section introduces the reader to the trade policy context of Ukraine, discusses 
our approach for measuring TPU, and shows our data sources. Section four 
describes our empirical results. The last section concludes and discusses 
implications for further research. 
5.2 Theoretical Model 
As our point of departure, we use a partial equilibrium model of monop­
olistic competition with heterogeneous firms (Melitz, 2003b). The firms 
face a costly and irreversible export decision and uncertainty in the foreign 
demand (Handley and Limao, 2015). Firms are risk neutral and care only 
about expected profits. Therefore, market volatility does not influence firm’s 
behavior. We add two important features to the model. First, we modify 
the trade policy uncertainty process to account for a binary and mutually 
exclusive choice between two policy alternatives. In our case, an increase in 
uncertainty of exporting to the EU is represented by a higher probability of 
joining the RU CU. Likewise, uncertainty of exporting to the CU increases 
in a probability of signing the EU FTA. Second, we incorporate a decision 
about imports of intermediate and capital goods into the production process. 
Assuming that this decision involves costly and irreversible investment, we 
show that uncertainty negatively influences imports of intermediate and 
capital goods. 
An extensive literature shows that the purchase of imported intermediate 
and capital goods is an important mechanism for increasing total factor 
productivity (TFP). Amiti and Konings (2007) disentangle the effect of trade 
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liberalization on productivity into output competition vs. input liberaliza­
tion effects. Fernandes and Paunov (2012) demonstrate that opening up 
to FDI in the services sector increases productivity in the manufacturing 
sector. The theoretical underpinnings of the input tariff liberalization effect 
on productivity are divided into static and dynamic gains. The static gains 
include gains from increased variety of inputs (Ethier, 1982; Markusen, 1989) 
and gains from better quality imported inputs (Hallak and Sivadasan, 2013). 
The dynamic gains come from learning from importing (Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991). 
A recent empirical literature compares the relative importance of these 
gains. Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2015) demonstrate that gains from 
variety amount to two-thirds of productivity gains, while one-third comes 
from better quality of imported inputs. Zhang (2017) further finds that 
importing increases productivity in the next period by 0.5-5.8 %. Finally, 
Ramanarayanan (2017) adds sunk costs with irreversibility to the model. 
Matching the model predictions to Chilean plant level data, the introduction 
of irreversible costs of importing improves the model fit by about two thirds. 
We use these findings to model the impact of uncertainty on imports. 
5.2.1 Basic Model of Exporting 
An exporting firm from a small open economy produces a variety ω. The 
firm is small relative to the market size of differentiated varieties in im­
porting countries (more generally, trade blocks or customs unions) and 
“believes” that it is too small to impact aggregate statistics. Assuming a 
standard constant elasticity of substitution utility function across varieties, 
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the firm is facing demand 
q(ω) = p(ω)−σE × Pσ−1 (5.1) 
where σ is the elasticity of substitution across varieties, p(ω) is price of 
variety ω, E is the total expenditures on goods in the differentiated sector,    1/(1−σ)and P = ω∈Ω p(ω)1−σdω is the price index, where Ω is the set of 
available varieties. We further assume that σ is common across all markets. 
In order to start production, the firm has to pay a fixed cost and learn its 
marginal cost c(ω), which is drawn from a known distribution Φ(c), defined 
over (0, ∞). Once the firm learns its marginal cost, it decides whether to 
produce or not. 
To enter a new export market j, the firm incurs an irreversible cost, IEX, 
which is pair-specific and cannot be applied to another country. If the firm 
exports, there is an exogenous probability of exporting continuation, β < 1. 
jAn exporting firm is subject to country j’s import tariffs, τ ≥ 1, which EX,s 
depends on the trade policy state, s. Given market conditions and trade 
policy state, this uniquely determines the profitability cutoff of the marginal 
exporting firm which is given by 
  1/(1−σ)
 
j (1 − β)IEX
 c = . (5.2)EX,s jas
j jwhere as = (τEX,sσ)
−σ[(σ − 1)P]σ−1E. 
125 5.2 Theoretical Model 
5.2.2 Imported Inputs and Productivity 
Now, consider a firm which sources inputs domestically or imports them 
from abroad. We introduce the following production function 
q = φLαL KαK MαM (5.3) 
where q is output, φ is productivity, L is labor, K is capital, and M is 
composite intermediate input. We assume that productivity is firm specific 
and drawn from a known distribution function F(φ), defined over (0, ∞). 
We also assume constant returns to scale, αL + αK + αM = 1. 
Further suppose that intermediate inputs are a composite good, such 
that   θ 
θ−1 θ−1 θ−1 
M = X θ + X θ D F
where XD is a domestic intermediate input, XF is an imported inter­
mediate input, and θ > 1 is elasticity of substitution across domestic and 
foreign intermediate inputs. Further, there are varieties of domestic and 
foreign suppliers of intermediate inputs given by XD = [∑nD xD
ϵ ]1/ϵand 
XF = [∑nF xϵ F]
1/ϵ, where σϵ = 1/(1 − ϵ) is the elasticity of substitution 
across inputs and 0 < ϵ < 1. 
We assume that factor prices wL, wK, wD, and wF are exogenous. To 
incorporate a foreign intermediate input into the production process, a 
firm incurs irreversible investment IIM per foreign variety, which is partner-
specific and cannot be recovered by switching to another intermediate good 
supplier. In addition, there is an ad-valorem tariff τIM,s, that is paid by 
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importers. Solving the cost minimization problem yields 
αL αK αM1 wL wK PM c(φ) = 
φ αL αK αM 
1 
nF(τ IM 1−θwhere PM = wF)1−θ + nDw
1−θ if the firm imports and PM = s D 
(nD)1/(1−θ)wD if it uses domestic inputs only. Given a productivity level φ, 
the ratio of the unit costs for a firm with foreign inputs cIM and a firm with 
domestic inputs c is given by 
  −αM 
θ−1 θ−1 cIM nF wD µ(τIM,s, nD, nF) = = 1 + ≤ 1 (5.4)c nD τIM,swF 
There are two sources of cost advantage of importing firms. First, prices 
may not be fully aligned and hence, imported inputs may provide an 
8advantage if τsIM wF < wD. Second, even if τsIM wF = wD, the importing 
firm has a cost advantage due to the imperfect substitutability of inputs: 
−αM 
cIM = c × (1 + nF ) θ−1 = c × µ. If nF ≫ nD, which is very likely to be the nD 
case for a small open economy, and hence cIM ≪ c. 
Consider a change in import tariffs from τ0 to τ1 > τ0, which does not 
have an impact on wF and wD. Keeping the number of foreign and domestic 
suppliers fixed, this scenario would result in an increase in the unit cost of 
an importing firm 
ln 
cI M,1 
cI M,0 
= ln 
µ1 
µ0 
= 
αM 
θ − 1 × 
nF 
nD 
wD 
wF 
θ−1  1 
τ0 
θ−1 
− 1 
τ1 
θ−1 
> 0 
(5.5) 
8Another interpretation is that imported goods may provide an advantage because they 
are cheaper in quality adjusted price. 
127 5.2 Theoretical Model 
5.2.3 Introducing Trade Policy Uncertainty 
The firm in the small open economy trades with two large trade blocs, 
one of which is the EU and one of which is the Russian CU. The three 
feasible policy states are a free trade agreement with the EU (EU FTA), the 
status quo policy (MFN), and the customs union membership (RU CU), 
shown in Table 5.1. In the case of the EU FTA, exporters from the small 
{τEU 0, τCU open economy face the tariff schedule τEX,FTA = = EX,FTA},EX,FTA 
which refers to a zero import tariff schedule imposed by the EU, and MFN 
import tariffs imposed by the CU.9 The status quo trade policy means that 
EU MFN tariff rates are applied to exports to the EU and zero tariffs to 
{τEU 10exports to the CU: τEX,MFN = EX,MFN, τCU = 0}. Finally, in the EX,MFN 
= {τEU case of the CU, the tariff schedule is τEX,CU EX,CU, τCU = 0}. Even EX,CU 
though the EU applies the same MFN tariff rates to both Ukraine and CU 
countries, by joining the CU, Ukraine would worsen the access of its firms 
to EU countries (τEU EX,CU ) for two reasons. First, the current WTO EX,MFN ≤ τEU 
bindings of import tariffs of Ukraine are lower than the CU applied import 
tariffs. Therefore, if Ukraine joined the CU and adjusted its import tariffs to 
the CU levels, it would violate its WTO commitments and trigger a lengthy 
and unpredictable process of renegotiating its bilateral trade relationships 
with all WTO members, including EU countries. Second, it would have to 
harmonize its technical standards and phytosanitary norms with the RU 
CU. These differ substantially from the EU standards, making it harder for 
9It was repeatedly mentioned by CU representatives that if Ukraine signed the EU FTA, it 
would lose its free trade status with CU countries. However, one might argue that such a 
threat was not considered as credible before 2014. Moreover, the EU FTA is compatible 
with Ukrainian free trade with CU countries. Therefore, it is not clear whether Ukrainian 
firms attached a high probability to a scenario where CU withdrew from the free trade 
with Ukraine. 
10Until recently, the Ukrainian exports to Russia were mostly tariff free with several 
exceptions. At the same time, Russia frequently introduced non-tariff measures that 
essentially blocked Ukrainian exports to Russia. 
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Ukrainian firms to export to the EU. The trade policy states for exports to 
the EU and the CU are summarized in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.1. 
State, s Export to EU Export to CU Imports from EU Imports from CU 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
EU FTA 
MFN 
RU CU 
0 
τEU EX,MFN 
τEU EX,CU ≥ τEU EX,MFNa) 
τCU EX,MFN 
0b) 
0 
0 
τUKR IM,MFN 
τUKR IM,CU > τ
UKR 
IM,MFN 
τUKR IM,MFN 
0c) 
0 
a) May be higher due to potential WTO disputes and non-tariff measures 
b) There are some exceptions. See text. 
c) Some restrictions apply. See text. 
Table 5.1 Ukrainian Tariff Schedules for Exports and Imports to/from EU and 
CU under different Trade Policies. The table shows that exporting to the EU 
would be more expensive for Ukrainian exporters than under MFN rules or the EU 
FTA, as would be importing from the EU. 
Firms from the small open economy can also import intermediate inputs 
from the CU and the EU. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5.1 present import 
tariffs that would be imposed on domestic producers importing from the 
EU or the CU under the different policy states. In the EU FTA state, the 
import tariffs for goods from EU countries equal zero, τUKR = 0, and for IM,FTA 
goods from the CU equal Ukrainian MFN import rates, τUKR IM,MFN > 0. In 
the MFN state, the tariff rates for goods from EU are positive τUKR IM,MFN > 0, 
and hence, larger than in the FTA state. In the CU state, the import tariffs 
for imports from EU are τUKR IM,MFN > 0.
11 For imports from the CU IM,CU > τ
UKR 
countries, Ukrainian tariffs are zero for both MFN and CU states. 
The state of the trade policy is a Markov process with a transition 
probability matrix 
11This follows from the fact that the CU tariffs are higher than the Ukrainian tariffs. We 
discuss this issue in details in the data section. 
  
  
5.2 Theoretical Model 129 
 
Λ =
 

 
ΛFTA 
ΛMFN 

 =
 

 
1 0 0
 
pEU pMFN pCU 

 (5.6)
 
ΛCU 0 0 1 
with pEU + pMFN + pCU = 1. The small open economy starts in the MFN 
state. Once the economy moves to either the FTA or CU state, it remains 
in that state indefinitely. Also, we can rank policy states according to the 
ease of access to the EU markets as CU ⪯ MFN ⪯ FTA. Hence, ΛFTA 
stochastically dominates ΛMFN , which in turn stochastically dominates ΛCU 
in terms of their ease of access to the EU markets. 
5.2.4	 Exporting under Uncertainty with Intermediate Imported 
Inputs 
The baseline model under uncertainty is considered in the appendix C.1.1. 
This section discusses how the introduction of intermediate goods changes 
the expectations from the baseline model. Let us denote cIM,s = µ(τIM,s, nD,s, nF,s) × 
∂µ c = µsc, where 0 < µ ≤ 1 and ∂τ IM > 0. In addition we denote hIIM = s 
IIM × nF. Under certainty, a firm imports intermediate inputs if 
1 
1−σ 
j	 (1 − β)hIIM c ≤ c	 = (5.7)IM,s	 jas(µ1−σ − 1) 
Comparing (5.7) with (5.2), all exporting firms would invest in imported 
inputs if IEX > I˜IM(µ1−σ − 1). However if IEX ≤ I˜IM(µ1−σ − 1), only a 
subset of exporting firms invests in intermediate inputs, and the two cutoffs 
are related as given by 
1 
1−σj	 j I˜IM c = c × × (µ 1−σ − 1) σ−1 1IM,s	 EX,s IEX 
  
� � 
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5.2.5 Importing under Uncertainty 
We now consider the case when there is uncertainty in import tariffs, but no 
j juncertainty in export tariffs, as = a .12 In order to optimally chose the mix 
of inputs, a firm solves the following stopping problem 
ΠIM = max ∆Πe − hIIM, βEsΠIM s s s ′ 
j j j jwhere ∆Πe = π(a , µs × c) − π(a , c) + Es ∑ βt[π(a , µs ′ c) − π(a , c)]. The de­s 
tailed discussion of this problem is provided in Appendix C.1.2. Proposition 
1 summarizes our main results about the relationship between uncertainty 
and importing. 
Proposition 1 (TPU and import of intermediate inputs) Under uncertainty 
about the future trade policy state, where an increase in import tariff rates is possible 
(moving from MFN to CU state), the cost cutoff for imports from the EU is unique 
and lower than the cost cutoff under certainty. A reduction in the probability of 
moving to the CU state leads to more imports of intermediate inputs from the EU. 
The relationship between the import cutoffs under certainty and uncertainty is 
given by 
 1 
1−σ 
c˜
EU IM,MFN =
 

 1 − β(1 − pCU) 1−σ µCU −11 − β(1 − 1−σ × pCU)µMFN −1 

 × c
EU IM,MFN (5.8)
 
12This assumption can be relaxed to aMFN = aCU , meaning there is no possibility of 
fundamentals decline in some state of the future trade policy. We can also consider a model 
with uncertainty in export and import tariffs, which would not change our conclusions, 
but would considerably complicate discussion. 
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As in Handley and Limao (2015), the uniqueness of the cutoff follows 
from the fact that a) the option value of waiting declines with an increase 
j jin the gains from importing intermediate inputs π(a , µs × c) − π(a , c) 
and b) policy states are ordered in terms of likelihood of good access to 
the EU: ΛFTA stochastically dominates ΛMFN, which in turn stochastically 
dominates ΛCU. From (5.8), we can see that uncertainty matters only if 
µCU ̸= µMFN, meaning that the value of waiting is positive only if a firm 
regrets its decision to start importing from the EU. Reducing the probability 
of joining the customs union to zero eliminates uncertainty and makes 
EU EU c˜ = cIM,MFN, which indicates zero value of postponing importing IM,MFN 
when there is no risk of a negative impact of the decision. A higher elasticity 
of substitution lowers the uncertainty cutoff, making it harder for firms 
to import from the EU, which is another way to test how uncertainty 
has a differential effects on firms with different elasticity of substitution – 
uncertainty effects more substitutable goods more strongly. 
To sum up, if the use of imported inputs involves irreversible sunk costs, 
firms in small open economies react to changes in TPU when considering 
to use imported intermediate inputs. A reduction in TPU encourages com­
panies to import intermediate inputs by investing in technology upgrading 
and increase their productivity, which can be observed as an increase in 
imports of capital goods, but should not matter for consumer goods. 
5.3 Data 
5.3.1 Firm Balance Sheet and Trade Data 
We obtain firm-year-level characteristics from statistical forms that all 
Ukrainian firms have to submit to Ukrstat, the State Statistical Service 
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of Ukraine. From the Financial Results Statements, we measure firm output 
as total sales revenues net of excise and other indirect taxes. The statement 
also contains data on material costs, which is measured as the firm’s expen­
ditures on materials, supplies, and utilities. The Balance Sheet Statements 
contains data on the end-of-year value of fixed assets, which we use as our 
measure of capital endowment of each firm. We measure firm employment 
as the full-time equivalent of the labor force, calculated as the average num­
ber of employees weighted by their time involvement. We then use these 
data to calculate important firm-level variables like employment and total 
factor productivity (TFP). The estimation methodology and main results are 
described in Shepotylo and Vakhitov (2015). 
We limit our sample to manufacturing firms (Section D of NACE, Revi­
sion 1 of Statistical Classification of Economic Activities) from 2003 to 2014. 
First, manufacturing industries are better described as monopolistically 
competitive relative to mining and quarrying where companies produce 
more homogeneous goods and markets tend to be oligopolistic, or utility 
companies where state regulation is strong. Second, productivity is better 
defined in manufacturing and more precisely measured than in services. Fi­
nally, manufacturing firms are more likely to be importers of intermediates 
than other types of firms.13 
We use the transaction-level database of foreign trade in goods by the 
Ukrainian Customs Service for generating firm-level exports and imports. 
The data contain comprehensive information on all export and import trans­
actions at the firm level during a given year. They also contain information 
on the value and quantity of trade, country of origin and destination, and 
the product classification at the four-digit level of the Harmonized System 
13For example, firms in wholesale and retail trade import mostly to resell goods. 
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(HS-4). The comprehensive transaction level data set enables us to link 
firm-level exports and imports to MFN tariffs at the HS-4 level, which we 
describe in the following subsection. We identify intermediate goods and 
capital goods by mapping the HS6 2012 codes to BEC Ver.4 classification 
codes, and using the respective BEC categories for both types of goods14. 
Then, we aggregate products from HS6 to HS4 using their median value. 
Table 5.2 below shows the mapping of BEC goods to intermediate goods, 
capital, and consumer goods. 
Good Type BEC Ver.4 Code Number of HS4 Codes 
Intermediate Goods 111*, 121*, 21*, 22*, 31*, 322*, 42*,53* 974 
Capital Goods 41*, 521* 175 
Consumption Goods 112*, 122*, 321*, 522*, 61*, 62*, 63* 523 
Table 5.2 Intermediate, Capital, and Consumption Goods: This table depicts 
the mapping of intermediate, capital, and consumption goods to BEC Ver.4 codes 
according to the UN Comtrade classification. BEC Ver.4 codes are mapped to 
HS-codes using the UN concordance tables at the HS4-digit level. 
Table 5.3 shows exports and imports of manufacturing firms by Ukrainian 
regions and destinations in 2010 and 2013. The East and Crimea regions 
were the major exporting regions, both in 2010 and 2013. Firms from this 
region exported mostly to CU countries in 2010, but had diversified to the 
rest of the world by 2013. Exports to the EU dominate the Western region, 
and expanded markedly between 2010 and 2013. In terms of imports, the 
South region, East, and Crimea imported heavily from CU countries in 
2010, while by 2013 all regions imported more from the EU than from any 
other origin. The data illustrate that by 2013, Ukrainian firms were already 
re-orienting towards European markets. Ukrainian exports still mostly went 
14The respective concordance tables can be found under the UN Comtrade Correspondence 
Tables. The mapping of BEC to intermediate goods, capital, and consumption goods 
follows the UN definition for Intermediate Goods in Trade. 
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to CU countries, but started to expand to other emerging economies by 
2013. 
Year and Partner 
2010 2013 
Region CU EU ROW Total CU EU ROW Total 
A Exports, in billion USD 
Center 2.05 1.03 1.64 4.71 2.96 1.39 5.89 10.24 
East&Crimea 4.13 2.43 3.43 9.99 5.91 1.88 8.11 15.90 
South 2.82 1.11 3.70 7.64 4.44 1.49 6.20 12.13 
West 0.41 1.14 0.25 1.79 1.12 1.94 0.36 3.43 
Total 9.41 5.72 9.01 24.14 14.44 6.70 20.56 41.70 
B Imports, in billion USD 
Center 0.83 1.89 0.56 3.28 1.36 4.09 1.49 6.95 
East&Crimea 3.63 0.83 0.48 4.93 1.65 6.73 2.57 10.95 
South 2.19 0.87 1.27 4.32 1.24 2.94 1.79 5.97 
West 0.26 2.00 0.10 2.36 0.22 3.86 0.31 4.39 
Total 6.90 5.59 2.41 14.90 4.46 17.63 6.16 28.25 
Table 5.3 Ukrainian Regional Manufacturing Exports and Imports by Destina­
tion, 2010 and 2013. The table depicts the regional trade of Ukrainian manufactur­
ing firms from different regions in Ukraine with the the CU, the EU, and the Rest of 
the World (ROW) in 2010 and 2013. Overall Ukrainian manufacturing firms trade 
more with the EU and the ROW than with the CU. While all regions gradually 
shifted towards EU imports from 2010 to 2013, Ukrainian exports were still mostly 
focused on the CU and the ROW. 
5.3.2 Tariff Data 
One of our key predictions is that a reduction in TPU has a larger impact on 
trade in products with higher MFN tariff rates, as shown in proposition 1. 
We obtain year-varying data on CU tariffs from Shepotylo and Tarr (2013), 
and data on Ukrainian MFN tariffs from the TRAINS database. The applied 
MFN rates of Ukraine are very close to the binding rates, so in the analysis 
that follows, we compare the applied MFN rates of Ukraine and the CU. 
It is important to emphasize that, as a WTO member, Ukraine accepted a 
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multilateral schedule of binding tariff rates which is not compatible with 
the CU MFN tariff schedule. Thus, Ukraine would have violated its WTO 
commitments by joining the CU, and would have faced large increases of tariff 
rates for most finished and intermediate goods. Table C.3 in the appendix 
shows the changes in applied Ukrainian tariffs and Russian Customs Union 
tariffs between 2003 and 2013. Russia import bans on on beer, vodka, 
juice, wallpaper and confectionery from mid-2013 do not affect our analysis, 
because we are only focusing on manufacturing products. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the differences in tariff rates between Ukrainian 
MFN rates and the CU by major product categories in 2012. Except for a 
couple of products, the CU tariffs are much higher than Ukrainian MFN 
rates, particularly in foodstuff, textiles, transportation, and wood products. 
If Ukraine had joined the CU in 2012, this would have increased Ukrainian 
applied MFN rates for more than 90 percent of all product lines, by 6.5 percentage 
points, on average. This would be a substantive increase in the levels of tariffs 
compared to the baseline MFN scenario. In contrast, the EU FTA would 
have left Ukraine’s MFN tariffs untouched (i.e. still lower than the CU 
tariffs), and would have set most of Ukraine’s tariffs vis-a-vis EU countries 
to zero. 
5.3.3 Trade Policy Uncertainty Measure 
We conceptualize TPU as the probability of Ukraine signing either the 
EU FTA or joining the CU with Russia. In this binary decision, each of 
these policies means increased uncertainty with regards to the alternative, 
because both policies could not have been implemented at the same time. While 
the common external tariff of the RU CU would have made the conclusion 
of the EU FTA impossible, an FTA with the EU would have rendered the 
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Figure 5.1 Differences in Applied MFN Tariff Rates between Ukraine and the 
RU CU in 2012. This graph illustrates the differences in the distribution of applied 
MFN tariff rates between Ukraine and the CU. The figure shows that the CU MFN 
tariffs are higher than Ukraine’s MFN tariffs in all product categories, particularly 
in foodstuff, transportation, textiles as well as wood and wood products. 
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CU with Russia politically unfeasible. To measure TPU, we use automated 
quantitative text analysis for large-scale, unstructured collections of texts. 
The measure is based on relative salience of the respective policy in 
Ukrainian business news. Our main source for measuring TPU consists 
of approximately 2200 trade-related15 news briefs from Ukraine Business 
Weekly (UBW). Operated by Interfax, UBW is a press release service that 
provides summaries of business and financial news in Ukraine. UBW is 
available over a long period of time, from January 2003 to today, and it 
concerns business news only, which makes it more relevant to our investi­
gation than broadsheet newspapers. To estimate TPU from UBW articles, 
we use so-called “topic models”, developed by computer scientists for the 
analysis and organization of large-scale collections of texts. Topic models 
analyze relative word occurrences in un-labeled documents in order to infer 
“themes” that run through them.16 It is crucial to understand that topics 
are not defined ex ante by the researcher, like in hand-coding of words or 
documents based on pre-defined dictionaries.17 
Estimation of the topic models works as follows: a topic K is defined as 
a distribution over a fixed vocabulary V. We assume that documents (press 
releases) are created by K topics. Across documents, we first randomly 
choose a distribution over topics βk. Each document is modeled as a 
distribution over K topics, θd. Within each document, words are generated 
by a two step process. First, for each word zd,n, one draws one topic for that 
15See Appendix C.2.1 for a detailed description of how we selected the text collection, or 
“corpus”. 
16These models have been successfully applied in both Political Science (Grimmer, 2010; 
Roberts et al., 2014) and Economics (Mueller and Rauh, 2018), and many more fields such 
as Genetics or Information Science (Blei, 2012). 
17For a good description of the basics of dictionary-based text analysis see Neuendorf 
(2002, Chapter 6). A well-known application of dictionary-based methods keywords 
representing left-right ideology in order to estimate scores of party positions using their 
election manifestos (Laver and Garry, 2000). In economics, Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) 
use pre-defined dictionaries to measure their Economic Policy Uncertainty index. 
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word from a multinomial distribution zd,n ∼ Mult(θd) (with zd,n indexing 
the topic assignment for the n-th word in document d). Second, a word wd,n 
is drawn from a distribution over the vocabulary wd,n ∼ Mult(βzd,n ) where 
βk,v is the probability of drawing the v-th word in the vocabulary for topic 
k. The likelihood of a word for a given topic is then the probability of a 
topic within a given document times the probability of a term in the overall 
word distribution, p(zd,n) · p(wd,n). This joint distribution of the latent and 
observed parameters (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2012) is formally given by 
K 
∏ p(βi) 
D N 
p(β1:K, θ1:D, z1:D, w1:D) = ∏
p(θd) ∏
p(zd,n|θd)p(wd,n|β1:K, zd,n) .
 
i=1 d=1 n=1 
Finally, the model assumes a Dirichlet prior for the topic proportions 
over documents, so that θd ∼ Dirichlet(α) (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003). This 
joint probability distribution can be used in order to calculate the latent 
parameter of interest, the posterior topic probabilities θd for each document. 
Higher posterior likelihoods of a topic mean that a high proportion of terms 
in document is assigned to that topic. The intuition is that documents in a 
collection of documents contain multiple topics or themes, but they exhibit 
these topics in different proportions, depending on which words (each 
assigned to one topic) are used more or less in these documents. Bigrams 
like “Association Agreement” or “Eastern Partnership” are related to the 
topic “EU-Ukraine FTA” , while terms like “customs union” or “EACU” 
would be related to the topic “Russia-Ukraine Customs Union”. Topic 
models do not require any prior information about the text - only the 
number of topics K needs to be specified. We use Structural topic models 
(STMs) which allow the introduction of document-level covariates, in our 
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case, the publication date, allow for topics to vary over time (Roberts et al., 
2014).18 
Figure 5.2 shows the topics estimated by an STM with K = 10, and the 
five terms mostly associated with them.19 The x-axis shows the overall topic 
proportions across all articles from all 10 topics, which sum up to 1. One can 
clearly identify the two topics which we are interested in: Topic 1 is about 
Ukraine approaching the EU, about the Eastern Partnership process and 
the Association Agreement (“easternpartnership”, “euukrain”, “association­
agr”). Topic 8 is about the Ukraine joining the CU with Russia. Documents 
with high proportions of this topic use terms like “economicspace”, “zone”, 
or “customsunion” score high on this topic. We can also differentiate the 
EU FTA and the CU topic from other trade topics which might be discussed 
in UBW, but which are not directly related to the EU FTA and the CU.20 
Figure 5.3 below shows the EU FTA and the RU CU topics over time, 
including 95% confidence intervals. It measures the relative salience of the 
two mutually exclusive policies. Thus, it is similar to the economic policy 
uncertainty measure developed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016). However, 
we do not use a pre-defined dictionary, as the topics are estimated from the 
textual data.21 Empirically, we are interested in the up-and-down swings 
between the two non-compatible policies. As long as none of the policies 
18A well known application in Political Science are party manifestos, which contain 
information about the election year, the type of election (federal, subnational), and the 
author (the party). See Volkens et al. (2015). 
19Here, we report the so-called “FREX” terms. These are words associated with the topic 
which appear with high probability and most exclusively this topic, but not other topics. 
However, all words can in principle occur in all topics, as the top assignment to words n is 
not deterministic but probabilistic. 
20For instance, topic 3 is about steel and cheese quotas (“quota, “pipe”, “dairy”,...) and 
topic 10 is about Russian gas imports (“gazprom”, “russiangas”, “gastransit”,...), two topics 
which are also very contentious in Ukrainian trade relations. In Figure C.6 in the appendix, 
we also provide snippets of articles that score high on our two topics of interest. 
21The raw monthly and weekly topic prevalences are presented in Figure C.5 in Appendix 
A6. 
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Figure 5.2 Mean Topic Proportions across K = 10 Topics. This graph shows the 
distribution of 10 topics estimated from 2200 Ukraine Business Weekly news briefs. 
The proportions across all topics sum up to 1 and indicate the prevalence of a 
given topic in a the collection of news briefs. The words are terms that are mostly 
associated with the respective topic. Topic 1 is abput the EU FTA and Ukraine-EU 
relations, whereas Topic 8 is about the RU CU and Ukraine-Russia relations. 
has been realized (i.e. pEU = 1 or pCU = 1), larger values in one topic can 
be interpreted as uncertainty with regards to the other topic. The smoothed 
time trend shows both the increasing prevalence of the EU FTA, and the 
simultaneous decline of the CU salience over time. It also highlights the 
short but sharp decline in EU FTA prevalence in 2013, when the Ukrainian 
president Yanukovich declined to sign the EU FTA. After Yanukovich is 
ousted from office, the EU FTA becomes more salient again.22 
The latent topics estimated from the UBW articles are therefore good 
representations of the long-run policy process and the relative probabilities 
22See the next section for a more thorough description. The graph also includes vertical 
lines for other events in the following order: 1) 08/2006: Announcement of plans for 
Eurasian Customs Union; 2) 07/2008: Inauguration of Eastern Partnership between EU and 
post-Soviet states; 3) 01/2010: Launch of Eurasian Customs Union with Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Russia; 4) 03/2012: Start of negotiations between EU and Ukraine on Association 
Agreement; 02/2013: EU Commission President Jose-Manuel Barroso announces Ukraine 
needs to decide between EU AA and CU with Russia; 01/2014: Yanukovich ousted from 
office following Euro-Maidan demonstrations; 03/2014: AA between EU and Ukraine 
signed; 04/2016: Ukraine signs Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the 
EU; 04/2016: Dutch Referendum rejects the EU-Ukraine DCFTA, which enters into force 
regardless in January 2017. 
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of the two trade policy options. Inspection of the words associated with 
topics, the documents associated with the topics, and the long-run trend 
resembling real-world events provide validity to our TPU measure.23 More­
over, in appendix A7, Figures C.9 and C.10 we provide evidence that our 
measure is not driven by changes in tone, or how UBW reports about the FTA 
and the CU. In another validation exercise, in Figure C.8 in appendix A6, 
we plot our measure against the widely-used Economic Policy Uncertainty 
(EPU) measures by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) for Russia.24 In line with 
our expectations, we find that our EU FTA measure is positively correlated 
with Russian EPU and that our RU CU measure is negatively correlated 
with Russian EPU. 
5.4 Empirical Analysis 
5.4.1 Ukrainian Trade Policy vis-a-vis the EU and Russia 
Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, Eastern European countries had to re-orient 
their foreign economic policies and sought either closer ties with the EU or 
the Russian Federation. By 2011, 12 former communist countries had joined 
the EU. Since 2000, Russia pursued the Eurasian Economic Union (EACU) , 
a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan. In 2003, Russian president 
Valdimir Putin officially invited Ukraine to join the customs union project, 
and publicly supported the pro-Russian candidate Victor Yanukovich in the 
Ukrainian presidential elections. However, Ukraine had already applied 
for EU membership in 1995, and most Ukrainian voters supported the 
Western-friendly candidate Victor Yushchenko. 
23In Appendix A5, we provide tests of non-stationarity of our measure, and reject it for
 
both time-series.
 
24We use Russia since there is no separate EU or Ukrainian EPU measure.
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Figure 5.3 Mean Topic Proportions of EU FTA and RU CU Topic, 2003-2017. 
This graph depicts the prevalence of the EU FTA topic and the RU CU topic from 
2003-2017. Both topics are fitted with spline for month. The figure shows how 
the mean topic proportions (in bold, with 95 percent confidence intervals) vary 
intuitively with actual changes in Ukraine-EU and Ukraine-Russia relations. Note 
that estimation uncertainty and variation in means is higher at the beginning and 
the end of the time period because less articles/data are available. 
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The Orange Revolution in 2004 resulted in a pro-EU government, and the 
WTO accession in 2008 further paved the way to negotiation of a free trade 
agreement with EU (Shepotylo and Vakhitov, 2015). In May 2009, the EU 
started the Eastern Partnership with the six ENP countries25 in order to “[...] 
create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further 
economic integration between the European Union and interested partner 
countries” (CoEU, 2009). In addition to free trade, the European Union 
offered a broader Association Agreements (AA) which included political 
cooperation, but without the promise of future EU accession (Aslund, 2013). 
However, in 2010, Victor Yanukovich won the presidential elections promis­
ing to strengthen economic ties with Russia while still following a two-tier 
trade strategy: "From his re-election in 2010 onward, President Yanukovych 
had purportedly cultivated ambiguity on the geopolitical orientation of 
his country...neither by originally indicating his readiness to sign the AA 
nor by eventually rejecting it" (Cadier, 2014). His government continued 
negotiations on a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with the 
EU (DC FTA) which was supposed to lower tariffs and Non-Tariff Barriers 
(NTBs) between Ukraine and the EU. 
Moscow vehemently opposed both the DC FTA and the AA, because 
Russia viewed them as a threat to their customs union. Before the 2013 
Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius where the DC FTA was scheduled 
to be signed, Russia imposed import bans on major Ukrainian exports to 
Russia and threatened to withdraw from an existing bilateral FTA with 
25In 2003, the EU had launched the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which supported 
structural reforms in exchange for improved market access and liberalization of visa 
regimes(Cadier, 2014). ENP governs the EU’s relations with 16 of the EU’s closest Eastern 
and Southern Neighbors. To the South: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia and to the East: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Russia takes part in Cross-Border Cooperation activities 
under the ENP and is not a part of the ENP as such. Source: https://ec.europa.eu/ 
neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/overview_en 
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Ukraine. Russia also promised to lower energy prices, and to provide 
financial assistance worth of 15 billion dollars if Yanukovich did not sign 
the DC FTA. On 21 November 2013, Yanukovich finally refused to sign the 
EU DC FTA, which triggered a civil unrest that eventually overthrew the 
Yanukovich regime in February 2014. Since then, a newly elected Ukrainian 
government has strongly committed to the path of European integration. 
The AA was signed in June 2014 and has only been provisionally applied 
since November 2014. The EU-Ukraine FTA has been provisionally applied 
since January 2016. 
5.4.2	 Trade Policy Uncertainty, Imports and Tariff Protec­
tion 
Our theoretical model predicts that trade of products which are protected by 
higher MFN tariffs should benefit more from the reduction in trade policy 
uncertainty than those with lower MFN tariffs. This prediction allows us 
to identify the TPU effects using both variation across time and products. We 
test the prediction by interacting our TPU measures with product-specific 
and time-varying MFN tariffs. 
Export	 Import 
Base +Empl +TFP +Ind +Ind.Trend Base +Empl +TFP +Ind +Ind.Trend 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
pEU × ln(1 + τMFN) 5.124∗∗	 4.036∗ 4.037∗ 4.553∗ 1.155 
(1.788) (1.789) (1.801) (1.803) (1.863) 
ln(1 + τMFN ) -.158 -.199 -.456 -.579 4.538∗∗ 
(1.259) (1.264) (1.264) (1.265) (1.370) 
pEU × ln(1 + τUKR) 2.989∗∗ 3.460∗∗ 3.341∗∗ 3.384∗∗ 3.070∗∗ 
(.572) (.570) (.575) (.575) (.581) 
pCU × ln((1 + τCU )/ -1.067∗∗ -1.535∗∗ -1.575∗∗ -1.538∗∗ -.206 
(1 + τUKR)) (.243) (.243) (.246) (.246) (.252) 
ln(1 + τUKR) -1.788∗∗ -2.027∗∗ -1.678∗∗ -1.675∗∗ -.379 
(.229) (.227) (.230) (.230) (.247) 
EU p -.158∗∗ -.0722 -.161∗∗ -.192∗∗ -.826∗∗ .0803∗∗ .0692∗∗ -.00118 -.0149 -.618∗∗ 
(.054) (.054) (.055) (.056) (.083) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.041) 
CU p -.176∗∗ -.244∗∗ -.209∗∗ -.200∗∗ .442∗∗ .0706∗∗ .0783∗∗ .137∗∗ .145∗∗ .402∗∗ 
(.031) (.031) (.032) (.032) (.056) (.020) (.020) (.021) (.021) (.031) 
ln(Employment)	 .357∗∗ .369∗∗ .374∗∗ .374∗∗ .401∗∗ .422∗∗ .431∗∗ .345∗∗ 
(.016) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
TFP	 .129∗∗ .186∗∗ .150∗∗ .130∗∗ .172∗∗ .146∗∗ 
(.010) (.013) (.013) (.005) (.006) (.006) 
Quarter ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Industry ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year ✓ ✓ 
Region ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 129502 128909 125696 125696 125696 807509 804767 786701 786701 786701 
R2 .875 .876 .876 .876 .880 .811 .813 .812 .813 .815 
Table 5.4 Ukraine-EU Trade, Tariff Protection, and Trade Policy Uncertainty. The table shows the impact of uncertainty on intermediate 
and capital goods with different levels of tariff protection. The dependent variable is the log of firm i’s exports/imports of product k 
to/from EU country j in quarter t, using only intermediate and capital goods. pEU captures the likelihood of Ukraine signing the EU FTA. 
pCU capture the likelihood of Ukraine joining the CU with Russia. ln(1 + τMFN ), ln(1 + τUKR), and ln(1 + τCU ) are the current EU MFN 
tariffs vis-a-vis Ukrainian exports, current Ukrainian MFN tariffs, and tariffs under the Russian Customs Union, respectively. All models 
include firm-destination-HS4 product fixed effects. Notes: + p<0.1 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are in 
parentheses. 
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In the following linear regressions, we focus on the interaction terms 
pEU × ln(1 + τEU MFN ) for exports of Ukrainian firms to EU member states, 
and pEU × ln(1 + τUKR MFN )/(1 + τUKR MFN) and pCU × ln[(1 + τCU MFN )] for imports 
of Ukrainian manufacturers from the EU.26 We expect positive coefficients 
for the first two cross terms and a negative coefficient for the last cross term. 
Products with higher tariff protection should expand more if the likelihood 
of signing the EU-Ukrainian FTA increases, resulting in an increased prob­
ability of tariff rates being reduced to zero. However, if the likelihood of 
joining CU with Russia increases, this would raise expectations that Ukraine 
would switch from its own tariff schedule to the CU schedule, which would 
result in lower imports from EU countries for products with higher CU 
protection, relative to Ukrainian tariffs. Table 5.4 shows the results from this 
test using Ukrainian exports to the EU (columns 1-5) and Ukrainian imports 
from EU (columns 6-10) as dependent variables. We consider only trade 
of intermediate and capital goods (BEC Rev. 4 classification) of Ukrainian 
firms with EU. All regressions include firm-country-product fixed effects. 
For Ukrainian exports to the EU, we find that pEU × ln(1 + τEU MFN ) has 
a significantly positive effect, which means that export of products with 
higher MFN tariffs expand more when probability of signing EU FTA goes 
up. Column (1) provides the baseline result. We control for employment 
(column 2), productivity (column 3), industry and region (column 4) in 
further specifications. The effect becomes non-significant when we add 
industry specific trends (column (5)), but it remains positive. Also, the effect 
of MFN tariff for this case turns positive, which may indicate a problem of 
multicollinearity in trade policy variables. According to column (4), which 
is our preferred model specification, elimination of TPU would increase 
26The export equation has only one interaction term because joining the customs union 
does not change tariffs faced by Ukrainian exporters that export to EU countries. 
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exports to EU by 8.3 percent, while elimination of tariffs would increase 
exports to EU by 1.3 percent. 
For imports, we observe a robust positive effect of pEU × ln(1 + τUKR MFN ), 
indicating that imports of products with high levels of tariff protection 
in Ukraine expand more when the likelihood of signing the EU FTA is 
high. Moreover, EU imports of goods that are more protected under the 
CU, relative to the Ukrainian tariffs, decrease more when pCU is larger, 
as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient on pCU × ln[(1 + 
τCU MFN )/(1 + τ
UKR 
MFN)]. Our results are robust to the inclusion of industry and 
regional dummies (column 9) and to accounting for industry-time trend 
(column 10). The magnitude of the effect is large. Based on the estimates 
from column (9), signing the EU FTA and completely removing TPU would 
increase imports from the EU by 10.1 percent. The effect of lower tariffs, on 
the other hand, would increase imports by only 6 percent. To the extent that 
imported manufacturing inputs are used to increase productivity, this could 
hint at potential productivity-reducing effects of trade policy uncertainty. 
5.4.3	 Trade Policy Uncertainty and Intermediate and Capi­
tal Goods versus Consumer Goods 
Our theoretical results indicate that uncertainty matters more for goods 
with higher sunk costs (equations 5.2 and 5.7). Thus, intermediate and 
capital goods used by firms in the production process should be responsive 
to swings in uncertainty, while consumer goods should be less sensitive to 
changes in TPU. We test this prediction by estimating the same model as 
before, and compare the effects on all goods, capital goods, intermediate 
goods, and consumer goods (BEC Ver. 4 classification). We present the 
results in Table 5.5 for exports (columns 1-4) and imports (columns 5-8). 
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The results confirm our theoretical expectations. The coefficients on the 
interaction terms consistently vary across different types of traded goods. 
Capital goods with higher tariff protection are the most sensitive to changes 
in policy uncertainty. Intermediate goods still have significant interaction 
terms coefficients, but the effects are lower in magnitude. Finally, consumer 
goods do not respond to the TPU changes and often have the opposite 
sign of the coefficients on the interaction terms. These results confirm our 
theoretical expectations that capital and intermediate goods should react 
more strongly to changes in TPU. 
Export Import 
All Capital Intermediate Consumer All Capital Intermediate Consumer 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
pEU × ln(1 + τMFN ) 1.460+ 35.35∗∗ 4.242∗ -.680 
(.876) (12.881) (1.822) (1.345) 
ln(1 + τMFN ) -.0620 -70.66∗∗ -.413 18.48+ 
(1.236) (27.151) (1.256) (10.448) 
pEU × ln(1 + τUKR) 2.447∗∗ 7.767∗∗ 2.668∗∗ -1.294 
(.519) (2.139) (.591) (1.553) 
pCU × ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR)) -1.606∗∗ -5.310∗∗ -.828∗∗ -2.178∗∗ 
(.228) (.769) (.260) (.633) 
ln(1 + τUKR) -1.582∗∗ -1.712+ -1.414∗∗ -1.452∗∗ 
(.213) (.920) (.236) (.553) 
Quarter ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Industry ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 176651 16463 109233 50955 880486 143757 642944 93785 
R2 .868 .867 .877 .842 .812 .776 .819 .802 
Table 5.5 Ukraine-EU Trade Trade Policy Uncertainty: Intermediate, Capital, 
and Comsumer Goods. The table shows the impact of uncertainty on interme­
diate and capital goods with different levels of tariff protection for intermediate, 
capital, and consumption goods. The dependent variable is the log of firm i’s 
exports/imports of product k to/from EU country j in quarter t, using only in­
termediate and capital goods. pEU captures the likelihood of Ukraine signing 
the EU FTA. pCU capture the likelihood of Ukraine joining the CU with Russia. 
ln(1 + τMFN ), ln(1 + τUKR), and ln(1 + τCU ) are the current EU MFN tariffs vis-a­
vis Ukrainian exports, current Ukrainian MFN tariffs, and tariffs under the Russian 
Customs Union, respectively. We control for the probability of joining the EU FTA, 
the RU CU, as well as firm employment and productivity. All models include 
firm-destination-HS4 product fixed effects. Notes: + p<0.1 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. 
We perform a number of robustness checks, all of which are described 
in more detail in the appendix. One important question is whether our 
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measure of TPU outperforms existing measures and simpler measures based 
on relative word frequencies. In appendix A10 and A11, we re-estimate 
the main results in Table 5.4 using the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index 
by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016), and simple measures based on relative 
word frequencies, none of which changes sign or significance of our main 
explanatory variable based on topic models. We also re-estimate the results 
in Table 5.5 using alternative topics from our topic model, such as a topic 
about natural gas or quotas, none of which have the same effect as our TPU 
measure. We also employ another battery of simpler measures, such as 
logged word counts, relative word frequencies for both EU and CU topics, 
and overall number of articles, none of which changes the main results 
presented in the last two sections. 
5.4.4 Trade Policy Uncertainty during the 2014 Transition 
In this last empirical section, we show that our results also hold in shorter 
time frames with large changes in TPU, between 2013 and end of 2014. 
In January 2014, after the Euro-Maidan demonstrations, the Yanukovich 
regime was ended and a EU-friendly government took office. As a result, 
the CU with Russia became politically unfeasible and the EU FTA much 
more likely. The large swings in uncertainty are also very much visible in 
our TPU measure in Figure 5.3 above. Shortly after Yanukovich had been 
ousted from office, the uptick in EU FTA visualizes the actual increased 
likelihood of an FTA with the European Union. Therefore, we run two 
additional model specifications, concentrating on the 2013 and 2014 time 
frame that was marked by increased volatility in TPU. For this purpose, we 
aggregate the firm-level trade data by firm, month and HS4-product, and 
restrict the sample to EU-Ukraine trade as in Table 5.4 above. 
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In the first model, we interact the TPU measure with HS4-product MFN 
tariffs. We control for firm-level factors and use firm-product-destination 
fixed effects, as well fixed effects for month, industry, region, and time 
trends. The results are show in Table 5.6 below. Consistent with our 
prior findings, the interaction term pEU × ln(1 + τUKR MFN ) is positive and 
significantly different from zero. As TPU with regards to the EU FTA 
is reduced (pEU increases), imports of products that are more protected 
under current Ukrainian MFN tariffs expand, since those products would 
benefit the most from the FTA with the EU. Conversely, the coefficient on 
pCU × ln[(1 + τCU MFN)] is significant and negative. For higher MFN )/(1 + τUKR 
values of pCU, imports of products that would be more protected under a 
potential customs union relative to the status quo Ukrainian MFN tariffs 
decrease substantively. In line with our prior results, this holds for Ukrainian 
imports only: exports to the EU are not affected by the interaction pEU × 
ln(1 + τEU MFN ). 
One concern could be that we are merely picking up the beginning of 
the civil war in Eastern Ukraine since March 2014. Shortly after the 2014 
transition occurred, a fully-fledged war broke out in Donbass (including 
Donetsk and Luhansk) from March 2014, severely reducing the data from 
those regions. Then, Crimea was annexed by Russia in March 2014 and 
firms from Crimea stopped reporting to the Ukrainian statistical services. 
Therefore, model 4 and 8 in Table 5.6 exclude firms based in Crimea, 
Donetsk, and Luhansk. Our results remain under this alteration and various 
other model specifications. 
In the second model, we take a difference-in-difference approach, lever­
aging the 2014 political transition as a shock to trade policy uncertainty 
with regards to Ukrainian relationships with Russia and the EU. The logic is 
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the following: the 2014 transition led to the formation of a new, EU-friendly 
government in Kiev. Hence, the transition reduced uncertainty with regards to 
the EU FTA for Ukrainian firms. Firms that trade products which are more 
protected under Ukrainian MFN tariffs or the potential CU with Russia 
should react more strongly to this reduction in uncertainty. We thus run the 
same model as before, but instead of using our TPU measure, we include a 
dummy variable Post that equals 1 for all months following the February 
2014 transition, and zero otherwise. We interact this Post-dummy with the 
same measures of Ukrainian MFN tariffs (Post × ln(1 + τUKR MFN )), EU MFN 
tariffs (Post × ln(1 + τEU MFN)), and the ratio of CU tariffs to Ukrainian MFN 
tariffs (Post × ln[(1 + τCU MFN )]) as before. Since the Post-dummyMFN)/(1 + τUKR 
implies a reduction in TPU with regards to the EU FTA (or equivalently, an 
increase in pEU ), we expect all three interaction terms to be positive.27 We 
show the results in Table 5.7 below. In line with our expectations, within 
firm-products-EU destinations with higher Ukrainian MFN tariffs and prod­
ucts with larger tariffs under the CU expand significantly more in the period 
following the 2014 transition. Consistent with our prior models, we find 
these effects for imports from but not for exports to the EU. These results 
hold controlling for a host of fixed effects, firm-level covariates, and a time 
trend. Again, the results also hold up excluding Crimea, Donetsk, and 
Luhansk, suggesting that we are not picking up the beginning of the conflict 
in Eastern Ukraine. 
27Note that this approach is very similar to Facchini et al. (2019). 
Base +Ind&Reg +Trend -C/D/L Base +Ind&Reg +Trend -C/D/L 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Exports Exports Exports Exports Imports Imports Imports Imports 
ln(1 + τEU )	 .097 .097 .097 .097 
(.19) (.19) (.19) (.22) 
ln(1 + τEU ) × pEU	 .016 .016 .016 .008 
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.05) 
ln(1 + τUKR)	 .113 .115 .115 .117 
(.18) (.18) (.18) (.18) 
EU ln(1 + τUKR) × p .116∗∗ .116∗∗ .116∗∗ .133∗∗ 
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) 
ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR))	 .049 .050 .050 .064 
(.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) 
CU ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR)) × p -.146∗∗ -.142∗∗ -.142∗∗ -.156∗∗ 
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.06) 
CU p -.707∗∗ -.716∗∗ -.716∗∗ -.716∗∗ -2.111∗∗ -2.099∗∗ -2.099∗∗ -2.215∗∗ 
(.18) (.18) (.18) (.19) (.24) (.24) (.24) (.25) 
EU p .886∗∗ .892∗∗ .892∗∗ .928∗∗ 1.822∗∗ 1.812∗∗ 1.812∗∗ 1.863∗∗ 
(.24) (.24) (.24) (.24) (.27) (.27) (.27) (.28) 
TFP .129∗ .136∗ .136∗ .134∗ .409∗∗ .451∗∗ .451∗∗ .440∗∗ 
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.08) (.09) (.09) (.09) 
ln(empl)	 .159 .105 .105 .166 .592∗∗ .533∗∗ .533∗∗ .501∗∗ 
(.13) (.13) (.13) (.15) (.16) (.17) (.17) (.19) 
Month FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Industry FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trend ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 324599 324599 324599 301726 320566 320566 320566 297653 
R2 .923 .923 .923 .919 .894 .894 .894 .890 
Table 5.6 Ukraine-EU Trade and Trade Policy Uncertainty, 2013-2014. The table shows the impact of uncertainty on intermediate and 
capital goods with different levels of tariff protection, between 2013 and 2014. The dependent variable is the log of firm i’s exports/imports 
of product k to/from EU country j in month t, using only intermediate and capital goods. pEU captures the likelihood of Ukraine 
signing the EU FTA. pCU capture the likelihood of Ukraine joining the CU with Russia. ln(1 + τMFN ), ln(1 + τUKR), and ln(1 + τCU ) are 
the current EU MFN tariffs vis-a-vis Ukrainian exports, current Ukrainian MFN tariffs, and tariffs under the Russian Customs Union, 
respectively. All models include firm-destination-HS4 product fixed effects. The models 2 and 6 add industry- and region fixed effects 
and models 3 and 7 add a time trend. The models 4 and 8 exclude Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. Notes: + p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. 
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Base +Ind&Reg +Trend -C/D/L Base +Ind&Reg +Trend -C/D/L 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Exports Exports Exports Exports Imports Imports Imports Imports 
ln(1 + τEU ) .103 .104 .104 .102 
(.19) (.19) (.19) (.22) 
Post× ln(1 + τEU ) -.006 -.007 -.007 -.010 
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
ln(1 + τUKR) .152 .154 .154 .159 
(.19) (.19) (.19) (.19) 
Post × ln(1 + τUKR) .124∗∗ .125∗∗ .125∗∗ .126∗∗ 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR)) .010 .012 .012 .018 
(.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) 
Post× ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR)) .112∗∗ .111∗∗ .111∗∗ .114∗∗ 
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Post .215∗∗ .218∗∗ .218∗∗ .225∗∗ .311∗∗ .308∗∗ .308∗∗ .330∗∗ 
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.07) 
TFP .129∗ .136∗ .136∗ .134∗ .402∗∗ .444∗∗ .444∗∗ .433∗∗ 
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) 
ln(empl) .159 .105 .105 .165 .590∗∗ .533∗∗ .533∗∗ .502∗∗ 
(.13) (.13) (.13) (.15) (.16) (.17) (.17) (.19) 
Month FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Industry FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trend ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 324599 324599 324599 301726 320566 320566 320566 297653 
R2 .923 .923 .923 .919 .894 .894 .894 .890 
Table 5.7 Ukraine-EU Trade and Post-February-2014 Transition. The table shows the impact of the 2014 political transition on goods 
with different levels of tariff protection, between 2013 and 2014. The dependent variable is the log of firm i’s exports/imports of product 
k to/from EU country j in month t, using only intermediate and capital goods. Post is a dummy variable that equals 1 for all the 
month-years after February 2014 and 0 otherwise. Post × ln(1 + τEU ) captures the effect of the political transition to an EU-friendly 
government on exports to the EU in goods that are more protected by EU MFN tariffs. Post × ln(1 + τUKR) captures the effect of the 
political transition on imports from the EU that are more protected by Ukrainian MFN tariffs. Post× ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR)) captures 
the effect of the political transition on imports of goods from the EU that would be more protected under a customs union with Russia. 
All models include firm-destination-HS4 product fixed effects. The models 2 and 6 add industry- and region fixed effects and models 3 
and 7 add a time trend. The models 4 and 8 exclude Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. Notes: + p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Robust standard 
errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. 
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The results above lend credibility to our main finding: a reduction in 
TPU leads to an increase in imports of intermediate and capital goods, and 
this relationship is conditional on the current level of tariff protection, as 
shown in our theoretical model.28 Firm-level imports increase more for 
goods that are more protected under the status quo, because firms face 
an increase in the probability that duties might be reduced in the future. 
As demonstrated in this section, these results are not only an artifact of a 
long-run trend towards further integration of Ukraine with the EU, they 
also hold in the context of high policy volatility between 2013 and end of 
2014, and the expected impact of the political transition itself.29 
5.5 Discussion of Limitations 
Some limitations with regards to the findings of this paper remain, which 
can be summarized along the issues of measurement and external validity. 
First, we assume that the relative salience of the EU FTA and RU CU topics 
approximate the likelihood of the respective policy being enacted. Our 
measure seems to vary intuitively along real political developments in 
Ukraine as shown in Figure 5.3, and structural topic models are appealing 
28For completeness, we run the same models with weekly data and show the results in 
Table C.9, Table C.10 (using a HP-filtered version of our TPU measure), and C.7 in the 
appendix. While the results in Table C.9 are not significant, the coefficients are all signed as 
expected. All other alternative models show significant results, consistent with the findings 
from the main text. The weekly tables should be interpreted with caution, though. First, 
the weekly firm-level trade data is incredibly noisy, as is our measure of TPU, shown in 
Figure C.5. Second, most firms will make their decisions to import or exports well in 
advance. It seems unlikely that firms to react to swings in TPU on a weekly basis, and 
adjust imports of intermediates. 
29In Table C.8 in the appendix, we show a placebo test for the difference-in-difference 
regression, using 2012/2013 data and February 2013 instead of the actual transition in 
February 2014. The coefficient on the ratio (Post × ln[(1 + τCU MFN )] becomesMFN )/(1 + τUKR 
insignificant, as we would expect in the absence of a shock to the TPU with regards to 
economic integration with either EU or Russia. The coefficient on (Post × ln(1 + τUKR MFN)) 
stays significant but becomes, negative, indicating an opposite trend of expectations. This 
is also shown in Figure 5.3: at the beginning of 2013, Yanukovich declined to sign the 
already negotiated DC FTA. 
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because they require less choices of specific key words by the researcher. 
Despite these advantages of our approach, there are some caveats to it. 
On the one hand, while a measure of relative topic salience works well in 
our application due to the non-compatibility of the EU trade agreement 
and the customs union with Russia, it might not work so well in other 
cases were policies are not strictly mutually exclusive. In these instances, 
researchers might want a measure that is based on volatility of different 
options, rather than salience. On the other hand, even more saturated topic 
models using more document-level covariates might not produce desired 
topics, or too general topics which do not speak to the policies under 
investigation. Therefore, I will explore different alternative measurement 
techniques in the future, based on pre-defined dictionaries and external 
texts as training sets for classification of news documents. These bear the 
risk of introducing more researcher bias (King, Lam and Roberts, 2017), but 
could serve as alternative measures in addition to topic models. In any case, 
their performance could be compared against each other. Which one of 
these is more adequate will depend on the case and the policy alternatives 
under investigation. 
Second, one could criticize that the case of Ukraine does not allow for 
much generalization of the finding that firm’s imports of intermediates 
do react to swings in uncertainty between trade policies, before those are 
resolved by one policy being locked in. Indeed, Ukraine faced particularly 
high and volatile policy uncertainty linked to the 10-year long political 
transition phase following the orange revolution. However, the findings 
are highly complementary to existing work on the positive impact of the 
orange revolution on productivity of politically connected firms (Earle and 
Gehlbach, 2015). Like this related work, we highlight the stark distribu­
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tional consequences of economic integration decisions across firms within 
the same sectors, which depend on firm-level characteristics such as the 
products these firms trade. Moreover, while Ukraine can be regarded as 
a most-likely (George and Bennett, 2005) or theory-informing case (Odell, 
2001), the implications from our theoretical and empirical findings could 
in principle be extended to other cases. For example, after the fall of the 
Iron Curtain, many countries of the former Soviet Union could have chosen 
economic integration with either the Russian Federation or the European 
Community, which consequently pushed for the inclusion of former Soviet 
states via a combination of economic incentives and strict conditionality 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Another current case is the United 
Kingdom’s decision about its future relationship with the European Union, 
following the 2016 referendum on leaving the EU. I will discuss how fu­
ture work could leverage these cases and apply alternative measurement 
techniques in the concluding chapter of this dissertation. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Despite the ubiquity of uncertainty and intermediate inputs in IPE and 
Economics, it remains unclear how firm’s decisions to source intermediate 
and capital goods are affected by uncertainty between alternative trade 
policies. Leveraging firm-product-destination-level data from Ukraine, and 
applying machine learning techniques to over 2000 Ukrainian business news 
briefs, we find that a reduction in TPU has a strong and positive impact on 
imports of intermediate and capital goods, We estimate that a full reduction 
of TPU increases imports of intermediate and capital goods by 10.1 percent. 
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Moreover, we find that goods which are more protected under status quo 
tariffs are more responsive to a reduction in TPU. 
The results of this paper have implications for the study of uncertainty 
in international trade. First, our results show a need to reconsider some 
core assumptions of theoretical work on trade and uncertainty in IPE. While 
some studies assume that private interests will tend to be in favor of stable 
(and open) trade policies (Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2008a), others assume 
that political leaders will tie their hands by signing PTAs, because of their 
welfare-increasing effects (Hollyer and Rosendorff, 2012). In contrast, we 
show that theses premises could be too over-simplifying, as swings in 
uncertainty between trade policies affect firms differently depending on 
the type of good they import, as well as the trading partner. As Mansfield 
and Reinhardt (2008a, p.642) argued over ten years ago, if trade institutions 
help to stabilize the expectations of private actors, then “it would be useful 
to analyze this micro-causal mechanism more directly in a study cast at 
the level of individual firms’ responses to trade agreement formation”. 
We follow this line of work, and additionally show that firms rationally 
adjust their import behavior already during the negotiation phase of PTAs, 
even the agreement has not been realized yet (Handley, 2014; Handley 
and Limao, 2015). Thus, we provide evidence of the effect of large swings 
of uncertainty on firm’s expectations before uncertainty-reducing trade 
agreements are enacted. We also show, using tariff schedules, that the design 
of the respective agreements is key for understanding the distributional 
consequences of PTAs. Therefore, it might be beneficial for scholars of IPE 
to pay more attention to the political process, including exogenous shocks to 
expectations about future outcomes, and their impact on corporate political 
activity (You, 2016). 
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Second, the paper shows how quantitative text analysis tools other than 
dictionary approaches can be applied to the study of trade and political 
uncertainty.30 There are many interesting potential cases which could be 
analyzed using the same or a similar measurement techniques, like the 
current discussion about different, clearly-named alternatives for the exit of 
the United Kingdom from the European Union, or the types of membership 
the EU is likely to grant to accession countries. LDA and structural topic 
models could also be used to measure other types of policy uncertainty 
when countries face multiple, mutually exclusive policy options. Examples 
of those include the joining of military alliances, or joining international 
organizations that exclude the membership in others for technical or political 
reasons. New advances in text-as-data research and machine learning thus 
hold promise for future research on policy uncertainty. 
Finally, the paper adds to our understanding of how uncertainty can be 
a barrier to economic growth in developing and emerging economies. Our 
model shows that uncertainty affects productivity of firms if there is a hold­
up of investment necessary for the import of intermediate and capital goods, 
which in turn affects the intensive margin of exports. This is particularly 
consequential given the importance of technological upgrading and learning 
by exporting for long-term sustainable economic and productivity growth 
in developing countries. 
30So far, machine learning techniques are only applied in econometrics for model and 
variable selection, for instance in the context of regressions using instrumental variables 
(Belloni, Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2014). 
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C.1.1 Exporting under Uncertainty without Intermediates 
If the future is uncertain, with the source of uncertainty generated by 
the state of the trade policy, the firm has two decisions to make. First, 
it decides on whether to export or not. We assume that the firm is risk 
neutral, so it cares only about expected profits.1 We also assume that the 
transition probability matrix (5.6) is common knowledge, shared by all 
firms. Second, the firm decides on the optimal timing to start exporting. 
As shown by Handley and Limao (2015), the relationship between cutoffs 
under uncertainty is given by 
1 
1−σ 
EU 1 − β(1 − pCU ) EU c˜ = × c (C.1)EX,MFN aCU EX,MFN 1 − β(1 − pCU )aMFN 
There is no effect of uncertainty on extensive margins of exports to EU if 
pCU = 0. An increase in the probability of switching from MFN to the CU, 
which is the only probability that matters in this case, lowers the marginal 
cost cutoff, making it tougher to enter the EU markets. The effect is stronger 
(τEU the smaller the ratio aCU /aMFN = EX,MFN )
−σ is.EX,CU /τ
EU On the other 
τEU hand, if τEU = EX,MFN, there is no effect of uncertainty on exports to EX,CU 
EU for any level of pCU. 
To sum up, a reduction in the probability of joining the RU CU would 
increase exports to the EU if firms perceive that joining the Customs Union 
increases EU tariffs applied against Ukrainian exports, and would have have 
no effect if firms perceive EU policy to remain unchanged. 
1It might be an interesting extension to consider a risk averse firm, which imposes different 
modifications of the objective function, and the firm faces a trade off of lower expected 
return in order to reduce the risk of an adverse outcome. 
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If the future is uncertain, with the source of uncertainty generated by 
the state of the trade policy, the firm has two decisions to make. First, 
it decides on whether to export or not. We assume that the firm is risk 
neutral, so it cares only about expected value. 2 We also assume that the 
transition probability matrix (5.6) is a common knowledge, shared by all 
firms. Second, the firm decides on the optimal timing to start exporting. If 
it starts exporting today, its expected present value of profits is given by 
∞ 
Πe(as, c) = π(as, c) + Es ∑ βtπ(as
′ 
, c) (C.2) 
t=1 
Alternatively, it may delay the decision, solving the following stopping 
problem 
  ′ Π(as, c) = max Πe − IEX, βEsΠ(as, c) (C.3) 
where the first element in brackets is the expected benefits of investing 
today and the second element is the expected benefit of delaying the decision 
for one period. The value of the option of investing into exporting is given 
by 
Vs ≡ Π(as, c) − Πe(as,c) + IEX (C.4) 
and the optimal stopping problem can be re-formulated as 
Vs = max {0, βEsVs ′ − π(as, c) + IEX(1 − β)} (C.5) 
where exporting decision is taken when Vs = 0. 
2It might be an interesting extension to consider a risk averse firm, which imposes different 
modifications of the objective function, and the firm faces a trade off of lower expected 
return in order to reduce the risk of an adverse outcome. 
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Consider a firm evaluating the decision to start exporting to the EU. 
Observing (C.5) and given assumptions about the TPU process, the option 
value Vs is decreasing with π(as, c), therefore decreasing in a and increasing 
in c. When a increases (trade policy switches from MFN to FTA state), the 
probability that it will stay in the FTA state goes up (in fact we assume that 
it is 1), while probability that a takes lower values (switches to MFN or CU) 
diminishes, in other word ΛFTA stochastically dominates ΛMFN, which in 
turn stochastically dominates ΛCU. This leads to EsVs ′ = Vs ′ dΦ(as ′ |as) 
is increasing in c. According to Dixit and Pindyck (1994), this leads to a 
unique cutoff cU such that all firms with c ≤ cU export to EU and firms s s 
with c > cU do not export to EU. Moreover, given our Markov process the s 
cutoff is given by 
1 
1−σ 
U,EU 1 − β(1 − pCU ) D,EU c = × c (C.6)EX,MFN EX,MFN 1 − β(1 − aCU aMFN pCU ) 
C.1.2 Importing Intermediate Goods under Uncertainty 
We consider the case of import tariff uncertainty only. A firm decides on the 
optimal timing to start importing intermediate inputs. In order to optimally 
chose mix of inputs, a firm solves the following stopping problem 
ΠIM = max ∆Πe − hIIM, βEsΠIM s s s ′ 
j j j j jwhere ∆Πe = π(a , µs × c) − π(a , c)+ Es ∑ βt[π(a , µs ′ c) − π(a , c)] = ∆π(a , µs ×s
 
j
c) + Es ∑ βt∆π(a , µs ′ c). 
The value of the option of investing into importing is given by 
VIM ≡ ΠIM − ∆Πe(as,c) + hIIM (C.7)s s 
� �
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and the optimal stopping problem can be re-formulated as
 
VIM j= max 0, βEsVIM − ∆π(a , µs × c) + h (C.8)s s ′ IIM(1 − β) 
where importing decision is taken when VIM ≤ 0.s 
The option value VIM is decreasing with ∆π(aj, µs × c), therefore increas­s 
ing in µ and c. When µ decreases (trade policy switches from MFN to FTA 
state), the probability that it will stay in the FTA state goes up (in fact we 
assume that it is 1), while probability that µ takes higher values (switches 
VIM to MFN or CU) diminishes. This leads to EsVIM s ′ = dΦ(µs ′ |µs) iss ′ 
increasing in µ × c. According to Dixit and Pindyck (1994), this leads to a 
unique cutoff cU such that all firms with c ≤ cU import from EU and firms s s 
with c > cU do not. Moreover, given our Markov process the cutoff is given s 
by 
 1 
1−σ 
c˜
EU IM,MFN =
 

 1 − β(1 − pCU ) 1−σ µCU −11 − β(1 − 1−σ × pCU )µMFN −1 

 × c
EU IM,MFN (C.9)
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C.2.1 Text Data and Pre-Processing 
We first download all news briefs from Nexis that are somehow related 
to either the EU FTA or the Russian CU using very broad Boolean search 
terms. Too large corpora (collections of texts) result in very general topics. 
Some pre-selection is necessary in order to find narrower topics related 
to TPU. The selection is no very restrictive, though, since we only pre­
select all articles that note either EU FTA or RU CU anywhere in the text.3 
Figure C.1 below shows a typical article from Ukraine Business Weekly, 
downloaded from Nexis in .txt format. We split the articles using the “### 
of ### Documents” line and retrieve the publication date using regular 
expressions. We also extracted the title for each article, and then retain only 
the text body of each article for further processing. We remove all meta-data 
prior to applying the topic models. We find 2201 articles between 2003 
and 2016, amounting to about 15 articles per month on average. Duplicate 
articles and non-business news are excluded from the search. Figure C.2 
shows the total number of UBW articles per month retrieved from Nexis 
and provides a description of the raw data. 
The raw articles contain meta information, such as copyright information, 
title, length, and publication date. From the raw articles, we retrieve title 
and publication date. We then erase all the meta information using regular 
expressions until we are left with only the text body of the articles. Most 
3The following Boolean search term was used: “HLEAD(russian federation OR russia* 
OR eu OR european union*) AND HLEAD(ukrain*) AND Body(trade agreement* OR free 
trade OR customs union OR trade deal OR free trade agreement OR eurasian customs 
union OR eacu OR eurasian economic union OR eeu OR association agreement OR dcfta 
OR aa)”. Including more terms did only increase the number of documents marginally and 
hence, we are confident that the sample of news releases is not biased towards Ukraine-EU 
or Ukraine-Russian relations. 
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quantitative text analysis techniques like the models we are using make 
the bag-of-words assumption, ignoring the order of words in a document. 
The only textual property that matters for the analysis of the texts is the 
relative frequency with which words occur within a given document in our 
collection of texts. However, we treat bigrams like “vladimir putin” and 
compound terms like “customs union” as single terms in the analysis, as 
they convey meaning in conjunction. 
Finally, we remove common English stopwords that do not convey 
meaning. We also stem the endings of words, leaving only the word “roots” 
for further analysis and remove words occurring in less than one or two 
documents.4 After these preparatory steps, the articles are translated into 
a “document-term” matrix (dtm) which can be further analyzed. The dtm 
is a matrix of the form d × w, where rows d represent single documents 
(here individual news releases) and the columns w represent terms and how 
frequently they occur in each document, resulting matrix in a large and 
sparse 2201 × 5968 matrix which can be further analyzed. 
Figure C.2 below shows the number of articles per month downloaded 
from Nexis. One can clearly see the overall increase in discussion of any 
sort of trade agreement, with either Russia or the European Union over 
time, peaking in 2014 around the final conclusion of the EU FTA and the 
peak of the trade tensions between the EU and Russia. There are also two 
low points in the number of articles, one at the end of 2006, and another 
around the beginning of 2011. These represent structural breaks in the 
textual data available in Nexis. During these time frames only a limited 
number of articles is available online. In 2006, all single articles are joined 
4All of the steps in this paragraph are standard in quantitative text analysis. For a good 
review and explanation of “stopwords”, “stemming”, and “bigrams” and pre-processing of 
documents see Grimmer and Stewart (2013). 
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Figure C.1 Example Ukraine Business Weekly Article. The figure shows a screen 
shot of a typical article of Ukraine Business Weekly, as retrieved from Nexis. 
in one document for one month.In 2011, there is one month without any 
recordings from Ukraine Business weekly. However, this does not affect our 
TPU measure. 
Many single words in the UBW press releases naturally occur together 
forming so-called bigrams, as described above. We do not want to treat these 
as individual words, as they clearly appear and convey meaning together. 
Table C.1 below shows the most commonly occurring bigrams, ranked by G2 
(a log-likelihood statistic.). Some of the most commonly occurring bigrams 
are “association agreement” or “free trade”. These are further cleaned by 
removing bigrams with stopwords5 which leaves about 360 bigrams. 
5Stopwords are terms which do not convey meaning, like “the”, “also”, or “have”. 
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Figure C.2 Number of Articles retrieved from Nexis over Time. The figure 
shows the number of Ukraine Business Weekly articles about international trade 
retrieved from Nexis between 2003 and 2017. It shows that the overall salience of 
trade policy is quite low before 2012, and then increases as negotiations between 
Ukraine and the EU progress, and conflict with Russian intensifies. 
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Word 1 Word 2 Frequency G2
 
association agreement 1954 19681.70 
free trade 1667 18213.69 
european union 1777 16020.75 
company news 1325 14984.43 
economic policy 1127 10636.42 
prime minister 816 10253.63 
customs union 890 8929.12 
press service 784 8387.41 
trade area 762 7700.77 
million tonnes 837 7488.57 
told interfax 610 7313.53 
viktor yanukovych 472 6398.05 
trade zone 582 6328.04 
web site 372 6271.47 
verkhovna rada 338 5733.27 
press conference 505 5688.02 
president viktor 478 5285.12 
cubic meters 324 4804.68 
mykola azarov 310 4748.70 
ukrainian president 699 4627.77 
press release 368 4177.94 
net profit 275 3591.02 
eastern partnership 245 3402.39 
euro 2012 233 3259.51 
european commission 420 3133.11 
naftogaz ukrainy 206 3048.06 
january 1 320 3027.47 
minister mykola 272 3006.65 
member states 253 2978.60 
square meters 216 2933.53 
Table C.1 30 Most Common Bigrams. The table shows the most common bigrams
 
in the Ukraine Business Weekly articles used for generating the TPU measure. Es­
pecially politicians, different EU agreements, and EU institutions appear frequently.
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C.2.2 Structural Topic Model and Text Diagnostics 
For measuring TPU from the documents, we use so-called “topic mod­
els”, developed by computer scientists for the analysis and organization of 
large-scale text corpora. Topic models analyze relative word occurrences in 
un-labeled documents in order to discover “themes” that run through the 
documents.6 Topic models belong to the family of unsupervised classifica­
tion methods because they infer the content of topics from the texts rather 
than assuming them. It is therefore crucial to understand that topics are not 
defined ex ante by the researcher, like in hand-coding of documents based on 
pre-defined dictionaries.7 
The simplest topic model is the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)8, a gen­
erative probabilistic model for discrete data (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003). 
Topics are defined here as a distribution over a vocabulary of words which 
represent interpretable themes. The LDA is a mixed membership Bayesian 
model, in which documents are represented as a mixture of topics. Thus, 
each document can be conceived as a vector of proportions, indicating 
the fraction of words belonging to a latent topic. Generative probabilistic 
models treat documents as if they had been generated according to a partic­
ular process involving observed and latent variables. The joint probability 
distribution of that process can be used in order to compute the conditional 
distribution, i.e. the the posterior distribution, of the hidden variables, 
6These models have been successfully applied in both Political Science (Grimmer, 2010; 
Roberts et al., 2014) and Economics (Mueller and Rauh, 2018), and many more fields such 
as Genetics or Information Science (Blei, 2012). 
7For a good description of the basics of dictionary-based text analysis see Neuendorf (2002, 
CH6). A well-known application of dictionary-based methods keywords representing left-
right ideology in order to estimate scores of party positions using their election manifestos 
(Laver and Garry, 2000). 
8Note that this section provides only a short and non-technical introduction into topic 
models, oriented at Roberts et al. (2014). The interested reader is referred to Blei, Ng 
and Jordan (2003) for the LDA topic model, and to Roberts and Stewart (2015) for more 
technical details on the Structural Topic Model (STM). 
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given the observed variables. The observed variables are the document-level 
words, and the unobserved variables refer to the topic structure. 
A topic K is defined as a distribution over a fixed vocabulary V. The data 
generating process is as follows: the LDA assumes that documents (press re­
leases) are created by K topics. Across documents, we first randomly choose 
a distribution over topics βk. Each document is modeled as a distribution 
over K topics, θd. Within each document, words are generated by a two 
step process. First, for each word zd,n, one draws a topic for that word from 
a multinomial distribution zd,n ∼ Mult(θd) (with zd,n indexing the topic 
assignment for the n-th word in document d). Second, an actual word wd,n 
is drawn from a distribution over the vocabulary wd,n ∼ Mult(βzd,n ) where 
βk,v is the probability of drawing the v-th word in the vocabulary for topic 
k. The likelihood of a word for a given topic is then the probability of a 
topic within a given document times the probability of a term in the overall 
word distribution, p(zd,n) · p(wd,n). This joint distribution of the latent and 
observed parameters (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2012) is formally given by 
K D N 
p(β1:K, θ1:D, z1:D, w1:D) = ∏
p(βi)∏
p(θd) ∏
p(zd,n|θd)p(wd,n|β1:K, zd,n) .
 
i=1 d=1 n=1 
Finally, the LDA assumes a Dirichlet prior for the topic proportions 
over documents d, so that θd ∼ Dirichlet(α) (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003). 
This joint probability distribution of words documents and topics over 
a vocabulary can be used in order to calculate the probability of topics 
for each word, and the topic posterior probabilities θd for each document. 
Higher posterior likelihoods of a topic means that a high proportion of 
terms in document is related to that topic. The intuition behind LDA is 
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that documents in a collection of documents (also called text corpus) contain 
multiple topics or themes. All documents in the collection are composed of 
the same topics, but they exhibit these topics in different proportions, and 
each word contributes to individual topics to a certain degree. Bigrams like 
“Association Agreement” or “Eastern Partnership” are related to the topic 
“EU-Ukraine FTA” , while terms like “customs union” or “EACU” would be 
related to the topic “Russia-Ukraine Customs Union”. Topic models do not 
require any prior information about the texts. Only the number of topics K 
needs to be determined ex ante by the researcher. 
Structural topic models (STMs) allow the introduction of document-level 
covariates (e.g. date, publication type, outlet, author) similar to covariates 
in regression models, in order to increase model fit and allow for topics to 
vary by covariates (Roberts et al., 2014).9 The document-level covariates can 
affect either topical prevalence, topical content, or both. Topical prevalence 
is the frequency with which a topic is discussed and topical content the 
variation in words used to discuss a topic (Roberts et al., 2014, p.4).10 We 
make use of the weekly publication date of UBW articles in order to provide 
better estimates of topical prevalence over time. We concentrate on topical 
prevalence because we are interested in the change in salience of trade 
policies over time rather than the change in words used to describe them.11 
We use the STM algorithm with K = 10 topics12, and include the pub­
lication week as a flexible b-spline in order to adjust topic estimation for 
9A well known application in Political Science are party manifestos, which contain 
information about the election year, the type of election (federal, subnational), and the 
author (the party). See Volkens et al. (2015). 
10Moreover, in STMS, topics can be correlated with each other and both the prior distribu­
tion over topics and the word use within topics can vary by covariates. 
11See Appendix 3 for discussion and analysis of difference in tone or evaluative word use 
over time. 
12We use a combination of automated methods and qualitative judgment in order to arrive 
at the number of topics. See Appendix 2 for a thorough discussion of of how we chose K. 
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variation over time. Adjusting for general trends over time is key in order 
to retrieve relative changes in topic salience and correct for seasonality and 
absolute growth of the topics over time. The resulting topical prevalences 
for an EU FTA and a CU with Russia are described in the following section. 
Most of the quantitative text analysis has been conducted in R using the 
Quanteda package (Benoit and Nulty, 2017) and the STM package (Roberts 
et al., 2014). In order to determine the number of topics, we use a com­
bination of automated cross-validation methods and qualitative judgment 
of the semantic content of the topics. This is a standard procedure rec­
ommended both for simple LDA topic models (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2012) 
and structural topic models Roberts et al. (2014, p.1068-1070). First, we 
estimate the model for many different values of K, between 5 and 150 topics. 
The searchK-function in the stm package (Roberts, Stewart and Tingley, 2015) 
includes a few tests for choosing among these different numbers of topics 
(Wallach et al., 2009). Figure C.3 in the appendix plots the results of these 
analyses. The most important indicator here is the held-out log-likelihood, a 
cross-validation measure, and the model residuals, both in the upper panel 
of the figure. The held-out likelihood is the probability of words appearing 
within a document when these words have been removed. This measure is 
similar to cross-validation, when some proportion of the data is held out 
for estimation and then used for validation later on. In this case, we set the 
share of held-out words to 0.5. As one can see from the figure, the held-out 
likelihood gets larger (the predictive performance of the model increases) 
with more topics, indicating a better model fit as the model becomes more 
flexible. Similarly, the model residuals are reduced with a higher number of 
topics. Note also that the model fit in terms of the held-out likelihood does 
not improve anymore for K > 50. In fact, residuals get larger for more than 
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50 topics, and the model fit gets worse, too. This illustrates the bias-variance 
trade-off, and that we are over-fitting the model with K > 50 Lantz (2015). 
Hence, this first test shows that we need a number of topics smaller or equal 
to 50. 
Second, we inspect the topics for different K and check whether they 
capture the CU with Russia and the EU FTA. The number of topics that 
seems to best capture both CU and FTA exclusively is a K of 10. According 
to the diagnostic values reported in the appendix, this model with 10 
topics does not have a perfect fit to the data. However, it captures well the 
substantive measure we are interested in. This is a typical trade-off using 
topic models: not always does the model with the best technical fit also 
provide the most intuitive and/or interpretable topics (Lucas et al., 2015). 
Using K larger or equal to 25 provides a very good model fit, but slices up 
topics unnecessarily. For instance, a high number of topics like 30, 40, or 
50 finds single topics for European Parliament discussions of the FTA and 
meetings between the Commission and Ukrainian officials.13 
However, we want these to be represented by a more general EU-
Ukrainian trade topic. We show in the main text that high values in our 
EU-FTA and RU CU topic proportions correspond to both the actual devel­
opment of general trade relations between Ukraine and the EU/Russia and 
that the press releases which score high on these topics are indeed about 
the EU FTA and the CU, respectively. 
13We also calculate the STM for a K of 20, which has a significantly better model fit. The 
monthly topic proportions are very similar to the ones we report below. The correlations 
between the chosen topics from a topic model with 10 and 20 topics are 0.83 and 0.74 for 
the EU FTA and the CU, respectively. 
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Figure C.3 Cross-Validation for the Structural Topic Model. The figure depicts 
different cross-validation tests generated from the structural topic model across 
different numbers of topics, K, with the most important one being the Held-Out-
Likelihood in the upper left corner of the plot. 
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We show the mean topic prevalence per month in Figure C.4. Although 
being very volatile, the topic proportions approximate the development of 
the Ukrainian trade policy over the last 15 years: while in 2003, the topic 
of forming a customs union with Russia dominated the economic news, 
relative to the EU FTA topic. The prevalence of CU topic gradually declined 
before it almost completely disappeared from the policy discussion in 2014 
when the FTA with the EU was signed. We also see the two time periods 
when only few or no articles where available in Nexis, in 2006, and in 2011. 
As the estimated topics represent the relative prevalence over time, this 
is not an issue for the estimation process, though. In 2011, both topics 
are equally affected by missing data, and the low number of articles in 
2005-2006 still leads to the topics being estimated correctly relative to each 
other. Figure C.5 below shows the raw data with weekly frequency. 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Time
M
ea
n 
To
pi
c 
Pr
ev
a
le
nc
e
2003−01 2004−01 2005−01 2006−01 2007−01 2008−01 2009−01 2010−01 2011−01 2012−01 2013−01 2014−01 2015−01 2016−01 2017−01
Topic 1 (EU FTA)
Topic 8 (RU CU)
Figure C.4 Mean Topic Prevalence per Month for EU FTA and the RU CU topic, 
2003-2017. The plot shows the average prevalence (salience) of the EU FTA topic 
and the RU CU topic over time. While the CU topi is more prevalent in the 
beginning of the investigation period, it declines in salience and is take over 
between 2012 and 2014 by the EU FTA topic, reflecting the higher likelihood of the 
prospective agreement. 
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Figure C.5 Mean Topic Prevalence per Week. The same as Figure C.4 above 
aggregated by weeks instead of months. 
C.2.3 Stationarity of Trade Policy Uncertainty Measure 
We also test for non-stationarity of our TPU measures and reject it in both 
cases, regardless of whether we include a trend or not. However, both 
series have strong autocorrelation patterns. For the monthly data, Table 
C.2 presents estimations for AR(3) processes and also VAR model where 
we look how the two topics are influencing each other. Lags beyond the 
third one are not significant. We also fitted ARIMA models and found no 
evidence of moving average components in both cases. 
C.2.4 Validity of Trade Policy Uncertainty Measure 
A way to validate the topic model chosen here is to look at press releases 
which exhibit high proportions of the respective topics. Do these documents 
refer to the EU FTA and the RU CU, respectively? Figure C.6 below shows 
two snippets from example articles with high topic proportions on EU 
FTA and Russian CU topics. One can see that press releases with high 
proportions of the topics estimated above do indeed discuss the EU FTA 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable pEU pCU pEU pCU 
Model AR(3) AR(3) VAR VAR 
L.pEU .285** .241** -.053 
(.07) (.08) (.08) 
L2.pEU .261** .220** .025 
(.08) (.08) (.08) 
L3.pEU .294** .261** -.017 
(.08) (.08) (.08) 
L. pCU .070 -.012 .150 
(.06) (.08) (.08) 
L2. pCU .411** -.009 .387** 
(.08) (.07) (.07) 
L3. pCU .353** -.147* .306** 
(.07) (.07) (.07) 
ADF -5.994 -7.350 
p-value .000 .000 
N 146 146 133 133 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table C.2 Test of Stationarity of Topics. Columns (1) and (2) report point esti­
mates of AR(3) models for corresponding series. Columns (3) and (4) present point 
estimates of a VAR model. ADF is the value of the Dickey Fuller test statistics 
without trend or drift with the corresponding p-value below. The null hypothesis 
is that the variable contains a unit root, and the alternative is that the variable was 
generated by a stationary process. 
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and the RU CU, respectively. The press releases identified as belonging 
to the EU FTA topic are about EU institutions and the progress of the 
Association Agreement with Ukraine, whereas the press releases belonging 
to the CU topic are about the customs union and the common economic 
space between Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. This does not 
mean that the respective press releases are only about the EU FTA or the 
CU with Russia as documents can consist of a mixture of topics.14 
Topic 1
European Council President
Herman Van_Rompuy has
said that the EU is ready
to sign and ratify the
Association_Agreement with
Ukraine, recognizing its
European aspirations, even
before the Eastern_Partnership
summit in November. "The
EU hopes to sign and ratify
the Association_Agreement,
including a
The European_Parliament (EP)
has expressed its continued
support for the European
aspirations of the Ukrainian
people, and confirmed its
commitment to sign the EU−
Ukraine Association_Agreement
as soon as possible. "[The EP]
confirms the EU's commitment
to further advancing relations
with Ukraine th
Topic 8
Russian Prime_Minister
Dmitry_Medvedev said he
had made Russia's point
clear about the situation
surrounding the Customs_Union
and about Ukraine's position
in it. He said after
talks with Ukraine's Prime
Minister_Mykola Azarov that
the discussion had focused on
strategic aspects of Russian−
Ukrainia
The draft agreement on
creating a common_economic
space between Ukraine,
Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus
envisages multi−speed and
multi−level integration,
whose first stage is the
creation of a free_trade zone.
Ukraine's First Vice_Premier
Mykola_Azarov said this in a
program on the First nation
Figure C.6 Example Articles for EU FTA and RU CU Topic. The figure shows 
articles from Ukraine Business Weekly with high topic proportions for the EU FTA 
(left, Topic 1) and the RU CU topic (right, Topic 8), showing that articles related to 
these topics are indeed about the FTA and the CU, respectively. 
Below in Figure C.7 we also provide wordclouds for the two topics, with 
EU FTA in black and RU CU in gray. The clouds show words that occur 
with a high probability, and the size of the words relates to the probability 
of a word to occur in the text collection, given the respective topic. 
14In Appendix 1.3, we also plot word clouds of these two topics. 
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Figure C.7 Word Clouds for EU FTA and RU CU Topics. The size of the words 
refers to the probability of a word in the corpus given the respective topic. 
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Given that there are other measures of policy uncertainty like the one 
developed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016), why are we using a new 
measure? First, while both measures rely on news coverage, we do not use 
a pre-defined dictionary of terms related to uncertainty like the Economic 
Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index. The STM does only require us to specify 
the number of topics, but no pre-defined keywords or dictionaries. Second, 
we do not measure general economic uncertainty, but trade policy uncertainty 
for specific and substantively important trade policy events between specific 
trade partners. The decision between a CU and the EU FTA is not captured 
by broad economic policy uncertainty. The EPU index picks up any kind 
of uncertainty and does not differentiate between global events (financial 
crisis), domestic uncertainty-inducing events (policy reforms), or specific 
events in relation to particular partners (e.g. Russian stop of gas exports, or 
threats thereof). In contrast, our measure picks up likelihood of changes in a 
specific trade policies with respect to particular countries/entities (Russia vs. 
EU). The interpretation of topic probabilities as uncertainty is derived from 
the fact that the two events (FTA vs. CU) are theoretically incompatible with 
each other and (even if compatible to a certain extent) not politically feasible 
at the same time. In a nutshell, our measure enables us to test predictions 
about uncertainty with respect to a specific policy vis-a-vis specific partners 
of Ukraine in the realm of trade - all three of which cannot be achieved by 
using the EPU index. 
Despite these conceptual and empirical differences between ours and 
the Baker, Bloom and Davis 2016 measure, the reader might still want 
to compare the two measures. Ideally, we would compare our CU and 
FTA topics over time with a Ukraine-specific economic policy uncertainty 
index. However, Baker et al. have not developed the economic policy 
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uncertainty index for Ukraine yet. In the absence of EPU for Ukraine, we 
plot our measures of EU FTA and RU CU probability against the EPU 
for Russia, shown in Figure C.8 below. From a Russian perspective, a 
higher EU FTA probability should mean higher economic policy uncertainty 
(challenging Russian regional foreign policy), and a higher CU probability 
should be associated with lower uncertainty (strengthening Russian regional 
foreign policy). The EU FTA measure correlates positively with the Russian 
economic uncertainty measure, indicating higher uncertainty when an EU 
FTA with Ukraine becomes more likely. The CU topic is inversely correlated 
with Russian economic uncertainty, but only weakly so. This makes sense 
if EU-Ukrainian trade relations are indicative of EU-Russian relations, and 
that this relationship is one determinant of the economic policy index for 
Russia. Russian economic policy uncertainty can only be a proxy for a 
potential Ukrainian economic policy uncertainty, but signs and the strength 
of the relationships are in line with our expectations, and add some face 
validity to our measure. 
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Figure C.8 Trade Policy Uncertainty (TPU) vs. Economic Policy Uncertainty 
(EPU) Index Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016). The figure shows the bivariate 
relationship between the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index developed by Baker, 
Bloom and Davis (2016), and the EU FTA and RU CU topics from the STM. It shows 
that intuitively, the EU FTA topic is positively related to higher Russian EPU, while 
the RU CU topic is negatively correlated with economic policy uncertainty. 
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C.2.5 Trade Policy Uncertainty and Sentiment 
It could be a concern that UBW reports generally more negatively about the 
EU FTA than about the RU CU. Political Economy research has shown that 
newspapers can have considerable political bias, often driven by the demand 
factors like political ideology of readers (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010). In 
our case, we would be worried if our measure would only reflect change in 
sentiment or tone in the news releases over time. This concern is mitigated to 
a certain extent because are using an economic news release service, rather 
than daily newspapers. Compared to news papers articles, standard in press 
release services like Reuters concentrate on the content of news, strip away 
evaluative language By conducting a so-called sentiment analysis of the news 
releases, we show that the tone of UBW releases is always more positive than 
negative, but is constant across time and topics. Sentiment analyses describe 
the emotional state or mood of written text (Gonçalves et al., 2013). Here, we 
use a very simple, lexical-based approach applying pre-defined dictionaries 
of positive and negative terms. A number of different dictionaries for the 
English language exist, including commercially available dictionaries like 
the Linguistic and Word Count (LIWC) program. We use a freely available 
dictionary developed by Theresa Wilson, Janyce Wiebe, and Paul Hoffmann 
at the University of Pittsburgh (Wilson, Wiebe and Hoffman, 2005). The 
results are shown below. 
The principle of this sentiment analysis is straightforward. We first take 
our collection of UBW press releases between 2003 and 2017, and apply two 
dictionaries to it: one dictionary with about 3900 negative English words 
and one with about 2200 positive words. Positive and negative connotations 
of words were developed by linguists and are described in depth in (Wilson, 
Wiebe and Hoffman, 2005). Then, we calculate the relative frequencies with 
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which positive and/or negative terms occur in each single press release. 
Below in Figure C.9, we plot the result of this exercise, where the X-axis 
indicates the respective month of publication and the Y-axis indicates the 
word frequencies of positive and negative terms (i.e., positive or negative 
terms divided by the sum of positive and negative terms) per month. The 
plot shows two results. First, regardless of the time period, there are always 
more positive than negative terms used in the press releases used in our 
further analysis. Second, the use of positive relative to negative terms 
is quite constant over time. While there is less variability in the relative 
frequencies (because there are more articles later on), there is no huge 
decline or increase of either positive or negative sentiment over time. This 
shows that the use of evaluative terms is stable over time: if there is a bias 
in terms of negative or positive reporting, it does not change dramatically 
over time. 
Another concern in relation to word use is that word choice within topics 
could be varying over time. For mitigating some of these concerns, we also 
do the sentiment analysis from above for articles with high topic proportions 
of both of EU FTA topic and the RU CU topic. Below, we plot the same 
graph as above, but restrict the sample of documents to those with topic 
proportions higher than the 75th percentile of the overall distribution of 
the respective topic. This reduces the sample of articles from UBW to 569 
for both topics, but still leaves enough variation over time. One can see 
that the picture does not change from looking at the whole sample. Over 
time, positively and negatively connotated terms are quite constant, both in 
the whole sample of articles and in articles which are very highly related 
to either the EU FTA or the RU CU. This result holds for other thresholds 
such as median or mean topic proportions. This supports or assertion that 
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Figure C.9 Positive and Negative Sentiment in Ukraine Business Weekly Arti­
cles. One possible objection to our measure is that we are only picking up biased, 
negative or positive reporting on the EU FTA or the CU. The figure depicts positive 
and negative sentiment in the language used in the Ukraine Business Weekly briefs 
used in the topic model, showing that positive words are used more than negative 
words, on average, but that this positive bias is constant over time. 
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the news releases from Ukraine Business Weekly do not change tone or 
sentiment substantively over the time period of investigation.15 Moreover, 
it is not the case that articles discussing the EU FTA are generally more 
positive in tone than articles discussing the RU CU. 
15Note that this could look quite different if our news source would be daily newspapers. 
Since the reporting in press releases is rather technical, it is not surprising that there is no 
change in positive or negative tone over time. 
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Figure C.10 Positive and Negative Sentiment in Ukraine Business Weekly Ar­
ticles. Here we show the results of a sentiment analysis using only articles with 
high topic proportions for EU FTA (left) and RU CU topic (right). The figures show 
that while positive sentiment is larger than negative sentiment, this positive bias is 
constant over time, and most importantly, not different between articles that talk 
mostly about the EU FTA and articles that talk mostly about the RU CU. 
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C.3 Empirical Analysis Appendix 
C.3.1 Tariffs in Ukraine and Customs Union, 2003 - 2013 
Table C.3 presents the evolution of the applied MFN rates of Ukraine and 
CU between 2003-2013, average difference in those rates, number of lines 
at HS4 digit level where the Ukrainian MFN rates are higher then the CU 
rates, and the number of lines where the Ukrainian MFN rates are lower. 
Tariff Year Mean Number of Lines with 
Ukraine MFN CU MFN Difference higher tariffs lower tariffs 
τUKR τCU τCU − τUKR τUKR > τCU τUKR ≤ τCU 
2003 6.94 11.92 4.93 196 949 
2004 6.34 11.61 5.14 158 987 
2005 5.75 11.34 5.50 130 1015 
2006 5.17 10.78 5.55 164 1036 
2007 5.13 10.58 5.38 175 1029 
2008 5.18 10.53 5.32 179 1028 
2009 4.70 10.66 5.94 151 1057 
2010 4.81 9.70 4.89 185 1028 
2011 4.67 9.86 5.20 187 1032 
2012 4.67 11.18 6.50 92 1129 
2013 4.77 10.12 5.35 128 1093 
All 5.29 10.78 5.43 159 1035 
Table C.3 Differences in Applied MFN tariffs between Ukraine and CU, 2003­
2013. The table depicts the average Ukrainian MFN tariffs across time and contrasts 
them with Russian the Customs Union tariffs. On average, MFN tariffs are over 5 
percentage points lower than CU tariffs, and only few MFN tariff lines were higher 
than the CU tariffs. 
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C.3.2 Summary Statistics
 
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
A. Exporters to EU 
ln(Export) 129502 9.888 2.621 -4.286 19.561 
pEU × ln(1 + τMFN ) 129502 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.071 
pEU 129502 0.174 0.124 0.000 0.411 
pCU 129502 0.319 0.155 0.000 0.849 
ln(1 + τMFN ) 129502 0.022 0.021 0.000 0.176 
TFP 125696 1.647 1.344 -8.312 10.356 
ln(Employment) 128909 5.501 2.135 0.000 11.264 
B. Importers from EU 
ln(Import) 807509 8.282 2.628 -2.301 20.718 
pEU × ln(1 + τUKR) 807509 0.006 0.007 0.000 0.167 
pCU × ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR)) 807509 0.018 0.019 -0.200 0.449 
pEU alt × ln(1 + τUKR) 
pCU alt × ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR)) 
pEU alt1 × ln(1 + τUKR) 
pCU alt1 × ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR)) 
pEU 
807509 
807509 
807509 
807509 
807509 
0.048 
0.064 
0.009 
0.010 
0.171 
0.046 
0.063 
0.009 
0.011 
0.123 
0.000 
-0.666 
0.000 
-0.112 
0.000 
1.048 
1.338 
0.178 
0.240 
0.411 
pCU 807509 0.326 0.160 0.000 0.849 
ln(1 + τUKR) 807509 0.036 0.031 0.000 0.405 
Quota topic 807509 0.097 0.068 0.001 0.310 
Natural gas topic 807509 0.062 0.042 0.000 0.179 
EU FTA relative word freq. 807509 0.246 0.117 0.000 0.440 
RU CU relative word freq. 807509 0.189 0.082 0.024 0.350 
ln(EU FTA) word count 807509 3.667 1.346 0.000 6.129 
ln(RU CU) word count 807509 3.389 0.944 0.693 5.576 
ln(Number of articles) 807509 3.196 1.071 0.000 5.313 
TFP 786701 2.157 1.206 -14.755 11.228 
ln(Employment) 804767 5.553 1.746 0.000 11.264 
Table C.4 Summary Statistics. The table reports summary statistics for the key 
variables interest for two different samples: exporting firms and importing firms. 
The data is quarterly between 2003 and 2013 at the level of firm, product, destination 
or origin country. 
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C.3.3 Robustness: Other Uncertainty Measures 
An important question is whether the novel measure of trade policy uncer­
tainty is better than existing ones. Also, it might be the case our measure 
capture overall economic uncertainty rather than specific trade policy con­
cerns which would put in question the validity of our main results presented 
above. Below, we use two simpler measure of uncertainty to demonstrate 
the robustness of our results. First, we consider the Economic Policy Un­
certainty (EPU) index developed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016), which 
capture the level of policy-related economic uncertainty. The EPU also 
allows us to separate overall uncertainty from the trade policy uncertainty. 
We use the EPU index for EU and Russia for the same period as our original 
results and include them in our regression analysis alongside to our TPU 
measures, respectively.16 Second, we also use simple relative frequency of 
words related to the EU FTA and the RU CU in the news briefs as alternative 
measures, to counter the argument that our measure might just pick up 
overall salience of trade policy. 
We estimate a model using the natural log of intermediate and capital 
goods imports to the EU as the dependent variable and include firm-country­
product fixed effects. The results using the EPU index are presented in 
columns (1) - (4) of Table C.5. First, the significance and size of the co­
efficients with the TPU measures remain virtually unchanged, while the 
coefficients with the EPU measures are not significant in most cases. This 
indicates that the TPU measure captures trade related uncertainty better 
than the general ones. The results with the relative frequency measures are 
presented in columns (5)-(8) of Table C.5. The results show that the relative 
word frequency of EU FTA does not capture TPU better than our measure. 
16Note that we use the EPU indices for the EU and Russia because there is no readily 
available measure for Ukraine. 
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The coefficient of the interaction term pEU × ln(1 + τUKR) remains virtually 
unchanged, positive and significant. At the same time the simple frequency 
measure of RU CU performs well. One reason for this could be that the CU 
topic model measure does not include some news relevant to developments 
around the CU. However, the overall conclusion from these result is that our 
measures outperform the overall measure of economic policy uncertainty 
and add more information than just simple word count measures. Most 
importantly, our main results using our EU FTA topic model measure hold 
including alternative measures of uncertainty and simple word counts. 
EPU measure EU&CU relative frequency 
Base +Empl +TFP +Ind&Region Base +Empl +TFP +Ind&Region 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
pEU × ln(1 + τUKR ) 3.370∗∗ 3.595∗∗ 3.512∗∗ 3.546∗∗ 3.551∗∗ 4.547∗∗ 3.957∗∗ 4.003∗∗ 
(.588) (.586) (.592) (.591) (.755) (.752) (.759) (.759) 
pCU × ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR )) -1.081∗∗ -1.515∗∗ -1.462∗∗ -1.395∗∗ .938∗∗ .559∗ .393 .399 
(.262) (.261) (.264) (.264) (.258) (.258) (.261) (.261) 
pEU alt × ln(1 + τUKR ) -.274∗∗ -.106 -.163 -.167+ -.501 -1.064∗ -.550 -.556 
(.100) (.100) (.101) (.101) (.531) (.528) (.535) (.535) 
pCU alt × ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR )) .0113 -.0157 -.0909 -.115 -7.192∗∗ -7.541∗∗ -7.101∗∗ -7.003∗∗ 
(.069) (.069) (.070) (.070) (.348) (.347) (.350) (.351) 
ln(1 + τUKR ) -1.490∗∗ -1.924∗∗ -1.555∗∗ -1.561∗∗ -2.202∗∗ -2.387∗∗ -2.102∗∗ -2.096∗∗ 
(.258) (.256) (.260) (.260) (.242) (.241) (.244) (.244) 
Quarter ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Industry ✓ ✓ 
Region ✓ ✓ 
Observations 807509 804767 786701 786701 807509 804767 786701 786701 
R2 .811 .813 .812 .813 .812 .813 .813 .813 
Table C.5 EU Imports and Trade Policy Uncertainty: Alternative Uncertainty 
Measures. The dependent variable is the log of the value of HS 4 digit product 
k import of firm i from an EU country j within quarter-year t. We consider only 
intermdeiate and capital good imports, according to BEC Ver. 4 classification. 
Alternative measures of uncertainty are EPUs for EU and Russia in columns (1)-(4) 
and frequency of words EU and CU in columns (5)-(8) The cross term pEU × ln(1 + 
τUKR) captures the effect of the likelihood of the EU FTA on imports of goods with 
different levels of tariff protection. The cross term pCU × ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR)) 
captures the effect of the likelihood of joining the RU CU on imports of goods 
with different levels of tariff protection. We control for probability of joining EU 
FTA and RU CU, employment, productivity. All models are estimated with firm-
country-product fixed effects. Notes: + p<0.1 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Robust standard 
errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. 
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C.3.4 Robustness: Other Topics and Salience of Trade 
Another concern could be that we are just picking up changes in other 
trade topics or other types of uncertainty related to the Ukraine-EU and 
Ukraine-Russian relations. We provides further robustness checks in Table 
C.6 using the same model specification for EU imports of intermediate and 
capital goods as before. In column (1) we include frequency of topic 3 from 
our text analysis above, which is related to quantitative trade restrictions, 
using the words “quota”, “steel”, and “milk”. More frequent mentioning 
of this topic is negatively associated with imports from EU, but it does not 
effect our measures of TPU effect on trade. In column (2) we include topic 10 
from our text analysis, which includes specific words “gas” – referring to the 
natural gas disputes, a different type of uncertainty frequently featuring in 
the Ukraine-Russia relationships which could also affect firm performance. 
Again, this topic negatively influence trade, but the effect is not significant 
at the 5 percent level. When we control for the overall level of debate on the 
EU FTA and the RU CU, including the natural logs of word counts for these 
topics in column (3), we observe significant signs of the coefficients but 
our main measures of TPU still remain significant, albeit slightly smaller in 
magnitude. We observe similar results when we include relative frequencies 
instead of logs of word counts in column (4). In column (5) we control for 
the overall number of articles on trade topics capturing importance of all 
trade related topics which has positive and significant coefficient, indicating 
that trade is more discussed when imports from the EU are at higher levels. 
In column (6) we include all additional controls, which does not impact 
significance of our measure pEU × ln(1 + τUKR), but the CU related measure 
loses significance. This is not surprising, since the impact of relationships 
with CU on trade with EU is of the second order of magnitude,while the 
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direct measure remains positive and significant in all model specification. 
Finally, we also report results with lagged values of TPU measures in 
column (7), which gives expected and significant signs for the variable 
of interest. These results lend further credibility to our results and our 
measure of TPU. Using absolute and relative word frequency measures, 
alternative uncertainty-inducing topics other than the EU FTA or the RU 
CU, and simple measures of overall salience of trade policy does not change 
the main results of this paper. 
Quota Gas Word count Word freq. Num. of art. All Lags 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
pEU × ln(1 + τUKR ) 3.077∗∗ 
(.575) 
3.373∗∗ 
(.575) 
2.752∗∗ 
(.576) 
3.012∗∗ 
(.576) 
3.441∗∗ 
(.575) 
2.402∗∗ 
(.574) 
1.715∗∗ 
(.588) 
pCU × ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR )) -1.364∗∗ 
(.246) 
-1.532∗∗ 
(.246) 
-1.152∗∗ 
(.245) 
-1.296∗∗ 
(.246) 
-1.563∗∗ 
(.246) 
-.388 
(.245) 
-.535∗ 
(.239) 
Quota topic -.409∗∗ 
(.028) 
-1.786∗∗ 
(.042) 
Natural gas 
topic -.0802+ 
(.046) 
-.792∗∗ 
(.064) 
ln(EU FTA) 
word count .0335∗∗ 
(.003) 
-.0717∗∗ 
(.008) 
ln(RU CU) 
word count -.117∗∗ 
(.004) 
-.0989∗∗ 
(.008) 
EU FTA relative 
word freq. -.0203 
(.028) 
-.186∗∗ 
(.048) 
RU CU relative 
word freq. -.628∗∗ 
(.028) 
-1.155∗∗ 
(.060) 
ln(Num. of articles) .0178∗∗ 
(.003) 
.219∗∗ 
(.004) 
Quarter ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Industry ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region 
Observations 
R2 
✓ 
786701 
.813 
✓ 
786701 
.813 
✓ 
786701 
.813 
✓ 
786701 
.813 
✓ 
786701 
.813 
✓ 
786701 
.814 
✓ 
772844 
.814 
Table C.6 EU Imports and Trade Policy Uncertainty: Robustness to other Topics. The dependent variable is the log of the value of HS 
4 digit product k import of firm i from an EU country j within quarter-year t. We consider only intermdeiate and capital good imports, 
according to BEC Ver. 4 classification. The cross term pEU × ln(1 + τUKR) captures the effect of the likelihood of the EU FTA on imports 
of goods with different levels of tariff protection. The cross term pCU × ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR)) captures the effect of the likelihood of 
joining the RU CU on imports of goods with different levels of tariff protection. We control for probability of joining EU FTA and RU CU, 
employment, productivity. All models are estimated with firm-country-product fixed effects. Notes: + p<0.1 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Robust 
standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. 
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C.3.5 Robustness: Weekly Data and Placebo Tests
 
Base +Ind&Reg +Trend -C/D/L Base +Ind&Reg +Trend -C/D/L 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Exports Exports Exports Exports Imports Imports Imports Imports 
ln(1 + τEU ) -.175 -.170 -.170 -.195 
(.22) (.23) (.23) (.25) 
Post × ln(1 + τEU ) -.011 -.011 -.011 -.013 
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
ln(1 + τUKR ) .048 .049 .049 .072 
(.20) (.20) (.20) (.21) 
Post × ln(1 + τUKR) .120∗∗ .120∗∗ .120∗∗ .123∗∗ 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR)) -.048 -.044 -.044 -.041 
(.12) (.12) (.12) (.13) 
Post × ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR )) .093∗∗ .092∗∗ .092∗∗ .097∗∗ 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Post .343∗∗ .344∗∗ .344∗∗ .360∗∗ -.065 -.069 -.069 -.084 
(.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.13) (.13) (.13) (.14) 
TFP .086 .087 .087 .087 .456∗∗ .502∗∗ .502∗∗ .493∗∗ 
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.13) (.13) (.13) (.14) 
ln(empl) .175 .134 .134 .200 .703∗∗ .649∗∗ .649∗∗ .641∗ 
(.11) (.12) (.12) (.13) (.20) (.22) (.22) (.26) 
Week FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Industry FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trend ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 588602 588602 588602 552380 579120 579120 579120 542867 
R2 .909 .909 .909 .904 .863 .863 .863 .857 
Table C.7 Ukraine-EU Trade and Post-February-2014 Transition: Weekly Data. The table shows the impact of the 2014 political 
transition on goods with different levels of tariff protection, between 2013 and 2014. The dependent variable is the log of firm i’s 
exports/imports of product k to/from EU country j in week t, using only intermediate and capital goods. Post is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 for all the weeks after February 2014 and 0 otherwise. Post × ln(1 + τEU ) captures the effect of the political transition to an 
EU-friendly government on exports to the EU in goods that are more protected by EU MFN tariffs. Post × ln(1 + τUKR) captures the effect 
of the political transition on imports from the EU that are more protected by Ukrainian MFN tariffs. Post× ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR)) 
captures the effect of the political transition on imports of goods from the EU that would be more protected under a customs union with 
Russia. All models include firm-destination-HS4 product fixed effects. The models 2 and 6 add industry- and region fixed effects and 
models 3 and 7 add a time trend. The models 4 and 8 exclude Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. Notes: + p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Robust 
standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses 
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Base +Ind&Reg +Trend -C/D/L Base +Ind&Reg +Trend -C/D/L 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Exports Exports Exports Exports Imports Imports Imports Imports 
ln(1 + τEU ) .270 .270 .270 .318 
(.53) (.53) (.53) (.62) 
post -.061∗ -.057∗ -.057∗ -.061+ .014 .012 .012 -.012 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.06) 
post × ln(1 + τEU ) .015 .014 .014 .010 
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
ln(1 + τUKR ) -.410∗∗ -.413∗∗ -.413∗∗ -.495∗∗ 
(.15) (.15) (.15) (.17) 
post × ln(1 + τUKR) -.067∗∗ -.066∗ -.066∗ -.061∗ 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR)) -.548∗∗ -.552∗∗ -.552∗∗ -.634∗∗ 
(.14) (.15) (.15) (.16) 
post × ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR )) -.035 -.035 -.035 -.026 
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.03) 
TFP .051∗ .052∗ .052∗ .054∗ .132 .133 .133 .141 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) 
ln(empl) .122 .108 .108 .142 .246∗ .252∗ .252∗ .238+ 
(.09) (.09) (.09) (.10) (.12) (.12) (.12) (.12) 
Month FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Industry FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trend ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 342081 342081 342081 309464 343386 343386 343386 310559 
R2 .925 .925 .925 .921 .894 .894 .894 .889 
Table C.8 Ukraine-EU Trade and Political Transition. Placebo Difference-in-Difference Estimation. The table shows a placebo test 
for the difference-in-difference estimation in Table 5.7, using February 2013 instead of February 2014 for the moment of the transition. 
The dependent variable is the log of firm i’s exports/imports of product k to/from EU country j in month t, using only intermediate and 
capital goods. Post is a dummy variable that equals 1 for all the month-years after February 2014 and 0 otherwise. Post × ln(1 + τEU ) 
captures the effect of the political transition to an EU-friendly government on exports to the EU in goods that are more protected by 
EU MFN tariffs. Post × ln(1 + τUKR) captures the effect of the political transition on imports from the EU that are more protected by 
Ukrainian MFN tariffs. Post× ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR)) captures the effect of the political transition on imports of goods from the EU 
that would be more protected under a customs union with Russia. All models include firm-destination-HS4 product fixed effects. The 
models 2 and 6 add industry- and region fixed effects and models 3 and 7 add a time trend. The models 4 and 8 exclude Crimea, Donetsk, 
and Luhansk. Notes: + p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. 
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Base +Ind&Reg +Trend -C/D/L Base +Ind&Reg +Trend -C/D/L 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Exports Exports Exports Exports Imports Imports Imports Imports 
ln(1 + τEU ) -.198 -.192 -.192 -.220 
(.23) (.23) (.23) (.25) 
ln(1 + τEU ) × pEU -.006 -.006 -.006 -.008 
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
ln(1 + τUKR ) .055 .055 .055 .072 
(.21) (.21) (.21) (.21) 
ln(1 + τUKR ) × pEU .026 .026 .026 .029 
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR )) -.037 -.034 -.034 -.026 
(.13) (.13) (.13) (.13) 
ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR )) × pCU -.018 -.016 -.016 -.018 
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.03) 
pCU -2.282∗∗ -2.289∗∗ -2.289∗∗ -2.378∗∗ -4.159∗∗ -4.142∗∗ -4.142∗∗ -4.268∗∗ 
(.57) (.57) (.57) (.59) (.72) (.72) (.72) (.75) 
pEU -2.194∗∗ -2.198∗∗ -2.198∗∗ -2.275∗∗ -3.276∗∗ -3.265∗∗ -3.265∗∗ -3.371∗∗ 
(.52) (.52) (.52) (.54) (.59) (.59) (.59) (.62) 
TFP .081 .082 .082 .081 .467∗∗ .514∗∗ .514∗∗ .505∗∗ 
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.13) (.14) (.14) (.14) 
ln(empl) .180+ .138 .138 .209+ .701∗∗ .649∗∗ .649∗∗ .637∗ 
(.11) (.12) (.12) (.13) (.20) (.22) (.22) (.26) 
Week FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Industry FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trend ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 555274 555274 555274 521323 546348 546348 546348 512375 
R2 .909 .909 .909 .905 .864 .865 .865 .858 
Table C.9 Ukraine-EU Trade and Trade Policy Uncertainty, 2013-2014: Weekly Data. The table shows the impact of uncertainty on 
intermediate and capital goods with different levels of tariff protection, between 2013 and 2014. The dependent variable is the log of 
firm i’s exports/imports of product k to/from EU country j in week t, using only intermediate and capital goods. pEU captures the 
likelihood of Ukraine signing the EU FTA. pCU capture the likelihood of Ukraine joining the CU with Russia. ln(1 + τMFN ), ln(1 + τUKR), 
and ln(1 + τCU ) are the current EU MFN tariffs vis-a-vis Ukrainian exports, current Ukrainian MFN tariffs, and tariffs under the Russian 
Customs Union, respectively. All models include firm-destination-HS4 product fixed effects. The models 2 and 6 add industry- and 
region fixed effects and models 3 and 7 add a time trend. The models 4 and 8 exclude Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. Notes: + p<0.10 * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. 
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Base +Ind&Reg +Trend -C/D/L Base +Ind&Reg +Trend -C/D/L 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Exports Exports Exports Exports Imports Imports Imports Imports 
ln(1 + τEU ) -.170 -.160 -.160 -.169 
(.18) (.19) (.19) (.20) 
ln(1 + τEU ) × pEU−HP -.083 -.093 -.093 -.148 
(.36) (.35) (.35) (.37) 
ln(1 + τUKR) -.565∗ -.563∗ -.563∗ -.562∗ 
(.24) (.24) (.24) (.25) 
ln(1 + τUKR) × pEU−HP 1.819∗∗ 1.814∗∗ 1.814∗∗ 1.852∗∗ 
(.50) (.50) (.50) (.52) 
ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR )) .583∗∗ .577∗∗ .577∗∗ .611∗∗ 
(.21) (.21) (.21) (.22) 
ln((1 + τCU )/(1 + τUKR )) × pCU−HP -2.755∗∗ -2.714∗∗ -2.714∗∗ -2.845∗∗ 
(.71) (.71) (.71) (.74) 
pCU−HP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
pEU−HP 2.859∗∗ 2.889∗∗ 2.889∗∗ 3.093∗∗ 3.417∗ 3.406∗ 3.406∗ 3.478∗ 
(1.08) (1.08) (1.08) (1.12) (1.37) (1.37) (1.37) (1.42) 
TFP .081 .082 .082 .082 .458∗∗ .505∗∗ .505∗∗ .496∗∗ 
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.13) (.14) (.14) (.14) 
ln(empl) .180+ .138 .138 .208 .699∗∗ .651∗∗ .651∗∗ .639∗ 
(.11) (.12) (.12) (.13) (.20) (.23) (.23) (.26) 
Week FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Industry FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Trend ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 555274 555274 555274 521323 546348 546348 546348 512375 
R2 .909 .909 .909 .905 .865 .865 .865 .858 
Table C.10 Ukraine-EU Trade and Trade Policy Uncertainty (HP-Filtered), 2013-2014: Weekly Data. The table shows the impact 
of uncertainty on intermediate and capital goods with different levels of tariff protection, between 2013 and 2014. The dependent 
variable is the log of firm i’s exports/imports of product k to/from EU country j in week t, using only intermediate and capital goods, 
using HP-filtered versions of the uncertainty measures. pEU captures the likelihood of Ukraine signing the EU FTA. pCU capture the 
likelihood of Ukraine joining the CU with Russia. ln(1 + τMFN ), ln(1 + τUKR), and ln(1 + τCU ) are the current EU MFN tariffs vis-a-vis 
Ukrainian exports, current Ukrainian MFN tariffs, and tariffs under the Russian Customs Union, respectively. All models include 
firm-destination-HS4 product fixed effects. The models 2 and 6 add industry- and region fixed effects and models 3 and 7 add a time 
trend. The models 4 and 8 exclude Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. Notes: + p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered 
by firm are in parentheses. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
Motivated by new theories and empirical evidence about the importance 
of firms in politics and the economy, this dissertation explored the role of 
firms in two key research areas in International and Comparative Political 
Economy: individual preference formation and the role of institutions for 
reducing trade policy uncertainty. The dissertation aimed to answer the 
following research questions: 
1.	 Do political preferences of employees align with those of their employ­
ers? 
2.	 Under what conditions do political preferences of employees align 
with those of their employers? 
3. How does policy uncertainty affect firm-level trade? 
I draw on micro-level data from firm and employee political donations 
and firm-product-level trade to examine the micro-foundations of important 
IPE theories and contribute to our understanding of preference formation 
and the role of institutions and uncertainty for international trade. Ex­
isting work on preference formation and the uncertainty-reducing role of 
international institutions provides a well-developed theoretical toolkit that 
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most often takes countries or sectors as the theoretical and empirical unit 
of analysis. However, this is at odds with new data which highlights large 
productivity differences between corporations and heterogeneity in the 
distributional consequences of economic or policy shocks across firms (Kim 
and Osgood, 2019). Moreover, even though existing work on preference 
formation and institutions, either implicitly or explicitly, theorizes along 
individual’s firm of employment (Owen and Johnston, 2017; Walter, 2017) 
or the expectations of firms with regards to trade institutions (Hollyer and 
Rosendorff, 2012; Kucik, 2012; Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2008a), the firm is 
usually ignored in empirical analyses following these discussions. In prac­
tice, key variables are measured at sectoral or country-level, and theoretical 
models assume homogeneous impacts along those levels of analyses.1 
This happens in part because collecting original firm level data is inher­
ently difficult, due to its large and unstructured nature. For instance, the 
US campaign finance data used for the first two papers of this dissertation 
contain over 62 million transactions between 1980 and 2018, over 4.2 million 
unique employer names, and over 880,000 occupation names. As described 
above, neither employers or occupations have unique identifiers. Therefore, 
I developed a script to link employers and occupations to unique IDs, im­
plemented in the programming language python. Due to the size of the 
data, I ran the script on a high-performance computer cluster and matched 
it to firm, industry, and occupation codes. This allowed the aggregation to 
different levels of observation and the subsequent analysis of firm-employee 
political alignment. Similarly, firm-level trade data is often only provided 
1For the few exceptions see Na-Kyung Lee and Liou (2019) and Hertel-Fernandez (2018) 
for individual preferences, and Handley and Limao (2015) as well as Handley (2014) for 
the impact of trade policy uncertainty on firm exports. Recent contributions relying on 
granular product-level data (but not firm-level data) on international trade are Kim, Liao 
and Imai (2019) and Chaudoin, Kucik and Pelc (2016). 
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by national governments, and data protection laws require the use of anony­
mous IDs and coarse geographical indicators (Bernard et al., 2018; Kim and 
Osgood, 2019). This means that one can usually not match firm-specific 
political variables or geographic variables of interest to the data, such as 
firm-specific political connections or constituency-level election outcomes. 
In the last paper of this dissertation, we circumvented this problem by 
combining a time-series measure of uncertainty with granular product-level 
tariff data to estimate the impact of uncertainty swings on the firm based on 
those firms’ traded products.2 As the use of large-scale administrative data 
becomes more and more common in the social sciences, these problems are 
not unique to the projects in this dissertation (Grimmer, 2015). Thus, this 
thesis also highlights the challenges in working with and generating data at 
the level of the firm. 
6.1 Implications and Future Research 
The remainder of this chapter discusses the main findings of this thesis and 
their implications for future research. The results and the original data will 
lay the groundwork for a new research agenda on corporations and politics 
which focuses on the political activities of firms and their employees. Within 
this broad agenda, I will investigate further the alignment between firms 
and their employees, and use new firm-level data to answer long-standing 
questions on the political economy of trade and money in politics. Further, 
this future work will address the limitations of this thesis with regards to 
causal identification, representativeness of country cases, and measurement 
of key concepts. 
2This is similar to the approach taken by Baccini, Pinto and Weymouth (2017) or Handley 
and Limao (2015). 
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6.1.1 Firm-Employee Alignment and Business Coalitions 
In the first two papers, I study when employees align politically with their 
company. While there is an ongoing debate on the impact of one’s firm, 
sector, or occupation on individual preferences, there is no clear consensus 
with regards to which one is more important. Moreover, existing studies 
rely on stated preferences of employees, and usually study either firm 
or individual preferences in isolation. Therefore, I leverage campaign 
contributions data from US firms and their employees between 2003 and 
2016 to compare firm and employee preferences. I find that employees in 
firms and sectors with more specific assets are more aligned politically, on 
average, but I find no impact of occupational skill specificity on alignment. 
Further, I show that more employee donations flow to candidates that their 
company PAC supports in the same electoral cycle. This hints towards a 
possible mechanism by which firms could signal their preferred candidates 
to employees, providing a link between firm and employee donations visible 
in the aggregate data. The findings have three broad implications for the 
study of preference formation, coalitions, and money in politics. 
First, this has crucial implications for coalition formation and societal 
cleavages. Given the empirical fragmentation of partisan donations across 
firms, broad class-based cleavages across sectors as described by Rogowski 
(1989) seem unlikely in the US economy of today.3 However, the clustering of 
high firm-employee alignment in some sectors of the US economy could also 
indicate that those firms are more likely to form ad-hoc coalitions or become 
politically active via umbrella associations such as the National Association 
3Hiscox (2002a) already noted the modern day US would be characterized by high asset 
specificity, and hence, by sector-based coalitions. Hall and Soskice (2001b) also describe 
the US skill formation system as firm-centered, compared to sector-based models in 
coordinated market economies. 
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of Manufacturers or the American Chamber of Commerce (Hansen, Mitchell 
and Drope, 2005). 
In future work, I want to build on these findings and investigate the 
impact of firm- and sector-level alignment on coalition formation and corpo­
rate political activities. This is especially interesting because the impact of 
alignment is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, corporations with 
politically homogeneous top management might be more likely to be con­
nected in ideologically extreme associations like the American Legislative 
and Exchange Council (Hertel-Fernandez, 2016), and could be more likely 
to engage in joint lobbying with similar companies. Connections and prefer­
ence alignment between CEOs could thus be an important mechanism for 
coalition formation between firms and for overcoming barriers to collective 
political action.4 On the other hand, very homogeneous firms might actually 
be less likely to form coalitions because they could face more difficulties to 
cooperate with firms which follow a more moderate strategy and split dona­
tions equally between parties (La Raya and Schaffner, 2015). I would expect 
the latter to be more prominent on cross cutting policies requiring more 
compromise between both sides of the political aisle. In any case, I want to 
improve the measure of alignment so that it does not only reflect candidate 
donations. For example, employees might express their political views by 
donating to PACs of sectoral umbrella organizations such as the National 
Association of Manufacturers (NAM), occupational associations such as the 
National Association for Realtors (NAR), membership organizations such 
as Americans for Prosperity, or their company PAC, all of which might 
provide important information about employee preferences. In addition, 
4This channels seems particularly relevant considering the important impact role of chief 
executive’s ideology and donations for company strategy and performance documented 
in Management and Economics (Cohen et al., 2019; Fremeth, Richter and Schaufele, 2013; 
Gupta, Nadkarni and Mariam, 2019; Unsal, Hassan and Zirek, 2016). 
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clusters of firms or employees donating to similar committees could be 
identified using dynamic clustering algorithms (Kim, Liao and Imai, 2019). 
Hence, I could track politically alike firms over time, observing changes in 
cluster composition and likely coalitions. I can then add corporate lobbying 
data and analyze the impact of alignment and cluster composition on joint 
lobbying on bills or policies over time. This research would contribute to 
both our understanding of political cleavages within and across sectors 
(Hiscox, 2002b; Kim, 2017), as well as the development and durability of 
business coalitions in American Politics (Hertel-Fernandez, 2016; Martin 
and Swank, 2012). 
6.1.2 Firms, Sectors, and Occupations as Preference Sources 
Second, the finding that sectoral and firm specificity matter more for align­
ment than occupations suggests that where individuals work matters more 
for alignment than what they do. While this goes against recent IPE and 
CPE research which highlights occupations as a main source of political 
preferences (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014; Owen and Johnston, 2017; Walter, 
2017), it could hint towards important differences between stated prefer­
ences and political action. The economic drivers of individuals who have 
already decided to become politically active might just be different from the 
economic correlates of individual stated preferences on topics such as free 
trade, which have been studied at length (Kuo and Naoi, 2015), but shown 
to be unstable (Guisinger, 2009; Rho and Tomz, 2017) and susceptible to 
framing (Naoi and Kume, 2015). These findings also suggest that where 
somebody works deserves much more attention in the study of money 
in US politics than is currently the case. Rather than treating individual 
donors as mostly ideologically motivated (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and 
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Snyder, 2003; Barber, 2016; Bonica, 2016a), this dissertation builds on work 
highlighting the strategic nature of individual giving (Barber, Canes-Wrone 
and Thrower, 2017; Fremeth, Richter and Schaufele, 2013; Gimpel, Lee and 
Pearson-merkowitz, 2008), and provides motivation to further study the 
economic motivations for individual giving. Thus, the dataset on matched 
firm-employee donations provides an opportunity to study the importance 
of firm-, occupation, or sectoral characteristics on political preferences in 
the form of donations to unions, membership- and trade associations, and 
political candidates. 
One particular interesting future project would be to link long-term 
structural changes in the US economy to individual and corporate cam­
paign donations. One of the most notable changes is the rise of ‘superstar’ 
firms (Bernard et al., 2018; Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008) and the increase 
in economic concentration and market power (Azar, Marinescu and Stein­
baum, 2017; De Loecker, Eckhout and Unger, 2018). Since the 1980s, average 
markups of firms have risen from 21 percent to over 60 percent above 
marginal cost, with large variations across different sectors of the economy. 
These changes might have affected the composition of political donations 
over time. Using the methodology of De Loecker and Eckhout (2018) to 
measure market power of US publicly traded companies between 1980 and 
today, the linked campaign finance data allows to answer whether changes 
in market power have equally led to increased concentration in PAC and 
individual donations from a few companies. In addition, the identifiers for 
individual occupations allow to evaluate whether an increase in concentra­
tion of employee donations would come from rank- and file employees or 
from top executives. While PAC contributions of firms are constrained by 
the strict limits on federal donations, individuals represent the largest share 
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of candidate’s contribution receipts.5 Employee donations could thus be 
another important resource for firms to exert political influence, in addition 
to other non-monetary resources like employee votes or brand reputation 
(Tripathi, Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2002). If correct, this would likely have 
implications for how market power might translate into political power of 
firms. Given the importance of campaign donations for politics in the US, 
this might also have consequences for the unequal representation of political 
interests in the US (Gilens and Page, 2014; Schlozman, Verba and Brady, 
2012) and beyond (Elsässer, Hense and Schäfer, 2018). 
A problem with existing databases on campaign donations is that they 
do not sufficiently differentiate between individuals’ sector and occupation 
of employment, or that both are lumped together, despite their key role in 
CPE, IPE, and Economics. In another future paper, I want to link occupa­
tion and industry codes to Congressional committees and subcommittees 
with jurisdiction about them. If individual donations are mostly driven by 
their firm, they should donate more to politicians which sit on committees 
regulating their sector. Conversely, if their donations are motivated by their 
occupation, they should donate more to committees overseeing their pro­
fession. I can then test the responsiveness of sector- or occupation-specific 
donations to legislators changing committee or subcommittee assignments. 
To strengthen causal identification, I can exploit quasi-random committee 
exiles of members of Congress to causally estimate the impact of sector-
or occupation regulating committees on individual donations (Powell and 
Grimmer, 2016). Case studies of particular sectoral and occupational at the 
federal level could be used to illustrate the links between jobs, legislator 
responsibilities, and donations. This work would go beyond similar work 
5Moreover, publicly traded companies employed almost 30 percent of US private sector 
employees in 2000 (Davis et al., 2006). 
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(Barber, Canes-Wrone and Thrower, 2017) by looking at all employees of 
publicly traded companies, by clearly differentiating between sectors and 
occupations of donors, and by analyzing both committees and subcommit­
tees assignments of legislators. Thus, I will be able to better analyze the 
relative importance of industries and professions for individual political 
preferences (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014; Owen and Johnston, 2017; Walter, 
2017), and equally contribute to the American Politics work on individual 
donor preferences (Barber, 2016; Barber, Canes-Wrone and Thrower, 2017). 
6.1.3 Political Economy of Trade and Uncertainty 
In the last paper, I investigate the impact of trade policy uncertainty on 
firm-level imports of intermediate and capital goods, using fine-grained 
Ukrainian firm-product-destination level trade data between 2004 and 2014. 
While existing work on trade and uncertainty highlights the role of insti­
tutions in decreasing uncertainty for corporations, most of the research 
abstracts from the firm and analyzes only very broad industries (Carnegie, 
2014) or the country-level (Hollyer and Rosendorff, 2012; Kucik, 2012; Mans­
field and Reinhardt, 2008a). As a consequence, this work essentially assumes 
away the distributional consequences of uncertainty reduction across firms 
in the same industry. We leverage the firm-product-destination-level data 
on Ukrainian firms between 2003 and 2014 to investigate how trading firms 
react to swings in uncertainty. Ukraine is a particularly interesting case to 
study political uncertainty because Ukrainian firms faced a highly unpre­
dictable trade policy, as the government was long undecided whether to 
integrate economically with Russia or the European Union. We find that 
reductions in uncertainty with regards to an FTA with the EU increases 
firm-level imports of intermediate in capital goods, but not for consumer 
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goods. Moreover, in line with our theoretical model, imports of goods which 
are more protected under the status quo (and hence, would benefit most 
from the EU FTA), expand more. 
These findings have important implications for research on firms in 
trade and trade politics, and the study of uncertainty in international trade. 
First, the lion share of the IPE work on uncertainty assumes that firms 
will uniformly welcome reductions in policy ambiguity (Mansfield and 
Reinhardt, 2008a), and that political leaders pursue FTAs because they are 
welfare-generating, on average (Hollyer and Rosendorff, 2012; Mansfield and 
Milner, 2012). In contrast, we show the clear distributional consequences of 
uncertainty reductions. Whether firms are affected by uncertainty crucially 
depends on the goods they trade and the trading partner, as well as the 
design of the prospective trade agreement (Dür, Baccini and Elsig, 2014). The 
use of aggregate, country-level, and un-directed trade flow data therefore 
provides only a partial and incomplete picture when analyzing the impact 
of uncertainty on trade. Moreover, non-trade issues such as intellectual 
property and foreign direct investment have been particularly contentious 
in the last years (Peel, Hornby and Sanderson, 2019; USTR, 2019). Therefore, 
future work could look more closely at specific uncertainty with regards to 
intellectual property intensive goods (Osgood and Feng, 2018; USTR, 2019), 
contract-intensive goods (Nunn, 2007), or trade in services (Weymouth, 
2017). Further, this paper illustrates a case in which firms rationally adjust 
their import behavior based on the negotiation status of trade agreements, 
even if the agreement has not been signed yet. Hence, we provide further 
micro-level evidence on how political institutions serve as anchors for the 
expectations of private actors (Broz and Plouffe, 2010). Moreover, the paper 
shows that globally integrated firms sourcing investment-intensive goods 
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from abroad are the main beneficiaries of uncertainty reduction via PTAs.6 
Thus, this research also contributes to broader work on how integration 
in global value chains promotes firm support for trade openness (Jensen, 
Quinn and Weymouth, 2015; Manger, 2009; Osgood, 2018). 
I want to extend this work on trade policy uncertainty to different 
countries and policy cases. A particularly interesting case to study the 
impact of uncertainty on business activitity is the United Kingdom’s 2016 
decision to exit the European Union. Compared to Ukraine, even more 
different trade policy options, between staying a fully-fledged member 
in the Common Market and a free trade agreement like the EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), are on the table, 
with particular political uncertainty about which can produce a majority 
in the British parliament. The exit from the EU is expected to have large 
negative effects on the British economy (Dhingra et al., 2017). Moreover, the 
uncertainty about the future of the UK-EU relationship has already been 
shown to affect overall UK growth (Born et al., 2019), as well as overall 
exports (Crowley, Exton and Han, 2019), and investment (Bloom, Chen 
and Mizen, 2019). With available high-quality firm-level data in the United 
Kingdom, I want to investigate the impact of trade policy uncertainty on 
firm-level trade and foreign direct investment in the UK. To improve on 
the measure of uncertainty employed in this thesis, I can imagine two 
alternative measurement strategies for trade policy uncertainty stemming 
from Brexit. First, I would add measures based on volatility of topics 
similar to the popular VIX index for expectations of stock market volatility 
(Whaley, 2009), rather than relative importance of topics. Second, I would 
also employ alternative dictionary approaches, incorporating synonyms 
6This point is related to the finding by Carnegie (2014) who finds that the World Trade 
Organization boosts trade in contract-intensive goods and fixed capital investment. 
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of uncertainty as in Baker, Bloom and Davis (2015), but more tailored 
towards the specific policies causing uncertainty. Alternatively, one could 
also use training sets of articles discussing political uncertainty in general 
and trade policy uncertainty in particular to classify documents in order to 
generate the uncertainty measure (Hassan et al., 2019). These bear the risk of 
introducing more researcher bias (King, Lam and Roberts, 2017), but could 
serve as alternative measures in addition to topic models whose performance 
could be compared against each other. This research would contribute to 
our understanding of the distributional consequences of uncertainty for 
firms’ international activities and extend the work of this dissertation to a 
particularly relevant case of policy uncertainty. 
Finally, I also want to investigate the impact of corporate influence on 
newly emerging protectionist trade policies in the United States. In 2018 
and 2019, the US government decided to put tariffs on imports of steel, alu­
minum, and many consumer products from China on the basis of security 
concerns. The tariffs have already negatively affected US consumers and 
import-dependent firms (Amiti, Redding and Weinstein, 2019), and while 
the tariffs have initially benefited industries in competitive districts impor­
tant for the Republican party (Fajgelbaum et al., 2019), retaliatory tariffs 
by foreign countries have targeted the same districts, offsetting positive 
vote gains for the Republicans (Fetzer and Schwarz, 2019). Importers of 
affected products can apply to the Department of Commerce (DoC) and 
the US International Trade Commission (USITC) to be exempted from the 
tariff and import-competing companies get the opportunity to argue against 
these exemptions. This represents a unique opportunity to observe both 
import-competing firms and importing firms within the same industry 
to mobilize politically. Thus, I will be able to investigate the impact of 
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between-firm differences on the likelihood of the DoC and USITC to grant 
protection or an exemption from protection. I expect that import-competing 
companies are more likely to prevent an exemption if they are located in 
strategically important swing districts. Moreover, I theorize that approval 
or denial of exemptions will further depend on prior political connections 
to the Republican party via campaign donations or lobbying. I will test this 
argument and hence, be able to determine which combination of corporate 
political strategies leads for protectionism to prevail over free trade and vice 
versa. This research contributes to the firm-level political economy of trade 
that looks at within-industry heterogeneity of political preferences (Kim, 
2017; Osgood, 2017b). It also adds to the under-researched lobbying of the 
executive branch (Hansen and Prusa, 1997; Ludema, Mayda and Mishra, 
2018; Webb Yackee and Webb Yackee, 2006) and how insulated executive 
agencies are from political influence (Weingast and Moran, 1983). 
6.2 Summary of Future Work and Outlook 
There are many reasons to keep study firms in IPE, CPE, and Political 
Economy more broadly. Firms are incredibly important actors in terms of 
donations and lobbying, and they provide the main source of an individual’s 
livelihood. Similarly, many empirical developments seem to consolidate 
the importance of firms for the future, such as the trends towards market 
and concentration, and labor market monopsomy. However, the lack of 
fine-grained data about firm’s political and economic activities has thus 
far prevented researchers to answer some of the most interesting questions 
related to firm’s involvement in the political process. 
213 6.2 Summary of Future Work and Outlook 
The newly available micro-level data on corporations will enable new 
research agenda on the role of firms in politics. This agenda includes the 
role of firms in shaping trade policy, the importance of political alignment 
between firms for the formation of business coalitions, and how much 
one’s workplace affects individual political attitudes. This work will have 
far-reaching implications for public policy, the workplace as a site of politics 
and preference formation, and for the role of international institutions in 
guiding international trade. I will be very glad to keep on contributing to 
this new and exciting research agenda with timely and relevant work on 
the role of firms in politics. 
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